This paper discusses Crossroad as a device that allows plays to form certain aspects of a simulation themselves. Crossroad is a gaming simulation based on experiences. First, a simulation is defined as an expression of knowledge based on experience. The experience, game play, Crossroad, simulation forming, and the way in which the simulation is provided are categorized after assuming two positions: simulation creators and simulation players. Second, it is stated that Crossroad is positioned between playing games that have been already developed by creators and building simulations that will be developed by players. Finally, it concludes that Crossroad is a device that allows players to form certain aspects of a simulation and a cognitive support tool to lead players from playing game to constructing solutions in gaming simulation.
We present a review of the quantum game theory seen from the author’s perspective. The quantum strategy is an extension of game theoretical strategy in which the classical joint probability representing the choice of players is replaced by quantum joint probability generated from Hilbert vectors or quantum wave functions. The extra environmental parameters appear in quantum strategies, because of the inherent entanglement present in the quantum wave functions. A detailed examination of the contents of quantum strategy reveals the existence of two components, the first of which is the pseudo-classical strategy that is a deformed strategy modified from the original classical strategy by environmental parameters, and the second of which is the purely quantum contribution that originates from the quantum interference effect. The pseudo-classical component is shown to represent the altruistic strategy which is effective in bringing dilemma games to Pareto optimal Nash equilibria. The quantum interference component usually supplies a small correction. In a proper setting of Harsanyi-type game with incomplete information, however, pseudo-classical terms can be made to cancel each other, leaving only quantum effect in the Nash payoffs, to which, a direct link to the quantum breaking of Bell inequality is established. We also discuss possible applications of quantum games to the evolutionary theory of biology.
We observe in human societies or ecosystems a collective of interacting decision-makers evolve their strategies based on their past experiences, and produce various types of social phenomena. The interactions among evolving/learning agents who interact with each others are often analyzed using (1) the evolutionary game approach or (2) multi-agent simulations with evolving agents (Evolutionary MAS). Although subjects for evolutionary game studies and those for evolutionary MAS studies often overlap, some subjects are best investigated by either of the two. In this paper, we first review the features of both approaches from viewpoint of Darwin’s theory of evolution, and discuss both approaches’ territory: what can be or cannot be well-analyzed by either of the approaches. Furthermore, we survey three researches done by the author and investigate concretely the potential or the possibility of either of the approaches.
Social simulations are one of methods to investigate the feedback between individual’s decision-making and social dynamics. Here we will show the effect of decision-making, which previous studies have not dealt with, on social dynamics, taking our three studies using evolutionary simulation, which is one of social simulations based on the evolutionary game theory: (1) how our decision-making mechanism evolves, (2) if the mechanism of human specific decision-making results in the human specific social dynamics, and (3) what kinds of decisions we make under constraint on the particular social institution. For (1), we investigate what type of decision-making function of punishment evolves in the coevolution of cooperation level and punishment. For (2), we assume that each player has attitude and behavior, and that each player learns either attitude or behavior from their parents, adults and peers. Then we examine if the discrepancy between attitude and behavior results in the coexistence of various social norms. For (3), we analyze the condition that rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are sustainable, and the effect of decision-making in the peer selection rule on sustaining ROSCAs.
Generally behavioral diversity of individuals is one of the central propositions in ecology.+ Additionally coexistence of various strategies and evolution of cooperation have been subjects of interest in the framework that they consider evolution in the game theory. Here we approach these problems from introduction of hierarchical structure into dilemma games. This hierarchical structure game includes the conflict between within-group and between-group gamesmanship. Actually our model is abundantly simple and consists of plain rules and assumptions. However the evolutionary dynamics of players is very complicated and unpredictable.
There are some previous studies in economics. Rapoport and Amaldoss(1999) include between-group competitions for promoting cooperative behavior. In this paper, we give a generalized analysis of the hierarchical structure game based on Rapoport and Amaldoss’s game and discuss between-group effects from the point of view of evolutionary biology.
The purpose of this paper is to show how we can make use of laboratory experiment as a method of equilibrium selection in a voting model that has multiple Nash equilibria. We first analyze this problem of equilibrium selection from a theoretical point of view, such as bloc voting. Then we examine the theoretical predictions by using data obtained from Kurosaka, Hizen and Yoshino’s (2010) laboratory experiment. Our data analysis shows that different Nash equilibria can be realized according to sessions and rounds, but a common characteristic, which is partially consistent with the theoretical predictions, is found between sessions.
Recently, a number of troubles evolving children have emerged on the Internet. Since around 2000, schools have taken certain measures to foster children’s “information moral” so that they can improve their judgment and regulate their behavior on the Internet. Moreover, in 2008, the “Act on Development of an Environment That Provides Safe and Secure the Internet Use for Young People” was enforced, which promoted information moral education and the development of a safe and secure Internet environment. Around a couple of years ago, troubles in using mobile phones were significant concern, however presently, game players are the most popular Internet terminals for children. This means that providers as well as game developers have a moral obligation to contribute to the discussion on children and the Internet.
This article considers this problem from different perspectives that of “children”, who are expected to learn various thing with interest, “guardians” and “schools (teachers)”, who are responsible for the children’s development under safe and sound environment, “companies and organizations”, which pursue profit and promote the development of society, and “the State and local public entities”, which pursue both a safe environment for children and the development of society.