Dispositionalism of color claims that colors are dispositions to cause certain sorts of visual experiences in perceivers. Lately, this theory has been criticized as conflicting with the phenomenology of color experiences. Critics insist that our visual experiences represent colors not as dispositional properties, but as simple, monadic, intrinsic features of physical objects, and that this poses a serious threat to dispositionalism. First, I will examine four versions of this kind of objection and defend dispositionalism against them. Second, based on these considerations, I will explicate the notion of ‘certain sorts of visual experiences' that dispositionalists refer to. More specifically, I will offer a promising view of color experiences through examining the phenomenon of color constancy.

Klyachko, Can, Binicioğlu, and Shumovsky (KCBS) have introduced an inequality which holds if there is a noncontextual hidden variable theory. It is called KCBS inequality. Its violation shows a contradiction between predictions of quantum theory and noncontextual hidden variable theories. Bell-Kochen-Specker (BKS) theorem also shows that there are no noncontextual hidden variable theories in quantum theory by showing that there is no value assignment on a set of all observables. Thus, its approach is different from KCBS inequality. In the present paper, we show a logical relation between KCBS inequality and a value assignment, and examine a consequence of this logical relation.

The aim of this paper is to give appropriate rejoinders to some typical objections to Epistemic Sortalism (ES) and thus to vindicate ES from them. ES argues that in epistemically individuating an object, a subject of perception needs to grasp under which sortal concept the object falls. ES has been, however, questioned lately in terms of both the possibility of misconceptions or ignorance of sortal concepts and the conflict with some current psychological research. I shall show that these objections pose no threat to ES, by examining the notion of ‘individuation' and thereby reorganizing ES as a specific epistemological theory concerning discriminating and identifying knowledge. Based on the relevant ontology, i.e., the constitution view, newly reconstructed ES requires an individuator to grasp the sortal concept of an object as an epistemic evidence.

In this paper I attempt a new analysis of utterances that (implicitly) convey typicality or nontypicality, which have been regarded as cases of conversational implicatures since Grice's classical analysis of them. Leading accounts of such utterances―Horn's and Levinson's―appear inadequate for a kind of them. I take it that utterances conveying typicality split up into two groups and they are different in their ways of generating a typicality implicature. And I regard utterances conveying nontypicality as more closely related with metalinguistic negation than Horn and Levinson assume.