The common idea that a gene encodes a phenotypic character has played an important role in the theory of evolution, one of whose origin is population genetics. Today, the relationship between a gene and a phenotype is sometimes interpreted informationally, i.e., a gene conveys phenotypic information. In this study, the nature of genetic information about phenotypes is discussed by considering teleosemantics. It shows that phenotypic information is not carried by a single gene, but by a genome containing multiple genes and the regulatory regions which form the related gene networks.

This paper discusses John McDowell's disjunctivism. Through the Argument from Illusion, many philosophers have accepted that subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experiences share an underlying mental state (a highest common factor). McDowell, by contrast, thinks of this conception of experience as problematic, developing disjunctivism, which claims that a veridical experience and a corresponding delusive one need not be taken as having a common state-even if they are indistinguishable from one another. However, his writings are difficult to read, so that his thought on disjunctivism, it seems, is still not properly understood or evaluated. Given that the validity of disjunctivism is an important topic in the philosophy of perception, and given that McDowell is one of the standard-bearers of the position, such a situation would be quite unsatisfactory. Therefore, in this paper I work on two things: namely, I try first to give an interpretation of his relevant thought, and then to reveal its significance.

Along with the advancement of science and technology, the quest for enhancement that can complement and modify human nature towards a better-than-well state is becoming a reality. One of the most tenacious criticisms of enhancement rests on the understanding that a persons’ nature should remain unmediated, thus, advocating the authenticity of human nature. Scholars against this bio-conservative critical position state that it is a conceptual mistake to derive “ought” from “is”. If the latter indication is valid, it is essential for bio-conservatives to present values, principles, and arguments that can refuse enhancement in alternative ways. In contrast, if advocates of technological progress (techno-progressives) want to lend a robust support to enhancement, they should present persuasive arguments rather than merely critiquing the lacunae in bio-conservative arguments. In this survey paper, we focus on contentions put forth by the techno-progressives against the bio-conservatives in attempting to justify enhancement, We especially scrutinise the case made by James Hughes, who advocates the convergence of technological progress and democratic social change.