This paper examines reasons related to governmental budget constraints that explain why the Japanese government has never given an evacuation order to areas with more than 5 mSV of radiation exposure per year. Both TEPCO and the government seek to obscure the accident and its resultant damage; they avoid clearly explaining the entire contaminated zone. The evacuation zone is set only for a 20-km radius of the plant and the area of exposure over 20 mSV, enabling the central and local governments and TEPCO to compensate at a minimum cost by means of decontamination projects. Ignoring possible public health risks, the governments and TEPCO can ensure the national economy's balance by avoiding the issue of a new, astronomical, and unaffordable national bond for the indemnity of additional evacuation compensation.

The “reputational damage” in relation to food products and radiation which is currently under the spotlight cannot be addressed simply by assuring people that food is safe. Rather, consumers need to be provided with persuasive reasons to feel safe, as well as the grounds for those reasons. The necessary grounds for safety comprise (1)information on the actual status of radioactive contamination in the agricultural environment, (2)elucidation of the mechanism by which agricultural produce receives radioactive contamination, as well as information on the implementation status of absorption prevention measures designed to address this, and (3)the establishment of inspection arrangements geared to the particular nature of the risk and the creation of a certification system.

In the Tohoku disaster area, seawall construction and a ground raising project based on a land readjustment scheme is proceeding at a rapid pace. However, in the Sanriku coastal areas, as the sea was an integral part of people's lives and livelihoods, many feel strong resentment against the plans for the giant seawall, and the gap between the wishes of residents and the government's plan is growing. The reconstruction projects currently underway, if continued as is, will generate a vast embankment. Yet there is concern about the lack of people interested in returning to those areas. Here we point out that the cause of this kind of gap and these concerns comes from the old system of government planning and financing for public projects. In order to really revive the destroyed cities, local governments should start by listening to the inhabitants; understand the opinions of those wishing to resume their lives and jobs where they lived before the disaster. Local governments should make future visions of cities along with the residents; the seawall plan should be part of those visions.

In this paper, we interpret the conflict between the Japanese company-based regulation system and the disaster recovery mechanism in Japan, and describe the main obstacles affecting Fukushima's recovery from nuclear disaster from the viewpoint of Régulation Theory. We also explain the necessity of a Social unit-based Institutional Coodination Mechanism to aid the recovery efforts in Fukushima Prefecture.

This paper emphasizes the important agendas related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and serve to invigorate the debate of nuclear energy usage. Until the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident occurred, the risk of nuclear power plants was considered to be zero or completely under control. An impossibility hypothesis of a serious accident, such as a meltdown, secured the health conditions of neighbors from radiation exposure. This overconfidence led the general pupblic to misunderstand that the economic compensation of potential nuclear damage from national government and companies was a type of subsidy without risk, and it contributed to population growth in municipalities around the nuclear facilities.

Unfortunately, an accident with radioactive contamination occurred; thus, the impossibility hypothesis was undermined. In addition, the large population around nuclear facilities made it difficult to evacuate, provide life support, and ensure fiscal compensation after the accident. However, we doubt that the opportunity cost of nuclear power is less than the economic benefits. I consider that now researchers of nuclear power energy must provide reliable and current information and engage in proactive discussions on nuclear energy.

Secure management of nuclear power plants requires workers to be of sound mental health. Therefore, the aim of this study was to determine the occupational stressors faced by workers in nuclear power plants in order to propose practical measures to improve their mental health. The target population of this study consisted of nondestructive testing personnel and radiation control personnel (radiation control personnel supervise and coach workers, including nondestructive testing personnel, on radiation protection) in periodic inspections of nuclear power plants. Participants (n = 87) completed a self-administered questionnaire that measured variables such as interpersonal issues on the job, cooperation from coworkers, and the number of vacation days given. The results indicated that “interpersonal issues on the job” (e.g., “there is a possibility that they incur a great danger to a lot of people due to their own misjudgment or lack of instructions”) was a stronger stressor. Moreover, a low level of cooperation from coworkers and an inadequate number of vacation days were found to affect the mental health of radiation control personnel. We therefore provide suggestions for effective management of radiation control personnel in terms of opportunity for long-term training for skill acquisition, number of days off work, and culture in the nuclear power plant.

The purpose of this paper is to disclose the trend of population re-centralization of metropolitan areas in prefectural capitals using ‘Population Share Potential.’ Based on the concept of population potential, “Population Share Potential” can be calculated by inserting the population share of a metropolitan area, instead of the actual population, in the population potential formula. The results show that although urban sprawl was predominant in the greater metropolitan areas mainly before 1995, re-centralization was observed some greater metropolitan areas between 1995 and 2000. The recentralization trend grew rapidly between 2000 and 2005, and expanded to local metropolitan areas between 2005 and 2010. On the other hand, the trend was weak overall in the prefectural capitals located in Chubu and Hokuriku areas, suggesting some regional differences. Recent evaluation of relative population distribution shows re-centralization in many local metropolitan areas.