This paper focuses on the individuals’ experience and traces the way how the government of Republic of China, formerly the Dangguo（党國）state, strengthened its relationship with organizations of overseas Chinese in Japan. Due to the onset of Chinese Civil War and confusion of Taiwan, the organization of overseas Chinese in Japan, including immigrants from Taiwan, are separated into 3 groups and according to their political positions: “Republic of China (ROC)”, “People’s Republic of China (PRC)”, and “Independent Taiwan”. The government of ROC together with Kuomintang (KMT) had to solve urgent problems such as maintaining power over overseas Chinese in its territory, suppressing some overseas Chinese who supported the PRC or Independence of Taiwan, and restoring firm relations with overseas Chinese in Japan. The author highlights the mainland-born KMT members who came to Japan via Taiwan in 1950s to 1960s. They were teachers in a Chinese school or branch officials of KMT in Japan and acted as an intermediary among the ROC government, the organizations of overseas Chinese, and individual overseas Chinese who came to Japan before 1950s. In conclusion, the author points out that the historical situation of East Asian counties during 1950s to 60s is reflected in the lives of mainland immigrants（外省人）who came to Japan during that time and that movements of people after the collapse of Japanese empire brought about a new recognition of “motherland” to overseas Chinese in Japan.

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In the 1920s and the 1930s, Leninism and fascism were the two dictatorship models imitated by the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China. In this study, I would like to discuss the characteristics of Chiang’s dictatorship and the development of his ideology by focusing on how he brought Leninism into his policy and his transformation of Leninism into fascism.
The legitimacy of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) party-state was based on the principle of party dictatorship. The KMT’s formal ideology lacked the ability to build a party-state system, and therefore Chiang Kai-shek had to use the prevailing models of dictatorship from Russia, Italy and Germany as his basis.
Essentially, Chiang Kai-shek was an anti-communist. Notwithstanding the ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, Chiang combined democratic centralism and the Führerprinzip into a model of a party-state regime for the KMT. Although there was an ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, as far as proposing an elitist dictatorship, power centralization, rigid organization and the negation of human rights were concerned, the two ideologies were completely coherent.
Chiang Kai-shek attempted to establish the party-state by building centralism and Führerprinzip into a formal system of ideology. Leninism and fascism were most influential under the KMT’s political regime, especially in the following three aspects: (i) the strategy of the National Movement; (ii) the establishment of the revolutionary dictatorship; and (iii) the principle of organization. Therefore, the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek can be seen as a mixture of Leninism and fascism.
Nevertheless, Chiang did not accept Leninism and fascism unconditionally. Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, the National Revolution Movement launched by the KMT modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship.
What Chiang seriously feared was the lack of the rigid party organization necessary to support the strong one-party politics essential to Leninism and fascism. In fact, because the KMT was organizationally weak, Chiang Kai-shek could not establish himself as a charismatic leadership in the mould of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini. Although Chiang’s dictatorial regime had the characteristics of the party-state and totalitarianism, its actual method of ruling was different from that of Leninism and fascism. The structure of the one-party dictatorship created by the KMT was an authoritarian regime based on military force.

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In order to clarify the significance of the Constitution which was promulgated in January 1947in the political history of the Republic of China, it is necessary to examine not only the perspective of parliamentary democracy but also that of constitutionalism. Thus, while focusing on the independence of judicial rights, this study presents an analysis of the issue of the affiliation of the Ministry of Justice with the aim of elucidating the nature of the discussion of the independence of judicial rights in the transformation of the political system during the Political Tutelage period.
Within the fragile single-party domination by the Chinese Nationalist Party, while interpreting Sun Yat-sen’s ambiguous Five Yuan System, the Chinese Nationalist Party and Nationalist Government already had the intention to introduce judicial independence within the context of the separation of the three branches of government. The discussion regarding judicial independence during the Political Tutelage period preceded the formulation of the Constitution of the Republic of China.

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This paper clarifies the significance and implications of Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ and his ‘Taiwanization’ (localization) policy that brought a drastic change in the Kuomintang’s cultural policy in postwar Taiwan.
‘Cultural construction’, launched by Chiang Ching-kuo, is the name that has been given to the last of the twelve major construction projects beginning in 1977, and includes the construction of local cultural centers and the establishment of a Cultural Commission in cabinet. By the construction of cultural centers in every county and major city, this ‘cultural construction’ is acknowledged as the most important cultural policy in the 1970s, having a strong impact on cultural developments in Taiwan thereafter.
The major findings of this paper are concerned with the implications of Chiang’s ‘cultural construction’ and his intention of promoting a ‘Taiwanization’ policy, not only in political administration but also in cultural administration. The basis of this discussion will be centered on the following observations.
Firstly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s landmark announcement to launch his own cultural policy marked a clear transition from Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of the 1960s.
Secondly, the highly symbolic appointment by Chiang Ching-kuo of Ch’en Ch’i-lu, a prominent Taiwanese scholar in the field of Taiwanese aboriginal studies, to the chair of the newly founded Cultural Commission in 1981, represented the first time the KMT was to place a local-oriented personality as the head of the government’s national cultural administration. As a result, Ch’en’s concern with local culture and the notion of Chinese culture opened up new horizons for the KMT’s cultural policy.
Thirdly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s policy of cultural localization is evident through the establishment of Taichung’s first cultural centre, founded in 1976 by the well-known Taiwanese poet Ch’en Ch’ien-wu. When examining the significance of Chiang’s localization policy, we should not neglect the fact that the ideas of a single Taiwanese intellectual became the base upon which Taiwan’s cultural policy was formed after 1970.
Fourthly, the establishment of display rooms and museums in local cultural centers, exhibiting notions of the ‘tradition’ and ‘uniqueness’ of various local places, presents a good illustration of the enhancement of local history and culture to represent the cultural policy of the new age. Such museums, initially conceived by Ch’en Ch’i-lu, can nowadays be seen everywhere, while the concept itself continues to be strongly promoted by the present government.
Finally, following the ‘Local Autonomy Act’, enforced in 1999, local cultural centers were gradually reorganized into local cultural bureaux. In short, it can be said that Chiang’s cultural centers became a prototype that since the 1990s has provided the basis for the decentralization of cultural policy. Hence, due to the above reasons, it is possible to state that Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ was a significant part of his ‘Taiwanization’ policy, which can be defined clearly as the ‘turning point’ in the KMT’s cultural policy.

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　互酬性の原則に基づく相互扶助組織は貧窮者を十分に包摂できるのか。本稿は，中華民国期の中国における華洋義賑会の農村信用協同組合（合作社）の事業を事例に，この合作社が貧農の包摂に失敗した背景と経緯を，成員資格の問題に焦点を当てて検討および記述した。第一に，華洋義賑会は合作社の経営を失敗に招く最大の要因が「不良分子」の存在であるという理解の下に，合作社の成員資格を善良な人格者＝「好人」に厳しく限定した。これは，自らを「好人」と証明するための農業における実績に乏しい下層の貧農の包摂を，著しく困難にしたと言うことができる。第二に，華洋義賑会は，「不良分子」を招き入れてしまう要因として，情実と体面＝「情面」の問題を指摘していた。しかし「情面」は，実際には合作社の設立における重要な契機となっていた可能性が高く，もしそうだとすれば，「情面」が配慮される機会の少ない貧農が，合作社から排除される結果になったと考えられる。

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The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, it examines Nationalist's attempts to implement the 1962 “Returning to the Mainland” plan. Secondly, it considers the Kennedy administration's response to this plan.
After having retreated to Taiwan, Nationalist China placed the highest priority of the national policy on “Returning to the Mainland”. But the United States, the major benefactor of the Nationalists, tried to avoid an armed clash developed between Taipei and Beijing, and consistently restrained the Nationalists from invading mainland China. Following the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the U. S. and the Nationalist China exchanged notes in which Taipei, under Washington's pressure, agreed to withhold military action without holding prior consultation. Furthermore, at the time of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Washington urged Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his “Returning to the Mainland” ambition. As a result, in an October 1958 joint communiqué' Chiang promised that the “principal means” of regaining the mainland would “not (be) the use of force”. Yet, the Nationalists still continued to pursue the policy of reconquering the mainland.
The Nationalists envisioned themselves accomplishing its mission through provoking a “revolution” in the mainland before initiating the invasion. In 1961, Chiang, judging that the post-“Great Leap Forward”-chaos in China, along with the Sino-Soviet dispute, had generated widespread anti-communist sentiments, ordered the military to prepare for an offensive campaign. In the following year, he requested Kennedy's blessing for this plan.
While the Kennedy administration had no intention of consenting to Chiang's demands, it could not afford to let their already strained relations deteriorate further. Therefore, rather than offering a clear reply, the administration partially satisfied Taipei's desire by allowing the Taipei government to carry out small scale “probing operations”. At the same time, Washington monitored Taipei's preparation for an invasion through taking an active part in the operation planning; it also pressed Taipei to reduce its military budget. Taipei yielded to the U. S. position because the two nations had agreed in 1960 to set a ceiling on the Nationalists' military spending. These measures kept the Nationalists from starting an offensive operation without impairing the relationship with the U. S.. Only after their enthusiasm for “Returning to the Mainland” faded, did the Kennedy administration inform Taipei of its opposition to conducting an invasion under the current circumstances.
Still the Kennedy administration's attitude toward the Nationalist's aspirations for “Returning to the Mainland” remained ambiguous. Kennedy never announced that such an operation would not be accepted in the future. It was not until Lyndon B. Johnson took office that a clear statement denying U. S. support for regaining the mainland was finally issued.

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The purpose of this article is to consider the reasons why the Kuomintang’s political tutelage failed to materialize in its expected shape by examining contradictions in political thoughtbetween Chiang Kai-Shek and Hu Han-Min, the two most significant figures in the policymaking process during the period of political tutelage.
Completion of the Northern Expedition in June 1928 encouraged the Kuomintang to transform itself from a revolutionary party aiming to overthrow the government into a party in power, and it was the principle of political tutelage that legitimated this transition—or in other words justified the Kuomintang ruling without electoral approval. Since the embodiment of the idea of political tutelage was intrinsic to the power game among political leaders such as Chiang and Hu, the shape of political tutelage policy subsequently changed according to power shifts within the party.
Hu Han-Min considered the objective during the period of political tutelage to be the return of political rights from the warlords to the people, who were the original holders of these rights.Therefore he advocated active support for educating people in exercising their political rights under the party’s leadership, while trying to counteract concentration of power in governmental organizations to prevent this power from being seized by warlords.
Chiang Kai-Shek, on the other hand, considered stabilization of society, which was to be achieved by eliminating the Chinese Communist Party, to be the primary task. He sought to concentrate power upon himself, and his priority was creating a government capable of constructing society, rather than the party.
Thus the two leaders’ differing visions of how to implement political tutelage collided, and rather than political tutelage being led by the party, the party was in fact subjected to a tutelary role under the government. The contradiction in political orientations between Chiang, who had to cope with the reality that the Kuomintang regime, due to its weak position in rural society, was dependent on the government to implement policies it had promised to the people, and Hu, who devoted himself to realizing a tutelary idea true to its original form, inevitably caused the idea of political tutelage not to bear fruit.

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This article addresses debates about “Reform” of the League of Nations from the viewpoint of Britain and China. “Reform” of the League was one of the contentious issues among the statesman, diplomats and intellectuals in the 1930s. They focused on the pros and cons of collective security and Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations because the “failure” of the League to stop Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Italian invasion of Abyssinia threatened the collapse of the League. There were two major opinions in the debate, “the Coercive League” and “the Consultative League”. “The Coercive League” was the course to reinforce collective security to prevent further aggression. Conversely, “the Consultative League” argument was to weaken collective security and induce Germany, Italy, and Japan to cooperate with the League. Deliberations took place in both the Council, which was led by Great Powers, and the Assembly, in which Small Powers could have greater influence. Therefore, this article deals with Britain as an example of a Great Power and China as one of a Small power.

The League was centered on the rapprochement rather than the enforcement in the late 1920s. Article 11 of the Covenant was more important than Article 16 in mediating disputes and reconciling belligerents. Britain administered the League Council through “the Concert of Europe,” which consisted of British, French and German Foreign Minister. The League Council was where the Powers consulted with each other. In contrast, China discovered the value of the Assembly as an arena of world opinion.

Japanese invasion of Manchuria from 1931 to 1933 destroyed the credibility of collective security and cooperation between the Powers. Furthermore, the Small Powers were irritated by the indecisiveness of Great Powers, especially Britain. Some officials of British Foreign Office began to consider “reform” of the League for the purpose of weakening collective security and reestablishing the superiority of Great Powers over Small Powers after the Manchurian Incident.

The Abyssinian Crisis from 1935 to 1936 accelerated this trend. The League of Nations voted for economic sanctions against Italy, but members including Britain didn’t carry out them fully. However, some Latin American members protested against the sanctions because they disrupted trade with Italy. The League Assembly set up a committee to study “the Application of the principle of the covenant of the League of Nations.” Even though Britain was pro-Consultative, she hesitated to revise the covenant. China was pro-Coercive and concerned about regionalizing collective security. The clash between two opinions left “reform” of the League deadlocked in the end.

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Was the Sino-American Rapprochement a turning point that changed everything? In 1969, the ROC changed the military strategy from “Offensive Posture” to “Unity of Offensive and Defensive”. Certainly, the advent of Nixon gave a big impact to the ROC’s national security, which heavily relied on the US. However, the ROC Government might decide to change its military strategy from “Retaking the Mainland,” which had been attempted for over a decade, to building up the consolidation of Taiwan’s defense when encountering the escalation of the PRC’s military threat even at the peak of the chaotic Great Leap Forward and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s provided a chance for the ROC to retake the mainland. The ROC would have been able to initiate military operations if received support from the US Nevertheless, US Government after the Kennedy administration was seeking coexistence with the PRC and therefore rejected all ROC’s requests.

At that time the PRC was strengthening its nuclear capability and conventional forces despite being in a state of political chaos. In response to the growing military threat of the PRC, improvement of the ROC government’s defense capability to secure “Taiwan” became its top priority. Moreover, when the US abolition of Military Assistance Program was announced, the ROC Government was forced to improve military advancement at the expense of its own economy and spend the limited budget on defense in priority. Therefore, the ROC Government had begun to reform the “Offensive Posture” strategy that it adopted since 1949, and decided to change to the “Unity of Offensive and Defensive” strategy that focused on defense more than before. This was before Nixon put forth the “Guam Doctrine” and started to approach the PRC.

Division of “China” was incorporated into the Cold War and immobilized. Although the chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s was likely to develop into “hot war” if ROC took military action. The US suppressed the ROC’s action for changing the status quo and avoided military conflict with the PRC. There is no doubt that the current US-China-Taiwan relations was formed in the 1970s, beginning with Nixon’s rapprochement to the PRC. However, the structure of maintaining the status quo of the ROC’s endeavor to acquire the US military commitment to resist the PRC’s continuous military expansion was gradually formed through the 1960s.

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This paper is designed to give new insight into agricultural development in China proper (not including Manchuria) during 1930s and 40s based on new estimate of output and price of agricultural products. The estimate in this paper has some advantages over previous studies of B.S. Wu et al., T.C. Liu and K.C. Yeh, D.H. Perkins. Firstly, it uses newly discovered statistical materials such as crop survey in northern provinces conducted by Japanese organizations and nation-wide comprehensive price survey carried out by Communist local governments in the mid 1950s. Secondly, diet and nutrition surveys carried out by Chinese and foreign experts in 1920s and 1930s are compiled to examine the reliability of output estimate. The following are main findings in this paper: 1) Agricultural output estimate in this paper seems to be the most reliable because food consumptions calculated from it are consistent with diet and nutrition materials. 2) Agricultural production value and value added for 1933 in this paper is lower than that of previous studies (Wu et al. and Liu and Yeh). 3) Production decreased sharply in northern and central China in the late 1930s due to the war against Japan, while that in southwestern provinces changed constantly. 4) There was a tendency towards rising output in Chinese agriculture after 1943, which seemed to be a cause of agricultural development in the early era of the Communist China. 5) China proper recorded the lowest agricultural GDP growth among the East Asian Countries/regions (Japan proper, Korean peninsula, Taiwan and Manchuria) and lower TFP growth than that of Japanese counterpart.

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