Sociological Theory and Methods
Online ISSN : 1881-6495
Print ISSN : 0913-1442
ISSN-L : 0913-1442
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Volume 9, Issue 1
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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Special Section : Mathematical and Quantitative Approaches to Politics
  • Special Section : Mathematical and Quantitative Approaches to Politics
    Masaru MIYANO
    1994 Volume 9 Issue 1 Pages 1-2
    Published: April 01, 1994
    Released on J-STAGE: March 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.9.1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Are Negotiators Hawkish or Moderate? :
    Negotiator Selection in Two-Level Games
    Keisuke IIDA
    1994 Volume 9 Issue 1 Pages 3-20
    Published: April 01, 1994
    Released on J-STAGE: March 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.9.3
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         The theory of two-level games seeks to integrate the models of international negotiations and domestic policymaking processes, and the existing literature has devoted its attention to the process of “ratification” as a mechanism of transmitting the preferences of domestic actors onto the contents of international agreements. However, selection of negotiators by domestic actors prior to negotiations can serve the same purpose. This article analyzes how domestic preferences affect international agreements through negotiator selection by combining a modified Downsian model and the Rubinstein bargaining model. According to this model, median voters may, under some restricted circumstances, prefer a hawkish to a moderate negotiator in order to enhance the country's bargaining power. The model clarifies the necessary conditions for such a “counter-intuitive” outcome to occur.
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  • Toward a General Theory of Political Violence
    Nobuyoshi KURITA
    1994 Volume 9 Issue 1 Pages 21-37
    Published: April 01, 1994
    Released on J-STAGE: March 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.9.21
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         Political violence is defined as rebellion against the restricted targets by people. There are rival or alterative models, the hypotheses of relative deprivation, of collective behavior, of resource mobilization, of mass society, of conflict contagion, of economic inequality, and, of dependency and periphery, in the field of study on political violence. According to two analytical axes, (1) psychocultural-relation and structure, (2) individual-ecological, these hypotheses are classified into four types, (a) micro political psychology, (b) micro political sociology, (c) macro political psychology, and (d) macro political sociology. The four theoretical types are not conflicting, but complementary. This typology and conceptualization can be applied to a basic model for sociometrical analysis of political violence.
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  • The Olson Problem and Resource Mobilization :
    Rational Choice Theory and Political Sociology of Social Movements
    Kunihiko KIMURA
    1994 Volume 9 Issue 1 Pages 39-54
    Published: April 01, 1994
    Released on J-STAGE: March 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.9.39
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         This paper explores the link between rational choice approaches to collective action or “the Olson problem” and resource mobilization theory as a political sociological approach to social movements. The three major themes in Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1965) are (1) group size and suboptimal provision of collective goods, (2) heterogeneity of individuals and provision of collective goods, and (3) effectiveness of selective incentive in eliciting contribution to collective goods provision. Critics from the resource mobilization perspective and formalizations in terms of rational choice theory concerning these themes are reviewed. The review suggests that, as for the first theme, attempts should be made to link the theoretical derivations obtained from the rational choice approaches with the findings in the study of social movements from the resource mobilization perspective. It is also suggested that, as for the second and third themes, formalizations in terms of rational choice theory which share the assumption of intergroup conflict and cooperation with the resource mobilization approach are needed.
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  • Efficacy of Vote in Multi-Seats Election
    Masaru MIYANO
    1994 Volume 9 Issue 1 Pages 55-69
    Published: April 01, 1994
    Released on J-STAGE: March 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.9.55
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         We examined efficacy of vote in multi-seats elections.
         Efficacy of vote has been calculated for single seat elections and several ways of calculation have been proposed. However, research for the multi-seats elections is far behind.
         We made general considerations for the voters in multi-seats elections. Multi-seats elections request new ideas for the analysis. Especially, we concluded that the assumption that voters have utilities on the combination of winners than the independent winners is suitable.
         Under the assumption we calculated the efficacy for the two-seats three-candidates case with the simplest method of multinomial distribution model.
         We find that a vote is more effective in two-seats three-candidates case than in one-seat two-candidates case. We also find that among two-seats three-candidates elections limited vote system (one vote for one voter) is as effective as bloc vote system (two votes for one voter).
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