The rapid transformation of agricultural retail marketing in developing countries is having significant consequences on agricultural development. This phenomenon—known as the supermarket revolution—means the expansion of modern retail companies, e.g., convenience stores, supermarkets, and hypermarkets. These modern retail companies have established a new marketing system that can supply high quality commodities via arrangements with traditional producers and middlemen. At the same time, there is an urgent concern that agricultural productivity in this supermarket revolution may decrease because smallholders with poor technology systems may be forced to exit from the new marketing system, and ultimately from the current agricultural market.

However, there is insufficient empirical evidence to support a hypothesis regarding the supermarket revolution, i.e., the linear transformation of traditional marketing into the new marketing system arrangement with modern retail companies. For example, the traditional retail market where the smallholders mainly participate still exists, and in Indonesia, it has even expanded. The recent downstream market could have ripple effects on the traditional upstream market, and provide a different perspective from the above hypothesis. Thus, it is important to clarify the changes in the traditional upstream market even if we must rely on qualitative analysis. Although many related studies have been conducted, especially on agricultural development in rural society and the traditional norms that underpin this development, the need to clarify the consequences of the supermarket revolution on traditional rural marketing remains.

In this study, we investigate the transformation of the traditional upstream market, which may compete with the modern retail marketing channels, with a special focus on rural areas, and we discuss its future pathways. Based on results of a vegetable marketing field survey conducted in rural Java, Indonesia, we characterize the transformation as involving the following two elements. First, compared to the situation in the 1990s, the credit tie among traders that has long served to strengthen their relationship has almost disappeared. Second, the number of brokers has decreased, some of whom have become middlemen. These findings highlight the intense market competition among upstream middlemen. We observed the continued use of traditional standing crop contracts, known as Tebasan, by the middlemen. The traditional scheme for collecting fresh produce also seems to be competitive with those of the modern retail companies. Lastly, we consider how the traditional upstream market could survive under the pressure of modern retail company practices.

It is often pointed out that the status of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been declining in the entire party and government system in China in recent decades. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been unable to cope with many challenges China faces today. With the progress of the Reform and Opening-Up policy since the early 1980s, pluralization and decentralization are increasingly apparent in making and implementing its foreign policy. And recently, media and public opinion and private sector interests have begun to influence Chinese foreign policy. However, the phenomena of the gradual erosion of foreign ministries’ status as well as the expansion of low politics diplomacy in foreign relations have been observed among other advanced countries.

This paper studies how the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reshaped its organization and changed its role as one of the country’s many complex party-government apparatuses in the era of globalization. Traditionally, the scope and jurisdiction of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been rather narrow as compared with foreign ministries in other countries. The departments focusing on managing international economy, foreign aid, national security, cultural exchange, and intelligence and analysis, which are common in other countries, do not seem to exist. In recruiting young diplomats, there has been strong emphasis on foreign language ability rather than basic knowledge of social sciences such as international relations or economics. Consequently, the reality of traditional Chinese diplomatic practice has leaned too much on bilateral relations.

However, the spread of globalization has brought significant structural change to the organization of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the apparent shift from regional affairs to functional affairs, several new departments have been established to tackle new global challenges. The impact of globalization has brought the low politics diplomacy dealing with the economics and social affairs to the forefront. Today, multilateral diplomacy is actively practiced. The ministry has been recruiting human resources with more diversified professional backgrounds.

As a result, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the globalization era has evolved to become more similar to ministries of foreign affairs of other countries. However, given the rapid change of circumstances both in and outside China caused by globalization combined with the traditionally limited jurisdiction and function of China’s national diplomatic organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has still been unable to fully meet the global challenges that today’s China faces.

Although the Republic of China, which was victorious in the Second World War, intended to obtain more war reparations from Japan than any other victorious country, the issue of the Republic of China’s demand for reparations did not develop as the government had initially expected. This was due to the US’s change to its policy in the occupation of Japan and its reduction of reparations collected. However, among the allied nations and governments, the detailed processes of negotiation and intentions regarding reparations have still not been clarified. Thus, it is possible that there were issues and circumstances affecting the Republic of China’s demands for reparations beside the reduction of reparations due to policy change in the US.

This paper focuses on the Republic of China’s decision-making process regarding the question of how to deal with the former Japanese navy vessels, which the government considers to be very important, and offers a detailed explanation of how this relates to the US’s provision of surplus military vessels to the Chinese Navy moved forward at the same time. This paper explores other possible factors affecting the Republic of China’s reparations claims, apart from the much-discussed US policy change.

FTAs in East Asia have proliferated with the onset of 21^st century. Establishment of ASEAN Economic Community and formation of ASEAN plus 1 FTAs is main achievement of East Asia Economic Integration in the first ten years of 21^st century. Since 2010, East Asian countries have embarked on the realization of region-wide Asian FTA. As for region-wide FTA, two concepts were proposed. One is Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) which is originated in trade liberalization projects of APEC and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which was proposed by ASEAN being influenced by the start of negotiation of TPP.

TPP was signed in February of 2016 after 5 years of hard negotiation. TPP was called 21^st Century FTA because of high level of liberalization and advanced rules such as discipline of State Enterprise and e-Commerce. After sign of the agreement, it was most probable that TPP would become FTAAP (FTA of Asia Pacific) as East Asian countries such as Korea, Thailand and Philippines expressed the intention of joining TPP. However, President Trump withdrew from TPP when he took office in January of 2017. Remaining 11 countries started to negotiate TPP 11 from March of 2017 and reached agreement substantially in November. TPP11 (CPTPP) was signed by 11 countries in March of 2018. TPP 11 maintained the characteristics of TPP as 21^st Century FTA though it suspended 22 stipulations. Until now, Thailand and Columbia expressed the intention of participation in TPP11 and various countries including UK showed interest in joining TPP11. TPP11 was concluded in a very short time and many countries desired to join because these countries were concerned about the expansion of protectionism.

Though not high in liberation rate and not advanced in rule if compared to TPP, RCEP is a quite important region-wide Asian FTA because it includes production centers of manufacturing industries and emerging consumer markets such as China, ASEAN and India. Negotiation of RCEP was being delayed, but negotiating parties agreed in July of 2018 to advance negotiation to reach agreement by the end of 2018.

Economic integration of East Asia becomes more and more important to maintain the trade regime in the Asia-Pacific which is free and based on rule and to prevent the expansion of protectionism caused by Trump Administration.

East Asia has continued high growth within a framework of world economy for over half a century. The major driving force behind growth and integration is foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations of advanced economies. It has promoted economic integration in East Asia by means of the generating international production networks or, in other words, production process division of labor. At the same time, in East Asia there has emerged middle class, and transformed the region from ‘world factory’ to ‘world market’. East Asia has also changed its growth mechanism during this century, which is reflected in the altering of the regional major emerging economies from ‘Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) between 1960s and 1980s to BRICs. And, China stands on top of emerging economies.

In this article, author traces East Asia’s miracle growth, its factors and mechanisms, and discusses China’s “One Belt One Road” Initiative and its meanings for both Asia and the world economy as a whole.

This article clarifies the various aspect of “The Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI), which is generally recognized as the blueprint of enormous economic zone concept under China’s strong leadership. Although China affirms BRI is an initiative for cooperation, guided by openness, win-win success, but it is hard to understand its real intention and policy priority from outside.

After obtaining the membership of World Trade Organization (WTO), China aggressively started to promote Free Trade Agreement (FTA) policy. Because bilateral negotiations are advantageous to China against the backdrop of overwhelming market power. And It seems China intends to achieve the complex objectives, including diplomatic purposes rather than economic benefits.

BRI was proposed by President Xi Jinping, in autumn 2013, while negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were in progress on the other side. So, there is also a view that BRI was a countermeasure for TPP. It is sure China is very cautious not to be excluded from establishing the world trade regulations. However, BRI differs completely from economic partnership, and China’s countermeasure for TPP is Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Although partner countries can achieve improvement of infrastructures and realize economic development through China’s huge assistance or investment, it becomes impossible to damage a stable relationship with China automatically. Furthermore, international order could be strongly influenced by China’s power.

Meanwhile, TPP12 was suspended by US new President, China has been released from the strong pressure of establishing the trade rules. Therefore, main developed countries, such as Japan, should encourage China to join making a high level of international rules.

This paper will examine those recent developments in East Asian economic integration that have occurred since the session “the Economic Integration and Development in East Asia,” held at the 2016 convention of the Japan Association for Asian Studies (JAAS) about two years ago. The work on plans like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is deeply intertwined with the tensions among the United States, China, Japan, the ASEAN countries, and other regional powers regarding their visions of a new regional order in Asia. That is, the outcome of RCEP negotiation, the effects of the TPP and the future development of the BRI will in large part determine both regional integration and the new regional order in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific.

The most important backdrop of these efforts is the stress placed on the liberal economic order by two. First, the United States, which was once a champion of the liberal economic order that worked hard to sustain it, drastically transformed its foreign policy, adopting an “America First” protectionist stance, beginning in January 2017. The U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, in particular, gave the scheme a shock, and this eventually led to the signing of the TPP without the United States, in a modified document called the Comprehensive and Progressive TPP (CPTPP) in March 2018. The “America First” policy provoked concern over the retreat of economic liberalism in Asia and the Pacific.

China, for its part, is rapidly expanding its economic influence in its neighboring countries, implemented through its state capitalism. The BRI exhibits characteristics of China’s economic management and strategy regarding Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Through the BRI, China is expected to provide huge economic benefits to countries in the affected regions, and the recipient countries welcome China’s assistance and support. However, China’s approach of state capitalism is not always compatible with the liberal economic order.

In this turbulence, the CPTPP and the RCEP are expected to help sustain the liberal economic order. When the CPTPP actually enters into effect, one should watch for whether it expands the economies and influence of its member countries. The negotiation of the RCEP, despite the rising expectations it has provoked, will not be easily finalized: the interests of the member countries interests remain sharply at odds. The level of liberalization and the quality of the finalized RCEP will determine the trajectory of economic integration in East Asia.