Social insurance for long-term care in Japan, enforced in April 2000, has become a prevalent feature of people's lives and is progressing favorably. However, the cost is increasing, and in addition, regarding the contents of service, false claims for insurance reimbursement and over-utilization are being reported. Therefore, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare set out concrete programs for the "Rationa-lization of care provision" as a special feature of the budget in fiscal 2003, outlining its stance on tackling this problem.
This paper adopts the supplier-induced demand hypothesis approach long engaged in energetic debates in the fields of health economics and examines the possibility of the existence of moral hazard. Data used for the verification is panel data by month and prefecture derived from "The state of long-term benefit payment," "The state of certified persons and beneficiaries" according to the All-Japan Federation of National Health Insurance Organizations and "The information of care providers" reported by the Welfare And Medical Service Agency (WAM). The estimation period is 22 months from June 2001 to March 2003.
This paper focuses on "home-visit long-term care" from among the many varieties of care services available, and it sets out to correct bias through the opportunity cost for access. Estimation results show that when the degree of competition in the home-visit long-term care market is heightened, service utilization is induced and care cost increases, and the induction is caused by the increase of frequency.
View full abstract