The paper reviews the progression of politics over criminal justice in Indonesia and East Timor from 1998 to 2010 and shows that the lack of sustained political will on the part of the international community and the fluid domestic political situation in Indonesia led to the failure and ultimate collapse of the entire post-conflict justice process. The paper takes up two human rights cases as examples, namely, the political violence surrounding the UN-organized independence ballot in East Timor in 1999 and the Tanjung Priok incident that occurred in Jakarta in 1984. The main struggle was fought over the persecution of high-ranking Indonesian officers who were accused of masterminding, authorizing, or tacitly supporting the crimes against humanity in East Timor. The process was intentionally delayed and the political leadership in Indonesia and the international community both failed to keep up the sustained demand for justice. The failure in this model case eventually affected the domestic judicial process in East Timor and the progress of the Tanjung Priok case in Indonesia.

The paper also describes the cynical worldview of Indonesian high-ranking officers who were involved in the East Timor operation. Finally, the paper draws lessons from these failures. First, Indonesia should have been fully integrated into the post-conflict peacebuilding process. Second, the Indonesian Armed Forces were badly neglected after they left East Timor. Some kind of security sector reform (SSR) would have been desirable, preferably under international supervision. And third, the international community failed to reveal the truth of the conflict, the truth that many western powers were also responsible for the conflict. To address the grievances of the Indonesian soldiers that they alone were accused, an international truth commission could have been established in order to clarify the responsibility of the international actors.

消費生活用製品事故の情報については，製品事故の未然・再発防止に資すること等を目的に経済産業省等により全国的な規模での収集等がなされている．また，被害者の適正な権利行使・救済を図る観点から製造物責任（PL）法施行に際して，各製品分野ごとに設立された「裁判外

More than 23 years have elapsed since the 1996 agreement of returning the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). This article examines structural factors that prevented the return. It argues that the dual hierarchical relations between the U.S. and Japan, and between Japan and Okinawa, caused a delay in returning MCAS Futenma until today. By reviewing changing geo-strategic surroundings, especially the rise of China, and discussing how the U.S. has responded to such changes, this article seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. military strategy and priorities have shifted over the years. It maintains that the increasing military capacity of China, most notably its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, forced the U.S. to reconsider the roles of its own forces in Okinawa and, as a result, prompted the fortification of Guam. The rise of China has also affected the military strategy of Japan, particularly of its so-called “gray-zone” defense of remote island territories. Under these emerging situations, the U. S. Marine Corps reevaluated its position in Okinawa, especially its Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), as deterrence and the only combat-credible U. S. asset pre-deployed in Japan. As MCAS Futenma hosts 24 MV-22, also known as Osprey, which are essential for the MAGTF to accomplish its mission, its return has been postponed until its core functions are relocated to alternative sites. Existing literature views that Japanese domestic politics are directly responsible for the delay. On one level, this article complements such a view by identifying the structural factors that indirectly affected the relevant decisions of the U. S. and Japanese governments in withholding the return of MCAS Futenma. However, the article concludes that the “failure” must be seen as a result of complex interplays among myriad levels of factors including the U.S.–Japan, Japan–Okinawa, and intra-Okinawa relations and politics.

本稿は、アフリカ開発にとって不可避の課題として認識されている