The purpose of this article is to ascertain the driving forces for liberalization of civil air transport (i.e., Open Sky) between Japan and the U.S. that had not been realized for a long time, as well as the stumbling blocks for full agreement due to discord over allocating daytime slots to the U.S. at Haneda Airport.
The problems of airports are influenced by historical decision-making. It is difficult to change the location of international airports because the airline companies who had invested in the airport will oppose the transfer since they would have to invest again in a new airport.
Therefore, this article will set up an analytical framework referring to the viewpoints of historical institutionalism, such as the study of Pierson (2004) and focusing on coordination problems, veto points, asset specificity and positive feedback that Pierson mentioned as factors that make revision difficult, but sometimes influence the conditions under which revision may be possible. After that it will analyze the factors of institutional change for the aviation liberalization between Japan and the U.S.
As to the method of the case study, this article will adopt the qualitative approach by conducting interviews with people related to the negotiations for the Civil Air Transport Agreement; the Department of Transportation in the U.S.; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) in Japan; and the airline companies. This article aims to contribute to the study of histric institutionalism, international aviation policy, and liberalization.
From the results of the case study, the liberalization of civil air transport between Japan and the U.S. was realized when the conditions of coordination problems, veto points and positive feedback changed. More concretely, as to veto points, the local governments around Narita Airport agreed with the slots increase at Narita Airport, and the influence of airline companies and their behavior toward the Open Sky agreement changed following the bankruptcy of JAL. As to coordination problems, the opinions of airline companies toward Open Sky were changed by the introduction of anti-trust immunity (ATI), and ATI also changed the opinion of MLIT about of protecting Japanese airlines from international competitions. In addition, a change of government changed the policy that Narita was the only international airport in the Tokyo metropolitan area. These changes gave choices to MLIT in the negotiation for Open Skye with the U.S. The agreement was limited by asset specificity by which airlines opposed moving to a new airport from the stand point of investment.
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