本発表では、軍事基地やの受け入れの見返りに当該自治体や関係者に莫大な補助金を支給するという「アメとムチ」の防衛施設政策が制度化される以前の1950年代の大分県の場をめぐる米軍接収反対運動の実態を明らかにする。これらの運動は、日常的な生活実践に根ざした地域住民の要求や軍事暴力に対する憤りが直接的に表出されたものであり、その意味で「生活世界」からの抵抗と呼べるものであった。このような民衆による抵抗の検討を通じて、基地や演習場をめぐる支配的な政治経済システムを批判的に乗り越える視座を探究することを目的とする。　
1952年4月のサンフランシスコ講和条約によって再び主権国家となった日本（沖縄と小笠原諸島を除く）は、同時に締結された日米安全保障条約に基づく日米行政協定によって日本国内への米軍の駐留および基地・演習場の利用を認めることとなった。この結果、日本国内の多くの軍事基地・演習場が引き続き米軍の接収下におかれた。
大分県内においても、日出生台（玖珠町・九重町・由布院町）、十文字原（別府市）などの旧帝国陸軍演習場が米軍に接収されたほか、塚原（由布院町）や久住高原（久住町）などが新たに演習場として接収される計画がもちあがった。これらの接収地（予定地）の大半は地元農家による農地および放牧・採草地として利用されていたほか、開拓地として戦後に引揚者が多数入植していたことから、米軍によるは地元住民の生命・生活の安全を脅かし、農作業を困難なものにするとして、各地で住民による激しい接収反対運動、接収解除要求運動が展開された。　このような地元住民による米軍接収反対運動は、1950年代半ばに内灘闘争(石川県)や砂川闘争(東京都立川市)など、大分県下のみならず日本各地で展開されたが、1957年のいわゆる「岸・アイク共同声明」に伴う米軍接収解除の進展により次第に収束し、その後は労働組合や政党等を主とするより党派的・組織的な反基地闘争にとって代わられた。
大分合同新聞を主とする当時の新聞記事と関連資料、および関係者への聞き取りの結果から、戦後の米軍占領下および接収下における演習場周辺住民の生活の実態を明らかにした。日出生台や十文字原では、実弾演習に伴う山火事による山林や草原の焼失、流れ弾や飛散する破片が近隣集落の民家に飛び込んで負傷するなどの事故が絶えず、住民たちは日々命の危険にさらされていた。農民たちは砲撃の間隙を縫って田植えを行ったり、演習が終わった夕方から夜通しかけて稲刈りを行うなど、その生活は困難を極めた。
そうした状況に対して住民たちがどのような主張を行っていたのかを1952～1955年に新聞紙上に掲載された陳情活動の内容から明らかにした。大半の陳情内容は「米軍接収反対」や「米軍接収解除」を求めるものであり、農地や牧野を返して欲しいという主張が中心となっている。一部の例外を除くと補償金や補助金などの要求はほとんど出されていない。失った土地や収穫物の代わりに補償金を受け取るのではなく、土地そのものを自分たちの側に返して欲しいという要求である。「行きてゆかねばならぬわれわれにとって高原はその源である」、「いかなる犠牲を払っても死力をつくして関係町村の生命線である高原を奪われたくない」、「この町の生命は牛と堆肥です」、「百姓や牛馬を殺すな」（以上、久住高原）、「農地の完全解放を要望」、「稲の刈り入れができない」（以上、日出生台）、「農地をとらないで」（大分飛行場）。これらの陳情に示されるように、この時期の地域住民の主張の論点は「日常生活そのものを回復すること」にあり、土地を含めたみずからの生活世界そのものを回復しようとする主張と言えるだろう。
以上のように、戦後の大分県における米軍接収反対運動においては土地を自己の生活世界を構成する不可欠の要素ととらえるラディカルな認識が見出される。補償金や代替用地などあらゆるものとの置き換えを拒否し、土地そのものを自分自身のいわば生の一部として守ろうとするこの姿勢は、普天間移設問題をはじめとする現代の基地問題を考えるうえできわめて示唆に富んだ内容を含んでいると考えられる。選挙や地方自治、官僚制度など制度化された現代の政治システムとは異なる、生活世界に根ざした回路を通じて軍事暴力に抵抗する手がかりを含んでいると思われる

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In this article an attempt is made to analyze how the Brezhnev government coped with the Prague Spring, by focusing on the following three points; military pressure on Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's ability to control the situation, bilateral and multilateral negotiations among socialist bloc countries.
CPCz April plenum adopted the Action Program as the guideline to reform socialism in Czechoslovakia. Although CPSU April plenum gave an indirect warning that such an activity might be dangerous, the Soviet Politburo sent a letter of “good will” to Dubcek's government as a conciliatory measure. In May, WTO contries, with the exception of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia and agreed on military exercises there as a temporary measure. After Kosygin's and Grechko's visits, Czechoslovakia also gave its consent to such military exercises in June. Although CPCz May plenum promised not to radicalize the reform, a dicision was reached to hold an Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9.
Reacting to the Prague Spring, the Soviet leadership sought negotiations with the USA and FRG. Czechoslovakia also showed an interest in the relations with FRG. As a result of these attempts, Ulbricht attacked the very possibility of such exchanges with FRG and the situation in Czechoslovakia had not changed. Then Brezhnev proposed bilateral talks with the Dubcek government in the middle of June, but Dubcek rejected the offer. This rejection influenced Brezhnev's perception of Dubcek as a leader whose policy was not in line with the orthodox communist tradition.
Military maneuvers which started from June 20 were strongly opposed by the Czechoslovak people and the famous “Two Thousand Words” was published in Prague. This statement proved to be a turning point and the Brezhnev Politburo changed their policies in three main aspects. 1. The Soviets stopped the negotiations with the FRG concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 2. They postponed the end of the military maneuvers. 3. They replaced the bilateral meeting with Dubcek by the multilateral meeting in Warsaw.
In the Warsaw meeting, Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov, who had attacked the Prague Spring from March, once again heavily criticised Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev also showed strong doubt in Dubchek's leadership and decided to secretly seek a puppet government. After the meeting, Soviet and Czechoslovakia had bilateral talks at Cierna nad Tisou and later a multilateral conference at Bratislava. No decisive and concrete agreements were reached, but at the time of the Bratislava conference, a letter to ask “brotherly aid” was sent to Brezhnev. The political negotiations were over. It depended on Dubcek's leadership whether to take resolute measures or not. Soviet leaders had gone on the summer vacation.
Even in the middle of August, the situation in Czechoslovakia had hardly changed, and Chervonenko reported it to Brezhnev at Yalta. Ulbrichit and Shelest, who had strongly opposed the Prague Spring, also conveyed the same information.
At last the Soviet Politburo gathered on August 16 in Moscow and decided on a military intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were some indications that Western countries were not likely to react too strongly if such an intervention did take place.
In conclusion, it may be said that military intervention did not only result in the consolidation of the Soviet bloc and promoted the creation of the basis of the detente at that time, but also deprived the socialist countries of the reform impetus beyond the Prague Spring for twenty years.

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This article intends to explore the transformation of the U. S. -Philippine military alliance during the post-cold war period. The U. S. bases in the Philippines, among which the Subic Bay Naval Installations and the Clark Air Base were the major ones, were the symbol of the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia, as well as the continued post-colonial relationship between the two countries. Although those bases were peripheral in America's military strategy, they were retained during the cold war period, due to the then existing international structure in which they worked as a balancer against the Soviet military presence in the region. The removal of the U. S. bases in the Philippines in 1992 has been generally viewed as the triumph of Philippine nationalism against the continued presence and influence of the ex-sovereign state. However, this type of interpretation does not explain why the Philippines invited the United States to come back to use her bases in the late 1990's, signing the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Moreover, after September 11, 2001, the two countries resumed joint military operations in an attempt to suppress the activities of anti-government organizations in the Philippines. This article investigates international as well as domestic political-economic factors that enabled the bases removal and the following conclusion of the VFA. In addition, it tries to explain the characteristics of the US-Philippine cooperation on the “war against terrorism” in the 21st century, namely, America's intervention in internal affairs of the Philippines under the name of “win [ning] the hearts and minds of the people.”
From the above analysis, it is obvious that the essential feature of the U. S. -Philippine relations during the cold war period, namely the Philippine's dependence on the United States with regard to international security and domestic counter-insurgency, as well as the pattern of the U. S. intervention, still continue in the post-cold war world. Meanwhile, however, the United States has become more demanding from her allies their utmost contributions to the so-called “common defense, ” and set her policy to supply economic and military aid as rewards to the allies' cooperation. Unlike the cold war era when the international structure was relatively fixed, given the United States and the Soviet Union as two contending superpowers, the United States herself decides who the enemies are, in the era of the “war against terror.” Under such circumstances, it tends to be more difficult than before for the weak “ally” to behave autonomously, and the intervention by the superpower in the ally's counterinsurgency operations tends to be justified under the name of the “war against terrorism”.

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Throughout Second and Third Indo-Chinese war period to post Cambodian war era, the ASEAN countries intensified military cooperation and arms buildup.
This paper examines “ASEAN solidarity” by looking at ASEAN countries' military cooperation and arms buildup.
It divided into three parts. The first deals with bilateral joint military exercises among the ASEAN countries, which began in 1972.
The second is discussion of some features of military expenditure. This part points out the gaps and or lags of the ASEAN states' defence spending.
The third is concerned with arms procurement policies and patterns of the ASEAN countries. This part points out the features, such as multiplesource acquisition and dependence on some major countries.

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