This article aims to re-examine the political process that allowed Deng Xiaoping to regain his power as Chinese leader in 1978, by focusing his foreign policy on domestic politics. Theoretical relations between his modernization strategy, foreign policy and the international state of affairs will be analyzed. It will be shown how Deng increased the tension with Soviet and Vietnamese “hegemons” while strengthening relations with Western capitalists and South-Eastern Asiancountries. His actions led him to become bogged down in the Sino-Vietnamese War in February1979. In doing so, the earliest foreign policy of Deng, who later became a leading advocate of the “independent foreign policy” as China opened up, will be clearly demonstrated. In foreign policy terms, Deng was an orthodox successor to Mao Zedong and highlighted opposition to Soviet “hegemonism.” However, Deng’s greatest domestic political vulnerability arose from his personal history. Deng had been criticized by Mao for his ambitious domestic policy which contradicted Mao’s revolutionary zeal. The United States presidential advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski visited China in May 1978 and stressed the importance of Sino-US strategic cooperation. Brzezinski offered China several technical measures to facilitate such relations.After their meeting, Deng started to promote his new opening-up strategy: because Mao’s diplomacy to form a coalition with the world against the Soviets had been successful, and also because the Soviet Union was actually perceived as the biggest threat to the world, the US and its allies were willing to help China to become strong enough to deter the powerful Soviet Union.Although the world situation was at a difficult stage, a precious opportunity for China to rapidly develop its economy had arrived with help from the developed countries. After winning many diplomatic successes with those nations, Deng justified his hurried development strategy by utilizing Mao’s foreign policy within the Chinese Communist Party(CCP). He proposed that the party should transfer its focus from class struggle to economic development, and gradually consolidated his domestic power. In parallel, China increasingly exaggerated the Soviet threat and its“ surrogate” Vietnamese threat. As the situation in Indochina worsened, Deng made his final decision to launch a war against Vietnam immediately after he took over the leadership of the CCP in late November 1978. In addition to referring to newspaper articles and information in previous studies, this subject uses a volume of historical documents and memoirs published in China in recent years, as wellas diplomatic records relating to China from other countries.
Many political studies of the Philippines share the assumption that the poor have been subordinated by the order of local elites and have functioned as a hotbed of the oligarchic democracy, and that if civic organizations are to help the poor they must be independent of local elites. However, one problem with this kind of assumption is that it ignores how the agencies of the poor negotiate with the dominant order of the oligarchy. I will present a framework showing how the various agencies of the poor struggle over social order, and demonstrating how the local power orders of local elites, the state control projects of state leaders and the social reform projects of civic organizations compete against each other. To make this clear, this paper also focuses on the struggles between the various forces over how street vending and city order in metropolitan Manila should be organized. One state leader tried to get rid of street vendors from the city (state control project) because he regarded the ubiquitousness of street vendors as a symptom of a weak state that cannot enforce law and order.Mayors have tried to maintain autonomous order in their bailiwicks (local power orders), and a civic organization has tried to legalize the interests of street vendors by lobbying the state (social reform project). Street vendors’ organizations have desperately defended street vending. Through this case study, I argue the following: first, in contrast to the dominant assumption of passivity of the poor, street vendors have influenced and constructed part of the contested social order by negotiating, resisting and cooperating with the practices of the state leader, local elites and civic organizations to create their own favorable order. The street vendors’ strategy of organizational bribing to avoid state control means that they have constructed an informal order vis-à-vis state control. Second, I also argue that there are dilemmas in the various expressions of agency available to street vendors. In particular, their practices to construct an informal order to avoid state control have prevented the social reform project which tried to legalize street vending because the informal order created stakeholders among the state officials. Finally, these ambivalent characteristics of the agency of street vendors indicate the difficulties that lie in constructing a democratic order in which the poor can uphold their interests and identities without being harmed by authoritarian orders of strong local elites and state leaders.
The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method. According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival. The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession. The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later. This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.
This research aims to investigate the supply structure of international syndicated loan markets in Asia. In this region, unlike other parts of the world, there is competition between Asianbanks—including Japanese banks—and Western banks. It is particularly important to note that in the Asian market it is possible to compare the leading Asian banks with Western banks. In addition, this study aims to examine how Asian banks compete with Western banks. This analysis uses the framework of industrial organization. An investigation of market conduct, and the factors determining syndication size, elucidates the market structure. From the viewpoint of asymmetric information, regression models have been used to study the factors influencing the number of participating banks. In this study, the empirical analysis uses micro data (loan terms). Further, this study focuses on the competition between Asian and Western banks rather than on typical measures of market concentration. The regression models provide the following results. A nonlinear relationship is found to exist between track record and syndication size. This result indicates that the reputation in the market reduces problems associated with asymmetric information. Companies that are rated or listed expand their syndication size and reveal additional credit information. Loan maturity and syndication scales are found to have a nonlinear relationship. The loan amount and credit line show expected positive effects on syndication size. This study reveals no significant results in terms of collaterals. The denomination of the Asian currencies, including the yen, displays negative effects; funding issues might be involved. The cases in which an Asian bank acts as an arranger have negative effects, implying that Asian and Western banks exhibit different market behavior. Along with the leading Western banks, the leading Asian banks tend to extend facilities of longer maturity and the same syndication size to borrowers, with less credit information.Moreover, the syndication size of the leading Asian banks is smaller than that of the Western banks. This market behavior is not generally expected. Meanwhile, Western banks sell loans to a relatively large number of participants because their loans are oriented to borrowers with more credit information. The key to explaining these differences in supply behavior is that the Western banks focus on deals that are in favor of transaction lending, and the Asian banks prefer a lending relationship based on long-term associations and comprehensive business. This lending relationship explains why the activities of Asian banks differ from what is generally expected.Another aspect of this analysis implies a stratified structure in the Asian market. The divided market structure might enable Asian banks to assume a position comparable to that of Western banks.
It is generally agreed that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) experienced a rapid increase in agricultural output between 1949 and 1952. Foreign economists, however, often point out that official statistics on agriculture in the early period of the PRC are not accurate, but this argument is based on comparisons of statistical figures from the PRC with those from the Republic of China, and figures from the Republic of China are by no means reliable either. It is therefore impossible to examine the agricultural conditions of the time simply by a comparison of statistics. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the campaign of land acreage measurement and crop yield assessment (cha tian ding chan gong zuo), which was the first agricultural statistical survey performed by the PRC, and to analyze the conditions of agricultural statistics at the time.The purpose of the campaign of the land acreage measurement and crop yield assessment was to acquire the information necessary to determine agricultural taxation. It improved the conditions for statistical surveys and revealed several pieces of hidden land, and from 1950 to1952, and especially in 1952, the figures for land acreage and crop yield increased remarkably.However, a considerable gap emerged between figures from before the campaign and after, which prompted the authorities to adjust the earlier figures and inflate them on the basis of the later figures. Although the great increase in agricultural output has been emphasized by Chinese scholars, the degree of the increase has in fact been exaggerated. The campaign was suddenly suspended in spring 1953, even though the authorities had at first planned for it to be a long-term project. Deng Zihui, who had played a leading role in the land reform, actively pushed for the abolition of the campaign, because it seemed to deny altogether the results of a land survey conducted for the land reform; he also feared the campaign would incur dissatisfaction among farmers through an increase in agricultural taxation. In August 1953, the campaign was officially given a judgment of disapproval by the authorities, which has not been overturned until now.Termination the campaign has made people oblivious to the fact that the increase in statistics on agricultural output in the early period of the PRC was partly the result of an improvement in the accuracy of statistical surveys.