This paper discusses how a discourse of “reporting” thoughts is possible in Jones' myth of EPM. It is unclear how it is possible for the Ryleans to “report” their own thoughts in Jones's myth. Sellars's answer is found in correspondence between Castañeda and Sellars. According to it, it is possible to “report” a thought by “respond[ing] to thought that-p by saying “I am thinking that-p””. I discuss the process by which the first-person authority over their own thoughts is established in EPM through examining of what it means to respond to their own thoughts in meta-thoughts and why it makes it possible for them to “report” their thoughts.
There is a familiar tension between the two main components of non-reductive physicalism, which are physicalism, on the one hand, and the non-reducibility or autonomy of so-called special sciences (i.e., sciences other than physics), on the other. While it is often claimed that this tension can be satisfactorily resolved by adopting the subset account of realization(defended by e.g., Shoemaker (2001) and Wilson (2011)), this paper challenges that popular view, by elaborating some critical comments by Funkhouser (2014). Then, after examining Funkhouser's own position, this paper proposes a new way of resolving the aforementioned tension, which consists in refining the subset account's analysis of realization on the basis of various dependence relations between causal powers.
The Manifestation Requirement, advanced by Dummett in his critique of semantic realism, has been criticized for being behavioristic, and the responses have been made that the critics are mistaken. However, the dispute has failed to exhibit the point of the Requirement. In this paper, I shall argue (1) that, in the light of Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge, knowledge of linguistic meaning is to be seen as the knowledge-how that forms the basis of the practical knowledge that an agent has of his own intentional actions, (2) that such knowledge of linguistic meaning is to be based on mutual agreements in a community, and (3) that the Manifestation Requirement is a condition for the possibility of such mutual agreements. As a result, the Manifestation Requirement finds its basis on the idea that language and linguistic acts are tools that we use while continually improving them.