The development of life science has prompted us to use the genetic tests clinically. Strohmenger and Wambach (2000) said that'from the insurance point of view, these diagnostic methods have to be considered as new possibilities for more exact risk classification of insured persons, and also as a possible source of new asymmetry in the distribution of information between insurer and insureds'.
We examine the effects of genetic tests on the health insurance market using the Rothchild-Stiglitz (RS) model. Our focus is on the problems after genetic tests. The information of the genetic test results is different from the information of usual risk of diseases of patients. It seems that insurers can get the genetic test information more easily than that of risk of diseases. Therefore, genetic discrimination is an important issue, and hence the authorities have considered the regulations on insurers' behavior of collecting and using the information of the genetic test results.
We consider five regulations following Doherty and Thistle (1996). Regulation 1 is to permit insurers to know the test results and use them for underwriting and premium rating. Regulation 2 allows insurers to ask applicants about their test results but applicants have no need to answer the question. Regulation 3 is a consent law. Regulation 4 prohibits insurers from inquiring about the test results of applicants. Under Regulation 5, insurers must treat all applicants equally on top of Regulation 4.
Our results are as follows. If insurers know that individuals take genetic testing, under Regulations 1,2 and3, it respects the rights of low risk individuals, the private insurers have complete information ex post and hence we have an efficient outcome in the RS model. On the other hand, under Regulations 4 and 5, the rights of high risk individuals are respected and there is an inefficient outcome because of incomplete information. Furthermore, Regulation 5 may cause the adverse selection problem. As for which regulation we should choose, some social agreement is needed.
View full abstract