In November 1949, with communists heading southward, Kuomintang’s control over southwest China quickly collapsed. What the communists were about to face was a highly militarized society with countless self-defense forces of villages and clans. Though showing their support towards communists initially, most self-defense forces openly revolted once the grain procurement program started.

In the spring of 1950, Guizhou, one of the provinces of southwestern China, had become ungovernable, leaving communist work-team members brutally slaughtered and newly established people’s governments ravaged. Official accounts of pacification actions in this region involves peace-preserving action of militia, a locally active military forces of rural proletariat freed by land reform.

Arguing Chinese Communist Party’s approach to handle popular unrests during the formative years of the People’s Republic of China was fragmented between central and local level. This article traces the continuity both of personnel composition and activities of local militia units. Utilizing newly available county-level archival resources from Guizhou, the following two questions are to be put under scrutinization. The author first compares central and local level cadres’ different approaches to popular unrest. Central level cadres, by repeatedly issuing urgent orders to their subordinate, demanded not only swift recovery of social order but also complete demilitarization of society. Under these orders, the People’s Liberation Army units and party activists were organized into work-teams and sent into villages where “bandits” were still active. Threatened with “rectification” if demands are not met within certain short period of time by their superior, local cadres decided to legitimize local self-defense forces’ existence, some of which were previously deemed as “bandits”, and utilize their presence to restore order. Self-defense forces thus rebranded first as “people’s armed forces (人民武装)” in 1951 and later the same year as “militia (民兵)”.

The author further analyzes the activities of the new militia members. Rioting and looting were rampant during 1951, and in some cases, militia members were overtly hostile towards the local government. To extend its control over the militia, “People’s Armed Forces Departments (人民武装部)”, with its reach into every county under CCP’s control, were set up by the PLA. Active military cadres were sent into PAFDs as directors, and militia captains were gathered at PLA’s compound, politically screened and trained.

In general, this article shows CCP’s experience of “internal pacification”, termed by Anthony Giddens. Screening and training secured PLA’s control over local militia units, and institutional expansion, as it is seen from the creation of PAFDs nation-wide, provides the infrastructure for state’s surveillance of the contentious society.

Mongolia initiated an independent foreign policy after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Economic difficulties caused by the abrupt loss of Soviet support were overcome with aid from Japan and the US, as Mongolia found itself at the center of Great Power interests in Northeast Asia. Mongolia continues to search for a good solution to balance her neighboring powers, but China’s steadily growing political and economic influence makes this a perennial challenge. The case of the Dalai Lama’s 2016 visit to Mongolia illustrates well how Chinese economic influence can stretch into Mongolia’s spiritual sphere.

Mongolia joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with observer status, but China encourages Mongolia to upgrade to full SCO membership. Mongolia’s declaration of permament neutrality at the UN in 2015 could be seen as a countermove. Maintaining a well-balanced foreign policy will remain a significant issue for Mongolia for the foreseeable future.

This paper describes the development of the bilateral partnership between Uzbekistan and China with new content and qualities, especially focusing on the historical background of mutual relations dating back to ancient times, delineating relations from the early modern period to the former Soviet era, and pointing out some legal aspects of multilateral economic partnership mainly after the independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 1991.

The “Introduction” points out the need to focus on the historical background of mutual relations between the both countries. It also mentions that Uzbekistan would assume chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2022.

“I. Historical Background” unravels the history of exchange between Uzbekistan and China till modern times. It also points out that the Silk Road supported their important and strategic co‑existence.

“II. Linkages between Uzbekistan and China from the geopolitical viewpoint of Central Asia” refers to the potential transit of Uzbekistan connecting East and West, the strengthening of regional ties with Central Asian countries including China, the process of economic integration and the expansion and fostering of mutual economic partnership.

“III. Major Legal Frameworks for Bilateral Cooperation” lists the major elements in bilateral relations since the recognition of Uzbekistan by China in 1991 and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.

“IV. Cooperation in Regional and International fora” points out that the SCO has been growing as an international organization and that Uzbekistan is one of the countries actively participating in the “One Belt, One Road” project and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

“V. Achievements in Economic Partnership Relations” notes the high dynamics of bilateral cooperation in the trade, economy and investment, based on the implementation of legal instruments between the two countries, and the deepening of the cooperation and their recent trends.

“VI. Bilateral Regional Cooperation” points to the expansion of cooperation between the local administrative bodies of the two countries, the opening up of new directions of regional cooperation, and the establishment of cooperation in various fields.

“VII. Prospects and New Directions for Cooperation” examines how China has become one of the key partners in Uzbekistan’s efforts to advance major reforms and economic modernization.

In the “Conclusion”, it’s concluded that Uzbekistan and China will celebrate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2022, are moving onto more ambitious tasks to overcome the tremendous achievements of the past.

As China pushes ahead with infrastructure development projects that are very large in proportion to the economies of several of its land-locked neighbors, there is bound to be concern over the social and economic ramifications of those projects. However, the progress of those large projects has not necessarily been unilaterally decided by China. Many of its neighbors are struggling in a world economy that is rapidly globalized based on opportunities created by maritime trade. For these land-locked neighbors, the rise of China since the 2000s has brought a major global market to their doorsteps. Furthermore, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) presents them with an unprecedented opportunity to overcome formidable geographical obstacles. This paper argues that BRI-related large-scale transportation infrastructure development in Laos is progressing in line with the intentions of Laos and China. To do so, we first examine the economic relationship between Laos and Thailand, which has the lowest geographical barriers and has been deepening with positive results for economic growth since the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the Asian financial crisis, which started in Thailand in 1997, made Laos acutely conscious of the risk of a catastrophe if its land-locked economy was overly dependent on a single route out of the country. That awareness prompted Laos to seek to diversify its external economic relations. Next, we show how Laos cannot dispense with the involvement of major economic powers if it plans to establish substantial economic relations with other countries in addition to Thailand. Laos has, therefore, found it particularly relevant to focus on expanding its trade and investment ties with China from the 2000s to the post-2016 era of the High Speed Railway (HSR) development. Finally, we highlight Laos’s current external debt difficulty which has been dramatically exacerbated by several large-scale projects and Covid-19 pandemic. We conclude with a discussion of how the HSR, which will be completed by the end of 2021, may contribute to the recovery of the Lao economy.