The aim of this paper is to examine the characteristics of Hungarian foreign policy under the Kádár-Regime. Especially the author thinks that analyses of the Czechoslovak situation in 1968 and the Polish situation in 1980-1981 are of great importance in Hungarian foreign policy after the Soviet military intervention in 1956. Hungarian leaders repeatedly placed emphasis on “Hungary’s experience” of 1956 on the occasion of the crises. In addition, the author regards ‘two front struggle,’ which was the basic principle of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HSWP) after 1956 as important. In this paper, he focuses on how Hungary coped with the Czechoslovak crisis and the Polish crisis.
János Kádár, the First Secretary of the HSWP, grasped power after the Soviet military invasion in 1956. Kádár and his colleagues strengthened the leadership of the Central Committee of the HSWP, and began to consolidate the socialist system by taking a hard line. In spite of cracking down on the opposing forces, his regime started to relax its domestic control and to introduce economic reform within the frame of the one-party rule in the mid-1960s.
During what was called the Prague Spring in 1968, Hungarian leaders expected Alexander Dudček, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to make a moderate reform without political liberalization, as they had done since the mid-1960s. But Czechoslovak leaders could not keep the Prague Spring under their control. Kádár supported the Soviet leaders and agreed on the military intervention in Czechoslovakia as a last resort.
However, Hungarian leaders were skeptical about the effects of the military intervention. They were anxious that the military intervention would have a harmful influence on Hungary’s reform. So Kádár tried to mediate between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. But his mediation ended in a rupture, because Dubček refused to make a concession to the Soviet Union. Finally, he made a decision to participate in the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Hungary’s participation in the military intervention was to follow the principle of international socialism.
Kádár expected the Polish leaders to find a way out of the difficulties by themselves in 1980-1981. Hungarian leaders were skeptical about the effects of the military intervention in Poland, although they regarded Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” as an enemy of socialism. He advised Polish leaders to restore the order by using internal forces without the intervention from outside.
Kádár thought that Wojciech Jalzelski, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and his comrades had to carry out consolidation of the socialist system, just as he had done after 1956. When Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law, Hungary supported him.

抄録全体を表示

乳がん検診の精度を保つには，装置・画像・検査者・判定者・運営システムのすべての精度管理が重要である。NPO 法人日本乳がん検診精度管理中央機構（以下，精中機構）は装置・画像と従事者の精度管理を担当しており，それらの現状について報告した。マンモグラフィ（MG）の読影および撮影技術者の教育は効果の証明された講習会方式によっており，５年毎の更新制度も導入されている。現在，医師・技師ともに１万８千人以上が受講しており，非更新者を除外した有資格者は読影部門１０，９３９名，技術部門１４，２８４名である。また，MG のデジタル化，モニタ診断化の変化に対応してデジタル講習会を構築した。一方，超音波部門では，日本乳腺甲状腺超音波医学会から引き継いだ講習会を精中機構の体制に再構築したばかりであり，今までの受講者は技術部門３，１２２名，医師部門２，２３４名である。今後，国内数カ所での同時開催が可能となるよう，システムを改変している。施設画像評価は，MG は２００１年からアナログシステムを対象に開始され，３年毎の更新制度となっている。２００４年４月からはデジタルマンモグラフィのハードコピーが，２０１２年４月からはソフトコピーによる評価が開始されたが，ソフトコピーによる評価が増加している。最近３年間の評価数は１，６４８台で，全国の撮影装置の約１／３に相当する。一方，超音波部門の装置および画質に関する基準作成活動は開始されたばかりであり，今後，精力的に活動を進める予定である。

抄録全体を表示

In this paper, I reflect on the correlation between the formation of Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and KIM Il-sung's maneuver to wage the Korean War. For a long time, it was believed that KWP was formed through the merging of South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) and North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP) from June to July in 1949 with KIM Il-sung as the chairman of the Central Committee. However, new materials prove that the formation of KWP just meant the integration of the Central Committee of both KWPs and had a close connection with the tactical defferences between PAK Honyong, the top leader of SKWP, and KIM Il-sung who had been pointed out the leader of Korean Communist Movement by Stalin in 1946.
PAK pursued the overturn of Rhee Syng-man's regime by guerrilla conflict of SKWP in South Korea and tried to avoid the civil war between South and North regimes by appealing for a ‘peaceful unification plan’ which the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) proposed. DFUF was established under PAK's initiative in June 1949. In this tactics it seems that SKWP and NKWP formed a ‘Joint Central Committee’ to manage activities of DFUF between June 28 and July 7 in 1949, when KIM Il-sung failed to take up the chairmanship of the Central Committee since the appeal of DFUF was not only one to withstand invasion of South Korea but also to contain KIM Il-sung's tactics. His tactics had dual purposes to achieve Korean unification and to seize the actual initiative of Korean Communist Movement with KIM's head position of KWP through advancing Korean People's Army into South Korea.
KIM opened up his tactics in a conversation with T. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassadar to North Korea, in August 1949 after his agreement to the ‘peaceful unification plan’ of DFUF. Although in September 1949 the Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party rejected this military option and ordered KIM and PAK to develop the latter's tactics with alerting KWP to the intervention of U. S. forces into the civil war, KIM Il-sung made a use of an opportunity of the favorable turn of Sino-Soviet relation. Finally, KIM gained his end in January 1950 that Stalin allowed him to prepare to open the war on condition that Mao Tse-zung should agree with KIM's tactics. Before the agreement of Stalin and Mao to open the civil war in Korean Peninsula, PAK had no other choice but to cooperate with KIM's tactics. Therefore the Korean War broke out in June 1950 and KIM began a purging of KWP after failing to accomplish his purposes through the war.

抄録全体を表示