A series of conferences were held in Washington, D. C. in October 1953, between mission leader Hayato Ikeda, personal representative of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, and Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State with staff representatives of related departments. It has been regarded until now that the requirement from the United States to reinforce Japanese defense forces was alleviated and that the development of Japan's defense policy after World War II was extremely affected by these Ikeda-Robertson talks. However, this common view mainly came from
Tokyo-Washington no mitsudan (Tokyo-Washington, D. C. Confidential Talks), published in 1956 by Kiichi Miyazawa, who attended the talks at that time. The purpose of this article is to restudy the contents and meaning of the Ikeda-Robertson talks based on primary sources.
Ikeda's five-year private plan of Japan's defense program, which he proposed at the conference in 1953, was different from the National Security Agency's plan at that time. On the other hand, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, since May 1953, had been planning the schedule for reinforcement of the Japanese defense forces. When the Ikeda-Robertson talks were held, the draft was under investigation at the Far East Command in Tokyo, and the Department of Defense had no intentions of negotiating concretely with the Ikeda mission. The defense plan proposed at the Talks by JCS was one which predated Dwight D. Eisenhower's rise to power, and was not officially admitted by JCS. While the mission stayed in Washington, D. C., JCS failed to propose a new plan. JCS officers furiously criticised Ikeda's plan at the Talks and never accepted it.
JCS did not modify the Japanese defense force goals after the Talks. However, in Japan, the defense forces planned by the National Security Agency were regarded as official and were proposed to the American Embassy in Tokyo and the Far East Command. Ikeda's plan had disappered completely. In fact, this draft was like an observation balloon for the Talks in Washington, D. C.
In conclusion, there was no proof that the Ikeda mission eliminated the U. S. pressure at the Talks. It was not until Eisenhower adopted a new policy toward Japan (NSC 5516/1), and the new structure called the “1955 system” was established in Japan, that the U. S. attitude toward Japanese defense forces began to change.
抄録全体を表示