Sociological Theory and Methods
Online ISSN : 1881-6495
Print ISSN : 0913-1442
ISSN-L : 0913-1442
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Volume 12, Issue 2
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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  • What are the problems worth questioning in mathematical sociology ?
    Michio UMINO
    1998 Volume 12 Issue 2 Pages 121-133
    Published: June 15, 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: August 26, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.12.121
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         Based on the review of academic activity of JAMS since its foundation about 10 years ago, this presidential address advocates that activities in mathematical sociology need not be based on a single orthodox philosophical basis. Activities in mathematical sociology are, and should be, so various that the philosophy they base on as a whole should be multifarious. Each project should adapt the philosophy that is most suitable to its characteristics and abstraction level. The address also stresses that mathematical sociologists should be interested in pursuing the mechanism of social reality rather than in the technical improvement of mathematical models.
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Special Section
  • Special Section
    Gaku DOBA
    1998 Volume 12 Issue 2 Pages 135-136
    Published: 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: August 26, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.12.135
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Evolutionary Approach and　Rational　Choice Approach in Sociology
    Teruya ODA
    1998 Volume 12 Issue 2 Pages 137-148
    Published: June 15, 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: August 26, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.12.137
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         In the field of game theoretical research in sociology, there are two different approaches, rational choice approach and evolutionary approach. Rational choice approach postulates actors' high caluculas ability and they are assumed to select Nash equilibria with consideration before the game. On the other hand, in evolutionary approach, actors only have bounded rationality and they select better strategy after the game in repeated games.
         These two approaches have been believed to be methodologically different. But recent advance in evolutionary game theory combines these two approaches. It is clarified that Stable States in an evolutionary game correspond to Nash equilibria in one-shot game, so actors with bounded rationality can select Nash equilibria. These two approach should be called “rational choice theory in the wide sense” and they can go together fruitfully.
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  • The Evolution of Social Interaction in Lattice Models
    Mayuko NAKAMARU, Hiroyuki MATSUDA, Yoh IWASA
    1998 Volume 12 Issue 2 Pages 149-162
    Published: June 15, 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: August 26, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.12.149
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         The rationality of human behavior seems unable to explain the altruism and spite which gives the player a short-term cost. Recent study of evolutionary game theory succeed to explain the condition for these social interaction to appear, based on the dynamics of different behaviors in the population.
         The critical importance of the spatial structure as been revealed- if players interact locally, the society to evolve is very different from if they interact randomly over the whole population. In this article, we review the studies on the evolution of social interaction in Lattice structured models (or cellular automata models). The analysis of lattice models have been restricted to direct computer simulations. Here we apply various mathematical analyses, including birth-and-death processes, pairappoximation, and the pair-edge method.
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  • A Generetive Model of Social Power Structure
    Naoki SUDO
    1998 Volume 12 Issue 2 Pages 163-179
    Published: June 15, 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: August 26, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.12.163
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         Ehara et al.(1984) and Yamazaki & Ehara (1993) found following facts in their conversation analysis.
         1) Many silences are observed in men's conversation. 2) Few silences are observed in women's conversation. 3) Man often interrupts woman's talk, and woman plays the role of listener in conversation between a man and a woman. From these facts, Ehara et al. (1984) concluded that social power exited between men and women. However, Ehara et al. (1984) could not specify the mechanism that produced such social power. This paper analyses this mechanism by using evolutionary game theory. As a result, this paper clarifies that self-defensive emotion realizes social power between men and woman, insists that tolerance to negative others enables equity relation between men and woman.
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  • The logic of Social Evolution :
    Natural Selection and Subjective Selection
    Gaku DOBA
    1998 Volume 12 Issue 2 Pages 181-194
    Published: June 15, 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: August 26, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.12.181
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         It has been repeatedly maintained that the selection mechanism is mainly “subjective selection” in the social evolution as against “natural selection” in the biological evolution. But this claim derives from the misconceptualization of the mechanism of social evolution. Theoretical entities that are selected are “individuals” as physical entities in the biological evolution as against “subjects” as ideal entities in the social evolution. Because of the confused identification of both entities, the logic of biological reductionism and the above claim are deduced. Based on the proper conceptualization, it is supposed that on the basis of subjects' worlds (knowledges, beliefs)the natural selection is the selection mechanism effects on the rules of subjects and the subjective selection is the selection mechanism effects on the actions of subjects. Therefore the logic of the explanation for the contains of subjects' worlds is indispensable so that the observer can discriminate between the natural selection and the subjective selection in the actual process of social evolution.
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Erratum
  • The Problem of “Action and Structure” in the General Theoretical Sociology :
    A Critical Review of Thomas J. Fararo The Meaning of General Theoretical Sociology
    Gaku DOBA, Tsutomu WATANABE
    1998 Volume 12 Issue 2 Pages 197-205
    Published: June 15, 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: August 26, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.12.197
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         Thomas J. Fararo, who is one of the founders of contemporary mathematical sociology has made s comprehensive survey of the sociological traditions in his book The Meaning of General Theoretical Sociology. ln this book he has pointed out “the unification process” of three traditions of sociological theories - systems thinking, theory of action, structuralism - and draw a brief outline in the generative structuralism that is supposed to be generated from the process. ln his idea the micro-sociology and the macro-sociology, or the action theory and the structural theory harmoniously unified inthe generative structuralism. Yet because it is also based on the substantialism of action and structure, it may be not able to solve the problem of conceptual circulation between action and structure which traditional sociological theories could not have solved. Therefore his idea of the generative structuralism is not in the right direction of “the unification process” in the general theoretical sociology.
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