Since the 21st century, parallel to its economic growth, the industrial structure of East Asia has been changing. This is due to the changes in the intra-regional division of labor, and the increase in direct investment and technology transfer. The sophistication of supply chains and the closeness of networks have become the driving force behind the improvements in manufacturing processes. Therefore, this study focuses on the structural changes in intra-regional trade brought about by three factors: 1) the changes in the intra-regional division of labor in East Asian countries and 2) the increase in direct investment and 3) the increase in the intra-regional trade. The first hypothesis suggests that the increase in the share of vertical intra-industry trade between two East Asian countries will increase the total trade volume between the two countries. In addition, after the Plaza Accord of 1985, there was a rush of Japanese companies entering East Asia, especially Thailand. These Japanese companies entered East Asia to replace their production bases because of the strength of the yen. In the 2000s, Thailand became a hub for international production networks, known as Thailand plus one. They expanded in response to the risk that China posed. As a result, the bilateral vertical intra-industry trade shares of Thailand and China, which had both become the hubs of international production networks, have increased, and the bilateral trade value of each of the two countries is also thought to have increased. The second hypothesis is that the increase in the bilateral vertical intra-industry trade share in East Asia increases the total trade volume between the two countries. This increase is particularly pronounced in Thailand and China. The results of the analysis support the first hypothesis, as the increase in the bilateral vertical intra-industry trade share of East Asian countries is statistically significantly “positive” regarding the increase in total trade value between the two countries. In addition, the results of the cross-sectional analysis are statistically significantly “positive” with regards to China for 20 years, from 1999 to 2018 and for the first 10 years, from 1999 to 2008. Moreover, it is statistically significantly “positive” for Thailand over an entire period, thereby supporting the second hypothesis.

How did Beijing become the capital of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Surprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not provided a clear answer to this question. This is because if the “necessity” of Beijing as the capital of the PRC were to collapse, it could contradict the overall historical narrative of the CCP concerning the State formation. Chinese Area Studies scholars argue that the acquisition of political cohesion and legitimacy in the process of selecting a capital has affected the national integration of the PRC. Nevertheless, such arguments do not fully explain how such an event occurred; thus, the logic between the capital selection and national integration remains unclear. Therefore, to clarify these questions, this paper analyzes the perceptions of the political leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the CCP, the Democratic Party (DP), and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) regarding the formation of the State and the selection of the capital. The result of the analysis shows that from the end of World War II to the establishment of the PRC, there was no concrete idea of selecting Beijing as a capital among the people. In the Constituent Assembly held in 1946, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to select Nanjing as the capital. However, the representatives of the Constituent Assembly highlighted various opinions on the selection; in particular, the delegates sought to strike a balance among China’s regions through this process. In response, the CCP delayed the selection and restrained local movements from establishing their own capital. Concerned about the CCP’s authority over the DP, who showed an inactive attitude regarding this, the CPSU demanded that the CCP establish the capital as soon as possible to consolidate their authority. However, on the eve of the establishment of the PRC, the CCP avoided active discussions on the selection of the capital; after the issue attracted public attention, they introduced official procedures to establish Beijing as their capital to consolidate their authority.

This special feature is based on the plenary session of the FY2020 Autumn Conference (November 7, 2020; Online meeting): “Infectious Diseases in Asia: Pandemics in Past and Present.” The theme for the conference was to consider how Asian countries are coping with the pandemic of COVID-19, the crisis for people around the world. What role do governments play for stopping human and economic losses caused by this pandemic? How is society responding to this new situation voluntarily or under the guidance of the government? And what type of state-social relationship is best dealing with this crisis? In this plenary session, these questions were discussed.

COVID-19 is spreading rapidly, and the situation of the world is changing day by day. We believe that this is the time when we need to take a step back from current situation and look back on history. Looking back on the past, infectious diseases have had various effects on human history. Even in modern times, pandemics have often put the world in jeopardy, killing a huge number of people. At that time, what policies did the governments use to repair the damage caused by the pandemic? It was also the theme for the conference to review past infectious diseases and the response of the state and society to them, and to consider how the development of the state and society and the sustainable cooperation beyond the state to defeat pandemic can be realized.

As this special feature is based on the plenary session of the conference, it consists of articles by three speakers of the plenary session. The paper by Kohei Wakimura discusses the port quarantine of the Red Sea route during the nineteenth century cholera pandemic. At that time, the Red Sea route was a concern as a transmission route for cholera. The paper by Wataru Iijima discusses China’s response to COVID-19 with a focus on the community. The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the Chinese community, which supported the tough measures of lockdown. The paper by Shozo Sakata discusses the characteristics of Vietnam’s politics and society focusing on the information dissemination conducted by the government during COVID-19 pandemic. He argues that the challenge of infectious disease control in Vietnam since the Nguyen Dynasty has been to acquire the knowledge about epidemic diseases from abroad and to inform its people.

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, we hope that this special feature will serve as a catalyst for comparative research on infectious disease control between each government and society, and for the dialogue between the past and present regarding pandemics.

We are still suffering from the disaster of COVID-19. A look into the experience of the cholera pandemic during the 19th-century would give us a great deal of insight on how to deal with the existing crisis. The cholera pandemic was a literal “pandemic” that swept the world six times in the 19th century. It was an unparalleled plague that had a profound effect on the progress of history. As it is well known, cholera was “endemic” to the Bengal region of India. However, for some reason, it became malignant and spread not only in India, but throughout the world, resulting in it becoming a pandemic. By reviewing the discussions of the International Sanitary Conferences, which began in 1851, this paper found fierce disagreements over how the European countries at the time prevented the spread of cholera from the east. First, we take up the controversy concerning the implementation of maritime quarantine during the cholera pandemic, meaning, the dilemma that arose between the epidemic prevention measures and economic activity. This issue translated to there being a conflict between continental European countries (such as France), which insisted on a strict quarantine measure, and Britain, which insisted on a loose quarantine measure called “medical inspection” because of free trade. Second, we focus on the issues surrounding the Red Sea route. There were growing concerns that the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca would result in the spread of cholera to Europe, especially through this route. There were conflicts between the continental European countries (such as France), which insisted on discriminatory and strict quarantine measures against Muslim pilgrims in the Red Sea, and Britain, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Persia, who opposed the continental European countries. The conflicts were so fierce from the 1st (1851) International Sanitary Conference to the 6th (1885) one that they did not see any agreement in the form of concluding an International Sanitary Convention. However, since the 7th conference (1892), consensus building started progressing gradually, and finally, during the 11th (1903) conference, it became possible to conclude an international sanitary convention in a cohesive manner. The international standard for the quarantine system, embodied in the International Sanitary Convention ratified in 1904, made a clear distinction between the medical inspection carried out in European waters and the quarantine implemented in the Red Sea. In the Red Sea in particular, the pilgrims to Mecca were subjected to “discriminatory treatment”. Thus, it is fair to say that it was a clear case of “double standards” and “Eurocentrism.” Finally, I would like to make the following statement: although hegemonic Britain was characterized by an “ethnocentric” diplomatic stance, it may also be possible to make a certain positive evaluation that it adhered to “realism.”

The Chinese government under the control of the Chinese Communist Party selected a lockdown to control COVID-19 in the first half of 2020. The main purpose of lockdown was to restrict the activities of ordinary people including their everyday life. The transfer from Wuhan/Hebei province to other cities/provinces was under severe restrictions. The Chinese government stopped the public transportations including railway, subway, bus, ships, and private car drive in Wuhan. The mobilization inside Wuhan was also under severe regulations, to buy everyday food was also under the mobilization permit. These kinds of severe and big-scale lockdown were the first case in the history of public health.

The lockdown was very effective to control COVID-19 in Wuhan, the pandemic was quite controlled in a few months. To control mobilization, the Chinese government prepared to supply much food, medical instruments for the ordinary people of Wuhan, and the central and local governments also paid much attention to support the people’s everyday life. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army was also mobilized to support the lockdown.

Why did the Chinese government succeed in anti-COVID-19? In Wuhan and other Chinese urban districts, “community” (社区 She-qu) played a key role in the lockdown. The severe inspections for health conditions were advanced at the health stations in the “community” by the staff who had a close tie with the local unit of the Chinese Communist Party. A severe curfew was also advanced based on “community” and sub-“community” (小区 Xiao-qu). The origin of this method was started at the anti-SARS movement in 2003, but the digitalization of community or personal control by the advanced ITC systems, for example, the “Health Code” was one of the new key methods at the control of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

The reality in China shows us that the “community” control is the reason why the Chinese government succeed in the control of COVID-19. The urban “community” was reorganized during the period of the privatization of the state-owned company, but only few studies discussed the role of public health. How to examine the role of “community” of China in the history of public health and the contemporary anti-epidemic measures is one of the important topics in Chinese studies and public health studies.

Vietnam became a country the world praised for its successful control of the COVID-19 infection in 2020. The government’s information management was one of the key elements for curbing the spread of COVID-19 in Vietnam. The government proactively disclosed information to the public and the international community regarding the infection’s status, and called on the public through various media platforms to take actions to prevent infection and cope with coercive lockdown.

Such postures of information management today are not new, but have descended from the strategies that the regimes have historically employed. The purpose of this paper is to examine the information management strategies in the event of epidemics in Vietnam. The paper first looks back on the history of epidemics and information management in Vietnam from the 19th century to the 2000s, and discusses how the present Communist Party and the government have shaped the strategies of information dissemination and propaganda. The paper then analyzes, focusing on the period of time during which COVID-19 spread in 2020, the contents and impacts of propaganda transmitted through various media platforms.

The regimes in Vietnam have always endeavored to acquire scientific knowledge about epidemics because many of the epidemics that Vietnam has experienced were unknown diseases brought from abroad, or traditionally existed calamities whose causes and countermeasures were unknown. Since the outbreak of SARS in 2002, the Vietnamese government has applied strategies to acquire resources and scientific information from the international public health regimes, in exchange for disclosure of information about domestic infection. At the same time, the Communist Party and the government have taken multifaceted media control, utilizing traditional media such as propaganda posters and loud speakers on the streets to the modern information platforms on the Internet and SNS. These platforms are used to inform the population at large of the actions necessary to prevent infection.

This paper also reveals that patriotic rhetoric and war-time analogies have often been used to mobilize the public to take actions, thereby representing the political aspects of the epidemic prevention measures. The strong slogans (e.g., “staying home is loving the nation”) conveyed to the public can be interpreted as messages to justify the presence of the Communist Party’s authoritarian regimes and its top-down policy implementation mechanism.