Latin America Ronshu
Online ISSN : 2436-5572
Print ISSN : 0286-004X
ISSN-L : 0286-004X
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Volume 48
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  • On the Institutional Incentives Faced by Brazilian Civil Servants
    Mauricio S. Bugarin, Fernando B. Meneguin
    2014 Volume 48 Pages 1-21
    Published: 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 18, 2022
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.50978/laronshu.48.0_1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    The present paper analyzes the institutional incentives public managers face in Brazil. A decision-theoretic model suggests that the constitutional principle of “Legality” induces tenured civil servants to adopt a non-innovative, bureaucratic management style. Conversely, temporary appointed managers tend to be more active, which could either generate higher social returns, in the case of socially inclined managers, or lower social return, in the case of managers involved in corrupt activities. A brief econometric analysis from 2002 to 2011 suggests that Ministries with higher percentages of temporary appointed managers tend to have higher corruption levels. Then, the conclusion discusses how institutions could be adjusted in order to stimulate a socially desirable innovative management while curbing corrupt practices.

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