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  • 湯澤 武
    アジア研究
    2017年 63 巻 4 号 39-57
    発行日: 2017/10/31
    公開日: 2017/12/14
    ジャーナル フリー

    Since the mid-1990s, in the face of the growing deterioration of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has taken the initiative to build regional maritime rules in the aim of promoting conflict prevention and management mechanisms. Their efforts have successfully resulted in the emergence of a number of regional rules involving China. Some of the most notable examples are the Declaration on Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, the guidelines for the implementation of the DOC in 2011, and the framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) in 2017. However, in recent years, as competition amongst clamant countries has intensified, the infringement of the DOC has become an increasingly common phenomenon at sea. This is evinced by China’s massive reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands, as well as the strengthening of existing facilities on their occupied islands and shoals on the part of other claimant countries; these include the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. With the weakening credibility of the DOC, in 2013 ASEAN and China agreed to commence drafting the COC. However, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of ASEAN’s initiative is to produce an enforceable binding code of conduct, the framework of the COC fails to specify the phrase “legally binding”, mainly due to China’s opposition. These recent developments raise serious doubts between regional observers about the credibility of ASEAN’s managerial role in the South China Sea disputes.

    Against this backdrop, the article seeks to illuminate the efficacy and limitations of ASEAN’s rule-making initiatives in the South China Sea. Structurally, the article is split into four section. The first section focuses on analyzing the main features of ASEAN’s approach to the rule-making in the South China Sea. The second section engages a historical investigation of ASEAN’s actual diplomacy in the processes of rule-making. The analysis is divided into four phases; 1) ASEAN’s initial diplomacy (1990–1995), 2) the conclusion of the DOC (1998–2002), 3) the making of the guidelines for the implementation for the DOC (2004–2011) and 4) negotiations over the framework of the COC (2012–2017). Based on the above analysis, the article then elucidates the utilities and limitations of ASEAN’s rule-making diplomacy. It is argued that while the “ASEAN way” of rule-making has made significant contributions to the development of conflict prevention measures and the promotion of “self-restraint” behavior among the claimants to some extent by ensuring their long-term commitment to the rule-making processes, it has nonetheless created problems of “definitional vagueness” and “decoupling”. As the power gaps between ASEAN states and China have rapidly grown, these weaknesses that are inherent in ASEAN’s rule-making diplomacy have become more prominent. The concluding section discusses the prospects for the politics of the rule-making in the South China Sea.

  • 森 巧
    史学雑誌
    2012年 121 巻 11 号 1957-1958
    発行日: 2012/11/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 広中 一成
    史学雑誌
    2012年 121 巻 11 号 1956-1957
    発行日: 2012/11/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 庄司 智孝
    アジア研究
    2017年 63 巻 4 号 24-38
    発行日: 2017/10/31
    公開日: 2017/12/14
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper explores territorial disputes in the South China Sea by comparing the approaches of the Philippines and Vietnam. The analysis centers on a) the process of approximating the two countries’ approaches; b) conditions on which to differentiate the two countries’ relationship with the South China Sea policy; and c) mutual interactions between the two countries, as evidenced through both the ASEAN mechanism and bilateral relations. The concept of “hedging” is employed in order to achieve equilibrium when considering their external relations.

    In 2012, Philippino President Aquino reinforced a confrontational stance toward China, during a stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. This stance included the strengthening of the Philippino-U.S. military alliance and emphasized the utilization of international arbitration. However, the subsequent Duterte administration completely changed Aquino’s approach by engaging in bilateral talks with China, and eroding the Philippines’ cooperation with the U.S. The Philippines shifted from a strong hedge to a weaker one.

    Vietnam had adopted a policy of “omnidirectional military diplomacy” to address the South China Sea, reinforcing cooperative ties with all external players, including China. However, the 2014 oil-rig incident revealed the limited effect of “omnidirectional military diplomacy.” Since this incident, Vietnam pursues a strengthened relationship with the U.S., while continuing to keep ties with China. Vietnam has been shifting from a weak hedge to a stronger one. In this regard, the hedging strategies of the Philippines and Vietnam continue to approach that of the other.

    The differences of approach between the two countries stem from differences in preconditions regarding relations with the U.S. and China. The Philippines has long been a U.S. military ally, whereas Vietnam’s foreign policy has emphasized maintaining a stable relationship with China. Vietnam also has pursued its strategic independence by promoting an “omnidirectional military diplomacy” with all major players in the region, including the U.S. and Japan. Domestically, the Philippines’ foreign policy changes greatly with a change in administration, while Vietnam’s basic stance in external relations is relatively consistent, regardless of any changes to its political leadership. Furthermore, as the Philippines, under President Duterte, prefers a reconciliatory attitude toward China, Vietnam, still strongly critical of China, might be “isolated” within ASEAN.

  • 野澤 基恭
    法政論叢
    2019年 55 巻 1 号 145-
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2019/04/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 国分 良成
    アジア研究
    2015年 60 巻 4 号 51-55
    発行日: 2015/04/06
    公開日: 2015/04/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 益尾 知佐子
    アジア研究
    2017年 63 巻 4 号 5-23
    発行日: 2017/10/31
    公開日: 2017/12/14
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper analyzes the development process and future direction of China’s South China Sea (SCS) policy, focusing on the organizational history of its State Oceanic Administration (SOA) that oversees the maritime administration under the State Council. Most previous studies on China have examined the SCS issue from a diplomatic, if not military, perspective. However, coastal states, in general, take two kinds of approach toward the disputed maritime zones they lay claim to. Recognizing the not-yet-demarked status of the disputed water, the international approach respects other claimants’ potential rights and seeks to control frictions in a cooperative manner before permanent delimitation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs often carries this responsibility in domestic bureaucracy. The second approach, that is, the domestic approach puts higher priority on establishing effective control over the disputed water, by exclusively strengthening their administration against other states. In China, the SOA has devoted itself to this mission for decades, aiming to protect China’s maritime rights but only won recognition from central leaders after 2006.

    The paper solves two puzzles regarding external Chinese behaviors. First, it answers why Chinese leaders shifted from a cooperative SCS policy to an aggressive one, using paramilitary forces belonging to the SOA in mid-2000. Chinese leaders first allowed SOA to initiate a regular patrolling system over the disputed water of the East China Sea in the summer of 2006, considering the soaring anti-Japanese nationalism in domestic society. Supported by the People’s Liberation Army Navy, SOA used the opportunity to expand the patrolling system over all of Chinese “jurisdiction water” the next year. Second, it reveals why China began reclamation of seven disputed maritime features in Spratly Islands in mid-2010. Given the tailwind of the domestic politics, SOA successfully achieved the legislation of “Island Protection Law” in 2009 that enabled it to establish administrative measures to enhance island control. Cooperating with the military authorized to manage offshore islands in the Chinese domestic system, SOA stepped forward to prepare reclamation plans to consolidate Chinese presence in the SCS.

    Unlike Hu Jintao administration that was vulnerable to the domestic criticism and therefore accepted SOA’s proposals without much consideration, Xi Jinping tightened his control over the SOA. He continues to prioritize the domestic approach, but aims at not raising international tension over maritime issues. The SOA was given the new task of establishing Maritime Silk Road under his initiative. Regarding the SCS, China is trying to find a way to make other claimants respect its rising influence by providing economic carrots to them in the new scheme, in the near future.

  • 齊藤 孝弘
    国際情報研究
    2015年 12 巻 1 号 3-14
    発行日: 2015/12/25
    公開日: 2015/12/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper will ask how Japan should go about establishing a favorable national security environment, and Will consider this through an analysis of Japan’s role in the process. First of all, it will focus on the East China Sea’s Senkaku Islands, while examining China’s maritime expansion and shifting American strategies. From there it will analyze the transformation of the security environment. Next, Japan’s response to the changing security environment in East Asia will be considered, along with the government’s approval of recourse to the right of collective defense. And Finally, attention will be paid to the influence Japan has had on setting up the Security Consultative Committee (known as 2-puls-2) with other major world powers, paving the way to establishing a new security environment.
  • 福田 潤一
    国際政治
    2017年 2017 巻 186 号 186_159-186_168
    発行日: 2017/01/30
    公開日: 2017/04/07
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡部 達味
    国際政治
    1997年 1997 巻 114 号 42-56,L8
    発行日: 1997/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    After the decline of the Western industrial civilization becomes clear, some people will try to find a new answer in Asian civilization, notably in China's tradition and experiences. This attempt, to my mind, is difficult to achieve in the near future.
    Modern China has not been and will not be in a position to offer an “alternative paradigm” to save human beings from difficulties arising from modernity, because China has followed the Western and Japanese paths of modernization. From the 19th century on, they have been humiliated by their national disaster of being subordinated to the developed nations in the West and even to Japan. Therefore, they have been trying to catch up and surpass the advanced West. The means they adopted in this process were quite modern in the Western sense. Especially in the field of international relations, where they have felt national humiliation most clearly, they have tried to emulate the Powers in the 19th century and early 20th century. For that reason, they are most classically “realistic” in their approach to this rapidly changing world.
    They tend to stick to power politics with military power as the main source of “power.” They are strict over non-intervention in internal affairs of other sovereign nations. They try to build a homogeneous nation out of the old Qing Empire. Thus, the perception gaps between Chinese images of their place in the world and their deserved future place in the 21st century, on one hand, and the changing and groping world, on the other.
    So far as the main trend in this direction continues, it is difficult to imagine that we can find a new source of desirable future image of the world in China's experience. Rather, when the world is changing, China will become a conservative factor in the way of a possible transformation.
    It is neccesary, therefore, to integrate the country into the changing international society, before we can expect a new contribution from China.
  • 荒木 一視
    経済地理学年報
    2013年 59 巻 1 号 163-167
    発行日: 2013/03/30
    公開日: 2017/05/19
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 吉田 直正
    法政論叢
    2000年 36 巻 2 号 67-76
    発行日: 2000/05/15
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Philippine became independent on the 4^<th> of July in 1946. But the independence day of Philippine is the 12^<th> of June. On this day in 1898 they declared independence of Spain, so they celebrated the centennial anniversary of its independence the year before last. During the first half of the century, Philippine had been a colonial of the United Stats of America and during the second half of the century, the relationship between the two countries has been good. The three Constitutions enforced meanwhile were severely influenced by America. In 1992 the bases of US troops were withdrawn from Philippine. Up to then, the largest bases of Asia had been in Philippine. This history occurs us a strong resemblance between Philippine and our country. From the point of view we'll make a survey the history of the Philippine Constitutions.
  • 加藤 美保子
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2005年 2005 巻 34 号 88-100
    発行日: 2005年
    公開日: 2010/05/31
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this article is to examine Russia's motives and the process of its entry into the Asia-Pacific regional cooperation in the political and security area. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been evolving its multilateral diplomacy in this region. Today Russia participates in not only the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Six-Party Talks, but also the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) . In post-cold war Asia Pacific, ASEAN's Forums which respect the consensus and the voluntarism and lead the regional cooperation mechanism coexist with the traditional bilateral alliances between the United States and the countries of the region. Some of the most compelling studies have explained Russia's heightened interest in the Asia Pacific in the latter half of the 1990s from the viewpoint of NATO enlargement. This interest, however, should also be examined in the context of the political and economic relations between Russia and the Asia Pacific countries. This paper focuses on Russia's political relations with ASEAN.
    First, the direction toward stressing multilateral institutions has roots in Gorbachev's diplomatic concept. Pre-Gorbachev Soviet security initiatives in Asia developed from the strategy of confrontation with western military blocks or containment of China. On the other hand, Gorbachev drew the lessons from ending their confrontation with capitalism. By doing so he succeeded in improving Soviet bilateral relations with a variety of countries in the Asia-Pacific, maintaining the stability of the international environment. In particular, Gorbachev aimed to expand the bilateral economic relations between the Soviet Union and the non-socialist countries such as Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN as well as participate in PECC, PBEC, and APEC to promote its Siberia and Far Eastern socioeconomic development.
    Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was first involved in the political and security cooperation led by ASEAN before entering the economic cooperation framework. This meant Russia was needed as a guarantor of peace and stability in Southeast Asia rather than just as an economic partner in Asia Pacific countries.
    Third, since the late 1990s Russia and ASEAN have gradually institutionalized their relationship. In 1996, when Russian Foreign Minister E. Primakov made a speech at the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences, he described ASEAN as the most important center of a multipolar world. In the first half of the 1990s Russia had little interest in the ASEAN regional forum because Russia devoted herself to democratization and the transition to a market economy. The priority in the foreign policy was given to the relationship with Europe, the United States, and the former republics of the Soviet Union. However, the NATO enlargement in 1997 led Russia to seek its own role in international relations. On the other hand, after the Asian Currency Crisis, ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea have been pursuing the problem solving mechanism which is not led by United States. Russia-ASEAN relations entered a new era with Russia's signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in November 2004. To Russia ASEAN is an “electoral district” to be recognized as a vital member of the Asian Pacific community.
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