The Paris Talks on the Vietnam War were begun as “two party” talks between Hanoi and Washington on May 1968, were expanded to “four party” talks with participation by the NLF and Saigon in January 1969. Afterward, the Paris Agreement was concluded on January 1973. Moreover, the greatest point of controversy in the negotiations was how to solve the “military issue” (withdrawal of U. S. troop) and the “political issue” (future regime in South Vietnam). The Paris Agreement had a separate solution for each by the initiative of Hanoi and Washington. Some students have indicated that Hanoi intended to achieve a comprehensive solution, while Washington preferred separate solutions for the two issues. This article is an attempt to reconsider these research to date, and to define the Diplomatic Struggle of the VLP for “Peace” during the “fighting while negotiating” period, through examining the Paris “Private Meetings” (1968 and 1969) between Hanoi and Washington.
The official “two party” talks had been fruitless by reason of each party's uncompromising insistence from the beginning. Then, the private meetings began in June 1968 and became the substantial “negotiation table”. They were held by request from Washington; however, Hanoi had supposed the “behind-the-scene” talks plan as a measure to settle the disputes. Washington demanded Saigon's participation, while Hanoi demanded the NLF join in the official talks at the private meetings. Eventually, President Johnson made a statement that the bombing of North would be stopped, thus starting “expanded” talks by the “four parties” in October 1968. The VLP's diplomatic struggle had achieved itsaims 1) to obtain a concession from Washington in connection with U. S. Presidential election in November; 2) to attain a bombing halt as “one step” to solving the “military issue”; and 3) to attain a international recognition of the NLF as a “break point” in the “political issue” in 1968.
The official “four party” talks had also been fruitless due to the same reasons as the previous talks. Therefore, the private “two party” meetings between Hanoi and Washington in May and August 1969 became the substantial “negotiation table”. The May meeting was especially important since Washington supposed private “four party” meetings, while Hanoi insisted on private “two party” ones. Moreover, the VLP had not advanced the “political issue” as priority one since January, before starting of the official “four party” talks. Accordingly, Hanoi had dealt with it by negative position to negotiate the solution of the “political issue” at the private “four party” meetings which would be joined by the the NLF. The VLP's diplomatic struggle aimed 1) to settle the “military issue” with Washington as the top priority; and 2) to prolong the “political issue” including the NLF as “party concerned” in 1969.
Later, the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Secret Talks as “two party” between Hanoi and Washington began in January 1970. The negotiating process at the private meetings (1968 and 1969), however, had been a “foreground”' for the solution of the Paris Agreement, in the VLP's diplomatic struggle.
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