The objective of this article is to examine the influence of cultural factors on systems of democratic control over the intelligence communities of different countries and the light this can shed on the road ahead as Japan develops its own oversight mechanisms.
The intelligence communities of different countries are configured in different forms. In the US, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the IC, while in the UK, the Joint Intelligence Committee which is a part of the Cabinet Office is responsible for directing the IC. This variation reflects not only the different presidential and parliamentary political systems but also the different organizational cultures of intelligence agencies in Britain and the US. For instance, the prevailing characteristics of organizational culture in the British IC are collegiality and collaboration. In the US, divisionism and bureaucracy are predominant. These cultural differences are rooted in the different political, historical and social environments unique to each country.
Systems for democratic control of the ICs also vary in different countries. In the US, congressional committees specialized in intelligence matters in both chambers of Congress exercise oversight and have strong authority over the IC. Although in the UK the Intelligence and Security Committee which directly reports to the Prime Minister is responsible for oversight of the IC, it exercises comparatively moderate control over the IC. Such differences are a reflection of the cultural differences between each country. The US system of oversight by powerful congressional committees reflects the high levels of public distrust in the IC, the result of a litany of intelligence-related scandals. This system also reflects the history of serious power struggles between Congress and the executive. In the UK, however, public trust in the IC, and collaboration between the executive branch and Parliament, has historically been greater than in the US.
Currently, Japan has no organization dedicated to democratic oversight of its intelligence organs. If Japan expands the scope of its intelligence activities, it will be necessary to develop new and enhance existing mechanisms for democratic control. In doing so it will be vital to ensure that they take account of the cultural factors at play in Japanese society rather than to transplant the systems of control in place in foreign countries which reflect their different cultural milieu.
The Japanese cultural factors that systems of control in other countries do not take account of are, firstly, a strong public distrust of intelligence activities, and secondly strong public desire to maintain the political neutrality of intelligence organizations. These cultural characteristics can be attributed to Japan's historical experiences during the Second World War, and are very different from circumstances in other countries. The existing Independent Regulatory Commission system could be a possible foundation on which to build a uniquely Japanese system for democratic oversight of the nation's intelligence activities.

抄録全体を表示

本研究では、多くの人に身近な社会的課題である飲酒運転が厳罰化へと向かう議題設定において、新聞報道がいかなる役割を果たしたかを検討する。1999年の東名高速道路事故と2006年の福岡事故を契機として道路交通法と刑法の飲酒運転規定が厳罰化されていることから、1990年から2009年までの20年間における朝日新聞、読売新聞、毎日新聞の飲酒運転に関する記事を対象とした。

新聞データベースから検索した記事を11カテゴリーに分類し、さらに、法案成立を境に期間を2期に分けて報道内容の変遷を検討した。そして、YanovitzkyとWeber（2019）が提唱したニュースメディアにおける5つの知識媒介機能の内、Linkage機能とMobilization機能について、新聞報道の役割を整理した。その結果、第一期ではLinkage機能が、第二期ではMobilization機能が強く働くことが示唆された。

抄録全体を表示

Discussions on the dispatch of Japanese personnel to UN Peace-keeping missions generally begin, with the Gulf Crisis of 1990 and the dispatch to Cambodia of 1992. In fact, however, Japanese contributions did not begin with the sudden end of the Cold War. They go back to the “International Cooperation Initiative” of the Takeshita cabinet that was founded upon three pillars, including the contribution of financial support and dispatch of personnel for settlement of regional conflicts. Based on this policy, the UNTAG dispatch may be considered the first full-scale dispatch of personnel due to the temporary nature of the transfers to UNGOMAP and UNIMOG.
In this report, I seek to clarify, using newly released MOFA documents, the policy making process of the Japanese government regarding the dispatch of election observers to UNTAG, a subject which has heretofore received little analysis. I will also make clear the limitations inherent in the MOFA initiatives. In order to throw into relief the political conditions regarding the UNTAG dispatch, I will devote particular attention to the activities of Prime Minister Takeshita and the MOFA authorities directly in charge on this occasion.
Although MOFA which agreed to the “International Co-operation Initiative” of Takeshita, was not able to accomplish a Self-Defense Force (SDF) dispatch, establish relevant legislation and a human resources pool organization, effective use of a postponement technique paradoxically allowed the dispatch to UNTAG to be realized. Such realization of the civilian dispatch to UNTAG was only a provisional step, however, and MOFA needed two phases of technique to realize SDF dispatch after the civilian dispatch.
During MOFA's attempt to realize the Takeshita initiative using this postponement technique, the project to dispatch election observers to UNTAG got somewhat ahead of itself, and measures to ensure their safety of were deemed insufficient. Although Minister for Foreign Affairs Sousuke Uno pointed out in discussions with National Governor's Association chairperson shunichi Suzuki that “bullets won't be flying,” the gun battles which had already broken out in Namibia rendered such optimistic assessments untenable. Actually, however, though the local situation was unstable just before holding the constitution parliamentary election, the above-mentioned optimistic prospect of Uno was maintained throughout. As for the government, its response to these circumstances were remarkable for their inflexibility.
In 1992, the SDF dispatch that MOFA had always aimed at was finally realized. Meanwhile, establishment of relevant legislation and a human resources pool organization are still in postponement. The contribution to UNTAG under the Takeshita administration was the first step in establishing the postponement mode in Japan.

抄録全体を表示

本稿では，自殺対策基本法制定以降の政策過程を検討し，そこでNPOが与えた影響を明らかにするとともに，その影響力の源泉の導出を試みた．NPO法人ライフリンク代表の清水康之へのインタビューと，2つの諮問機関での議論の分析から，ライフリンクは，遺族とのつながりを通じて自殺の実態に関する貴重な情報を取得するだけでなく，国会議員とのつながりを構築・強化してきたことが明らかとなった．この国会議員との関係性が，ライフリンクの政策提言の影響力を高める源泉として機能したといえる．ただしNPOが政策過程でそうした大きな影響を及ぼすことには，弊害や危険性を指摘する声も少なくない．実際，本稿からも諮問機関での議論をバイパスし，NPOが政策過程に直接，強い影響を与えている様子が浮き彫りになった．この影響を検証・評価するためには，その後の政策過程を含めて更なる検討を行っていくことが必要であろう．

抄録全体を表示

This study focuses on the city of Himeji, where a large number of Vietnamese live, to understand the changes in housing among Vietnamese and their relationship with Japanese. An increasing number of Vietnamese own single-family homes instead of public housing. There are Japanese who engage with Vietnamese in various ways, mainly by greeting them. Differences can be seen between Japanese who want to engage in community activities together and Vietnamese who want to consult with them. Maintaining relationships is important in public housing where residents are replaced, while maturing self-governing organizations is an issue in detached housing areas.

抄録全体を表示

This article aims to contribute to an understanding of the Japanese defense industry, focusing mainly on its structural characteristics. To analyze this topic, it employs the structure-conduct-performance paradigm for industrial organizations. The article also examines Japan's national security policy in the postwar period as one of the factors that influences the formation of the industry. Journalists and scholars have researched the Japanese defense industry in the past; however, we are still in the earliest stages of being able to account sufficiently for the structural characteristics of the industry, which features close-nit relationships between the sole buyer and the very limited number of suppliers. In addition, this paper tries to combine a micro-level approach such as industrial analysis, with a security analysis which requires macro-level approach.
The first section examines the characteristics of the buyer (i. e., the Japanese government and the Japan Defense Agency) by reviewing the Japanese defense procurement system from the following aspects: regulations stipulated by the government and the agency, source selection, and contract type. These business terms and conditions, all of which are barriers of entry into Japanese defencse market, tend to restrict defense contractors to a limited number of firms. In other words, these firms are protected in the closed market where the fixed relationships between the government and the suppliers provide the noncompetitive mechanism of the procurement system.
The second section reveals the uniqueness of the Japanese defense firms. This paper points out, as the features of the Japanese defense industry, that; 1) the Japanese market is occupied by highly concentrated firms at the aggregated level; 2) major prime contractors have cooperatively and routinely shared works in accordance with policy implementation and administrative guidance by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Defense Agency; 3) business transactions between a prime contractor and subcontractors are likely to be made through the cooperative organizations which could lead to long and stable relationships between the upper-tier firms and the lower-tier firms. Judging from these aspects, it can be said that the Japanese defense industry is disposed to the noncompetitive structure, which is described as a rigid structure in this paper.
To determine the reason for the rigidity, the Japanese security policy in the postwar period is examined in the third section. In general a government which is a sole buyer in a defense market has a great influence on defense acquisition, and its intervention in the defense industry can be justified on the grounds of the importance of national security. The weapons acquisition process in Japan features budget primacy, followed by achievement of a quantitative target of a defense buildup plan within the restricted budget. New weapons systems are seldom acquired in Japan's defense buildup planning; rather the planning gives priority to the replacement of the obsolete systems with the new ones. Coupled with the small demand in the Japanese defense market due to the government's principle of banning export of weapons, the uniqueness of the weapons acquisition process would make the structure of the industry rigid. Estimation of the future demand for defense equipment would be easy and likewise, Japan's defense budget has been stable. These features enable the defense production programs to be deliberately allocated to a limited number of companies, leading to fixed relationships between the buyer and the suppliers.
The Japanese government has maintained the Security Treaty with the United States as the critical part of the fabric of Japan's security policy throughout the entire postwar period. The reliance on U. S. military capabilitgy and presence under the bilateral security system has directed Japan's defense

抄録全体を表示