Over the past three decades social science has brought institutional change into focus. The debate on the transformation of the welfare state is part of it. Whether the welfare state has been dismantled or not under the impact of economic globalization in particular, that has been the question. In order to develop concepts to grasp overall the transformation of the welfare state, this paper examines, first, the concept of the great transformation, which was originally developed by Karl Polanyi and has been in recent years applied by Mark Blyth, Eiichi Kato, and others to the era of globalization since the 1980s. Blyth argues that Polanyi's double movement, which explains the great transformation and is defined as disembedding market (marketization) and labor's counter movement against it that uses state to protect themselves, is "the motor of institutional change," and that the contemporary neoliberal economic order can be seen as another double movement, but in reverse, which attempts once again to disembed market from society and to roll back the institution of the welfare state. Kato also defines globalization since the 1980s as another great transformation and argues that its essence is privatization, historical meaning of which is that it has functioned as a propelling power to dismantle the welfare state. Although there are many coinages for post-welfare state, Kato says that Neil Gilbert's "enabling state" best expresses a paradigm shift of state. While Kato's overall view, including his stage theory based on Kozo Uno's, is distinguished, I think that the competition state, which was originally developed by Philip G. Cerny and has been used by scholars such as Ronan Palan, Tore Fougner, and others, seems to be better concept than the enabling state, because the concept of the competition state expresses overall strategy of state and the zeitgeist in the era of globalization and includes the concept of the enabling state. Therefore, this paper examines, second, the concept, limitations and potential crises of the competition state. Furthermore, it takes a look at historically specific nature of "competition" in the era of globalization, which is pointed out by Fougner. Third, the transformation of the French welfare state is examined. The French political economy, which had been characterized by dirigisme (state interventionism), has changed rapidly into a market-oriented one since the mid-1980s. According to Jonah D. Levy, however, the French state has not rolled back and in fact its interventionism has redeployed in social policy. The French welfare state has undergone structural changes as Bruno Palier points out and its roll has been converted to market-supporting one. According to Levy, the dirigist state has become the social anesthesia state. Vivian A. Schmidt says that the welfare state increasingly takes a back seat to the competitve state. I think that just as the night-watchman state was subsumed under the welfare state, the welfare state has been subsumed under the competition state.

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I understand that the capitalism (including mercantilist state capitalism, liberal state capitalism, and imperialist state capitalism) before First World War is a classical capitalism and that the capitalism after the end of Second World War is welfare state capitalism. I think that about 40 years from the WW I to the end of WW II is a historical transition period from classical capitalism to welfare state capitalism. Each state in capitalist countries became welfare state as welfare nationalist state during the WW I, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and WW II, but it lacked the cooperation mechanism of each other. Consequently, it did not form stable welfare state capitalism as a world-historic stage of development. The Pax Americana after WW II created a world hegemonic order in which welfare state capitalism in advanced countries of the West could develop with stability. With the conclusion of hostilities, New Deal liberal ideology had been undermined. During WW II, the government had served certain dominant interests at the expense of those less powerful. Through the functions of wartime economy, the large corporations concentrated their power. Although the labor movement had been vastly expanded in size, unions proved to be no match for business. This balance of power precluded any consistent social-democratic trend for the American political economy. This characteristic of the state of the United States after WW II had a great influence on the other countries' welfare state through various channels. These channels included the Breton Woods system, the Marshall Plan, other foreign aid, and military aid. The influence that Washington exerted through foreign aid in most of Europe could be imposed in West German and Japan. As a result, welfare state of many countries became less social democratic under Pax Americana. As a security system, American ascendancy had to have a military and strategic component. The United States became the linchpin of the North Atlantic Alliance. British, Canadians, and other allies shared the military burden. The United States coordinated an international set of military commitments. It won the principle that every ally would set aside a continuing share of national revenue for defense. Military spending and welfare spending came together to form the core of state allocations in the post-war era. The forty-year period of crisis was settled when the United States and Soviet Union finally displaced both the old imperial leader, Great Britain, and the ambitious challengers of the two world wars, Germany and Japan. At the level of domestic politics, the ideological clashes between Marxist socialist or communism on the left and an authoritarian nationalism or fascism on the right, also had to be successfully resolved with some sort of truce. The formation of the welfare state system as an international system under American hegemony was the product of a compromise. This compromise or social agreement had a historic significance. The political coalitions of welfare state in the West included working class representatives as well as spokesman for such conservative forces as industrial capital or the church. It added a new page to the history of capitalism.

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Japanese social security system, which was set up after the Second World War, has expanded over the past half century and changed gradually with the transformation of Japanese economy and society. Its aims have changed from those that cope with unemployment and poverty to those that deal with declining birth rate and aging society, and its policies from measures to reduce the poor to measures to manage the middle classes. As a result, its characteristic has changed from low-welfare and low-taxation to high-welfare and high-taxation. While against the trend toward high-welfare and high-taxation reforms of social security system have taken place to return to low-welfare and low-taxation, its attempts have failed and high-welfare and high-taxation have taken root. We can understand the meaning of these changes of social security system in terms of its relation to capitalism as follows: social security system has been transformed from a system of temporary decommodification to deal temporarily with the poor youth who can commodify their labor-power, which means low-welfare and low-taxation, to a system of permanent decommodification to manage the aged who can not commodify their labor-power, which means high-welfare and high-taxation. The transformation of social security system from the temporary to the permanent like this might be grasped as meaning de-capitalism rather than decommodification.

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Since the late of 1990s, most countries have developed a wide range of policies on childcare services, care leaves and flexible working hours. In 2000s, the term of "work-life balance" was introduced and has been used by Government and by the academic community with very little discussion of its meaning in comparison with the use and promotion of "work-family balance". Firstly, this paper explores the meaning of introduction of this term "work-life balance" and reason for it, and its significance at the family policy level. Second, the the author try to investigate the historical status of welfare state retrenchment, i. e. "welfare contractualism", which concludes individualism and marketism. Third, the meaning of the paradigm shift of German family policy in terms of transformation of welfare state regime is investigated. The author find that the sharing of unpaid care work at home between women and men is the cornerstone of "work/family/life balance" policies.

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The heterogeneity of firms was not one principal theme in the theory of the firm, in particular for the neoclassical theory of the firm that supposes the universal firm model to maximize the profit. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to introduce a theoretical issue about the heterogeneity of firms in the theory of the firm. For this purpose, firstly we pay attention to the institutionalist theory of the firm, for example VOC and SSP. Derived from the analysis of the variety of capitalism, the institutionalist theory of the firm considers that the institutional environment in which the firm operates conditions the strategy and organizational structure of the firm. That is, the institutionalist theory insists that a particular institutional environment shapes a particular firm model, so called a national representative firm model. In the consequence, we have the variety of national representative firm models in the world. In this respect, the institutionalist theory plays an important role to reexamine the universal firm model as one best way and to introduce the heterogeneity of firms taking account of the variety of capitalisms. Against the institutionalist theory based on the national representative firm model that means the homogenization of firms in one institutional environment, the Regulation theory aims to put out the coexistence of heterogeneous firms in one institutional environment or in one country. But, in fact, the principal domain of the Regulation theory is the macroeconomic analysis, because the original issue was to analyze the crisis of capitalism, while there were some researches on the firm (MTR1) by regulationists. In this context, the analysis of firms is becoming one domain in the Regulation Theory with the theory of productive models developed in GERPISA that shows the variety of productive models both in the world and in one country. Introducing the theory of productive models, the Regulation Theory is changing its theoretical point of view on the analysis of firm, that is to say from MTR1 to MTR2. While MTR1 proposed implicitly or explicitly a national representative firm model like the institutionalist theory, MTR2 aims to reexamine a representative firm model and to analyze comparatively firms taking account of the heterogeneity of firms both in the world and in a country. From these points of the heterogeneity, in conclusion we will talk about the Japanese firm model that we find often in textbooks on Economics and Management. They proposed a representative Japanese firm model, for example J-firm model by Comparative Institutional Analysis, and also analyzed the Japanese firm as if all Japanese firms have same characteristics concerning Cross-shareholding, On-the-Job-Training system, Main bank system, etc. Moreover, speaking frankly we regarded the representative Japanese firm model as Toyota System Production or Toyota model. But, as mentioned the theory of productive models, Honda shapes its original firm model comprised by "innovation and flexibility" profit strategy and "Honda (productive) model", while Toyota is characterized by "permanent reduction in costs" strategy and "Toyota (productive) model". Then, in this article we would like to introduce an issue of the heterogeneity of firms in the theory of the firm and show a methodological or theoretical basis towards the analysis of the heterogeneity of firms in terms of the Institutionaliste theory, particularly the Regulation Theory.

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J. Schmpeter once explained depictively the accumulation process of capital focusing on entrepreneur and banker. Its formal modeling and analysis has long been a question. The reason is the difficulty of modeling which grasps the essential characteristics of both real and financial sectors, while keeping the system to be operative. We make up such a model and analyze the instability of balanced growth path with "Harrod-Okishio" type investment function and M. Kalecki type bank lending function. The main results are as the followings: 1. In temporary equilibrium, if the rate of investment increases, interests rate rises, bank loan increases, its profit increases and its rising rate accelerates. 2. On medium term equilibrium path, the higher the saving rate is, the higher the growth rate is, the higher the rates of profit of both sector rise, the higher the interests rate is, and the higher the rate of monetary sector to real sector rises. 3. The balanced growth path with "Harrod-Okishio" type, which is generally said to be instable, becomes stable, if its steady growth rate is higher and the elasticity of interests to lending is high enough. This is because, as the share of interests in total profit reacts sensitively to the change of investment rate in disequilibria, the realized profit rate of real sector does not react positively to the rate of investment rate. 4. The conclusion of 3 is based on the linear approximation around the neighborhood of equilibrium. So, this does not exclude upward stability and downward instability of the system as a whole. But, on the contrary, taking account of the non-linear credit cost function, it suggests the opposite.

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of interactive service work and clarify the methods of controlling interactive service workers. Because of the distinctiveness of interactive service work in that the object of labor is customers, the labor process consists of triangle relations of managers, workers and customers, and not of binary relations of managers and workers in the manufacturing work. In the triangle relations, each party concerned seeks their own gains. Conflicts of interests, which are not observed in the manufacturing sector, then emerge. Because customers are supposed to have customer sovereignty in the interactive service work, managers and workers face dilemmas in dealing with the customers to provide services effectively and at the same time maintain the myth of customer sovereignty. To control interactive service workers, managers then face such difficulties as variability of customers, openness of the labor process, impossibility of monitoring the labor process, insufficiency in measuring of workers' performances, and making workers exercise their own initiative and discretion. These difficulties are based on the necessity to realize both providing services effectively and maintaining the myth of customer sovereignty. Methods to overcome these difficulties of labor control are monitoring via new technologies, labor control via customers, developing customer-orientated attitudes of workers, empowerment of workers, and ideological control in workers' self-management. Methods to control interactive labor process mentioned above can be characterized as a conjunction of, what Andrew Freedman noted, direct control strategy and responsible autonomy strategy. Managers then face a contradiction to implement two opposite strategies, one to allow workers discretion and autonomy and the other not to allow them. A possibility for workers to resist managers' labor control strategies emerges from this contradiction. Namely, by making use of the rhetoric of customer sovereignty which is stressed by the management in responsible autonomy strategy, workers can force the management to mitigate direct control strategy as appropriate customer services would not be provided under direct control.

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As described herein, the Kaleckian growth model microfoundation was produced. Ikeda (2006) pointed out similarity between the Kaleckian model and the New-Keynesian imperfection theory. Although he produced the Kaleckian model a microfoundation on a mark-up price setting and saving function, he gave it no Kaleckian feature that increased monopoly power decreases the growth rate. It has no an autonomous investment function. Therefore increased monopoly power increases saving, which increases investment. This paper introduces investment determination considering the growth rate of demand expectation reported by Adachi (2000). We follow Adachi (2000), which derived an investment function of the imperfect firm. Thereby, we obtain Kaleckian's particular result. The microfoundation is on Post-Keynesian streams, which value the reality of economic models based on the following points. (1) Animal spirits, which are not reduced to probabilistic expectation, determine investment. (2) Development of a credit system occurs behind the autonomous investment function. (3) The economy is on a dynamic transition path. The three points described above differ from Neo-Classical assumptions. Neo-Classicism adopts no subjective expectation such as animal spirits and subsumes that saving determines investment. It also tends to value the equilibrium state when it discusses the economy. Adopting the "ad hoc" assumption that consumption is done using only wage income, we produce no microfoundation of our entire model to assert the importance of an autonomous investment function. However, the assumption is useful when considering the relation between income distribution and the macro-economy. Although Post-Keynesian is often criticized for its lack of a microfoundation, the point is not whether a microfoundation exists but if the assumption is realistic. The Post-Keynesian school can explain the real economy despite that criticism. This paper's main point is that autonomous investment is necessary when we consider the microfoundation of the Kaleckian growth model.

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