Philosophy (Tetsugaku)

Science and the View of the World

The Case of Galileo

Seizo Aoki

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 1-17
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.1

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Having described the process from the Galileo's first acquaintance with the Copernican theory to his establishment of that theory, the author passes on to the Galileo's most decisive demonstration of the theory, and indicates that his scientific demonstration was founded on a grave erroneous theory of tide.
Galileo, being a great physicist and astronomer, developed the modern science in various branches ; mathematics, dynamics, astronomy etc. But as the establishment of Copernican theory by Galileo, which has been considered to be his most important contribution to the modern science, was founded on a wrong assumption, the process against Galileo by the Roman Catholic Church, which has been regarded as a typical model of the conflict between science and religion, may not be called exactly as a conflict between science and religion. It would be more proper to say that it was a conflict between an old view of the world and a new one.
The author maintains that the relations between science and the view of the world might be considered as the relations between productive forces and the productive relations which are described in the Marx' Preface to the “Critique of the political economy.” Science should be with, and be developed in, a view of the world, and the view corresponds to a certain degree of development of the science of that time. And when the view of the world became a barrier of the development of science, but not the conditions for it, the view would be replaced by another. The process against Galileo was the replacement of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic view by the Copernican.According to this opinion of the author, it may be not difficult to understand, why the Galileo's scientifically erroneous demonstration of Copernican theory has really been the most important contribution to the modern science by him.

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Logic of Discovery

Shuntaro Ito

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 18-39
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.18

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It seems to me that there have been two philosophical view-points on the nature of 'law ' or 'theory ' in science-inductionist and hypothetico-deductionist. According to the former view presented by Bacon, Mill etc., the scientific law is nothing but a generalization of individual facts by inductio per enumerationem, while the latter view presented by modern philosophers of science like Carnap, Popper, Braithwaite etc. stress the explicative function of scientific theories which are verified by conclusions deduced logically from them.
'Inductionist ', I believe, is wrong in regarding the formation of a ' law ' simply as a generalization of individual facts and in neglecting its explicative nature. On the other hand, 'hypothetico-deductionist'-though they rightly stress the explicative nature of a law-give no account about how such a law is formed initially. The neither view takes 'logic of discovery ' into proper consideration. ' Hypothetico-deductionists ' say in chorus that the initial stage of conceiving a new theory is utterly dependent on a 'genius ', 'hunch ', 'intuition ' or 'inspiration ' of individual scientist and does not imply any logical elements. It rather belongs to the domain of empirical psychology or socio-historical analysis.
I think, however, that the process of new formation of a law or theory is rational enough to be susceptible of logical analysis and these logical elements in scientific discovery cannot be reduced to a psychological or sociological problem.
I analyse this logical process in the following typical examples of scientific discovery :
1. Discovery of the law of falling bodies by Galileo
2. Discovery of the law of elliptical orbits of the planets by Kepler
3. Discovery of the law of universal gravitation by Newton

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The Logical Structure in the Writing of History

Yoshio Kayano

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 40-59
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.40

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This essay consists of three main parts. (1) The first one deals with the problem of the materials of historical knowledge, i.e. reliable documents and artifacts, which are established by a strict historical-critical method. (2) The second part treats how historical knowledge is reconstructed. a) Historical documents serve as data of history, but they themselves are not verified with their original happenings, which are perished at present. b) In writing history, one uses reconstructed statements which are inferred from given documents. If this inference means to find a mere consistent relation between data, then it does not follow that this relation has any means to confirm itself in its correspondence to the original happenings. c) In order to prevent these reconstructed statements from falling into speculative suppositions which have no means of empirical equivalence, one should appeal, at the same time, to the present human knowledge as well as experience, using some laws, generalizations, regularities, ideal types, patterns, which hold to be true. It is natural, however, that to have an empirical equivalence does not mean to have an empirical correspondence to the past original events. (3) The last part has an aim to make some analysis of the reconstruction of past continuities or series of events or the continuant persistence of both parts and partial attributes of an event, because the writing of history has its unique aim to reconstruct not only factual statements of past but also statements concerning continuant past. In short, this essay is merely a partial sketch of “The Logic of Historical Knowledge, ” which I have long pursued.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 60-79
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.60

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Contingency and Necessity of Temporal Being

Kiyoyuki Yamamoto

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 81-99
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.81

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The principal problem of this essay : What is the causa principalis of esse actualerei singularis (individualis)?
(1) Esse actuale is duratio, sive indefinita existendi continuatio. Although it can_ be defined with any temporal terminus a quo and ad quem, it can't be confused with acternitas. Permanence (durable duration), aevum and sempiternity are only modes of duration, but don't belong to the eternity itself. (2) Res singularis is integral individual. When it is some composite one, it has to have an integral innerpower. (3) And every integral individual is a corresponding part of the Infinite, their principal cause. The Infinite and its integral parts belong altogether to the coordinates of aeternitas. (4) The Infinite, the principal cause is companied by some concomitant causes, external and internal causes. They are only sine-qua-non to the principal cause, but supported by the latter. (5) In the co-ordinates of eternity, we can recognize the infinite thickness of the temporal duration, for the Infinite is enough open to support the infinitely various rhythm of the whole duration.
Conclusion : The ontological point of view of this essay is the positive philosophy or the philosophical (metaphysical) empiricism. Its most important points are (i) the integral nature of individual and (ii) the Infinite as the principal cause of every individual. These points make the positive philosophy to agree with the actual and infinite progression of the temporal duration.

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La raison dialectique et la raison analytique

Sadao Tajima

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 100-118
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.100

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Cet essai a pour but d'eclaircir la distinction et le rapport de la raison dialectique et de la raison analytique. La première partie montre la sémiotique américaine et la théorie de l'information comme deux représentants les plus importants de la raison analytique contemporaine. Nous remarquons d'abord que le concept sémiotique de la signification conserve la distinction classique de la connotation (property) et de la dénotation (class) qu'on peut déterminer quantitativement, et nous examinons la relation mathématique de leur détermination quantitative à ce qu'on appele “la quantité d' information” dans la théorie moderne de l'information. Ensuite nous distinguons la quantité et la qualite de la signification et démontrons dans la seconde partie que la théorie dialectique de la quantité et de la qualité dans ce domaine peut intégrer les relations rigoureuses du coté purement quantitative de la signification. La connaissanse de l'individu et celle de l'histoire donnent les exemples claires de cette dialectique de signification. On peut estimer la portée de la méthode progréssive-regressive de J. P. Sartre.

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Motion and Reality

Norio Fujisawa

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 119-141
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.119

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The paper deals with Zeno's celebrated arguments against the reality of motion. My aim is, however, not to offer a new solution for them, but to bring forward for consideration the general claim assumed in them about the criterion of 'reality' : i.e. the claim that what is logically (λóγφ) impossible must not be regarded as 'real'.
With this intention I first reexamined Aristotle's two different treatments (the one, in Physica Z2, 9, the other, ibid. θ8) of the 'dichotomy' and the 'Achilles and the Tortoise' in some detail, and tried to make clear in what points they were inadequate for Zeno's contention.
Then, in conformity to the results of these considerations, the solutions offered by modern philosophers, such as H. Bergson, B. Russell, C. D. Broad and G. Ryle (together with W. James, A. N. Whitehead and J. N. Findlay), were reviewed and classified.
It was observed that the points made by some of these writers (C. D. Broad and G. Ryle) are, in principle, exactly the same as those in Aristotle's first solution (Phys. Z2), which Aristotle himself regarded as insufficient. And as to the others, in spite of their elaborate efforts, it must be admitted that Zono's problem about motion, as such, has not yet been finally answered and, moreover, can never be answered. The reason of this impossibility to be answered is simply that, under the rule to be observed in the treatment of this problem, the reality (i.e. rationality or logical possibility) of motion should be shown without defining in advance 'what is perceived' (τò αiσθητóυ, to which motion belongs) as 'real', and that 'what is perceived' can never be perfectly rational i.e. 'to be grasped by λóγοζ.

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J. Bohme und die deutsche Philosophie

Haruo Omura

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 142-156
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.142

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J. Böhmes Theosophie ist der sehr charakteristische, christliche Mystizismus und ist ganz anderes als die Philosophie. In der Tat trat sie nicht in die deutsche Philosophie seit Leibniz hinein. Aber, was den deutschen Idealismus betrifft, so hatte sie grossen Einfluss auf Hegel und Schelling. Wenn sie auch hier unverändert, charakteristisch war, so wurde sie doch in geeigneter logischer Form systematisiert und in dem bestimmten Bereich der deutschen Philosophie verallgemeinert. Hegels Konzeption über die “Wissenschaft der Logik” ist insbesondere bemerkenswert. Die spekulative Seite der Böhmeschen Theosophie wurde erst von ihm klar gemacht und erweitert. Schelling war dagegen vielmehr der Nachfolger ihrer mythologischen Hauptseite.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japane ...

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 157-171
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.157

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Les problemes d'ètre chez Avicenne et chez St. Thomas d'Aquin

Yasuo Chisaka

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 172-181
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.172

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Avicenne et St. Thomas sont d'accord pour reconnaître que l'idée d'être est ce que l'intelligence conçoit en premier iieu au moyen d'abstraction et de séparation des expériences sensibles.
L'être se considère, selon Avicenne, de deux aspects : essence et existence. Avicenne a distingué les essences des choses d'une triple manière et a regardé l'essence considérée absolument en elle-même ccmme l'indépendante sans aucun rapport avec les autres, tandis que les essences qui se trouvent “in re” et “in intellectu” sont rapportées à un état quelconque. D'où il consulte que l'existence qui ne peut être appelée qu'un accident a'ajoute à l'essence constituée absolument en elle-même, et que l'existence et l'essence se distinguent réelement l'une l'autre. Il en résulte que l'essence seule désigne l'absoluité autosuffisante et le fondement le plus final, et que, par contre, l'existence n'a qu'un caractère accidentel qui ne se trouve qu'en union avec l'essence.
St. Thomas a admis premièrement cette distinction tripartite d'essence soulevée par Avicenne, mais il a été différent entièrement de celui-ci au cas où celui-là a appliqué la théorie d'acte et de puissance à la considération sur l'être. Aprés cela, il a envisagé l'être comme l'acte des actes et comme la cause des existences à la fois, puisque l'être lui-même justement l'acte premier, infini et pur. L'être, qui ne participe à rien, est donc le principe de toute réalité et la perfection la plus haute. Le tout est réalisé par la participation à l'être. Il est par là évident que toute réalité est composée d'essence et d'existence et que l'essence elle-même est en puissance à l'égard de l'être.
Ainsi, à l'opposé de l'opinion avicennienne, au lieu que l'être soit accidentel, c'est, pour St. Thomas, le fondement absolu sur lequel tous les principes seront établis, et c'est, d'ailleurs, à l'être lui-même que s'accorde toujours toute la primauté.

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Das Problem der “Achtung” in Kants Ethick

Yasuo Takemura

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 181-189
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.181

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Es ist die Absicht dieser Abhandlung, den Begriff “Achtung” in Kants Ethik in. seine eigentliche Stellung zu bringen. Das Achtungsgefühl hat von mehreren Philosophen-auch von Kant selbst-mißverstanden worden, nur darum daß es ein Gefühl ist. Ich habe es in einen negativen Sinne in die Mitte von Kants Ethik zurückgebracht, indem ich den Begriff des Willens, das von Kant als von der sittlichen Gesetzen unmittelbar bestimmt ausgesagt wurde, für einen Willen als “Idee” angesehen and dann auch gezeigt habe, daß das Gefühl, das er aus seiner Ethik ausschließen wollte, -um genau zu sagen-nur das in der Selbstliebe begründete. bedeutet. Nach Kants Aussagen in ?Metaphysik der Sitten “oder ?Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten” kann Achtung aber, ich denke, ncch positiver eingenornmen werden : nämlich sie kann als einen aktiveren Entschluß eines Subjekts vor der sittlichen Gesetzen begriffen werden.

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Uber die Welt und das Nichts in Heidegger

Tatsuo Taniguchi

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 190-198
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.190

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Es ist die Absicht dieser Abhandlung, die Zusammenhang zwischen die Welt und das Nichts in Heidegger zu erklären, und damit den Schritt seines Denkens bis zum Sein zu deuten.
Die Transzendenz ist die Grundverfassung des Daseins. Das Ziel dieser Transzendenz ist einerseits die Welt, und andererseits das Nichts. Die Welt ist kein Seiendes, sondern drs Wie im Ganzen, das das Seiende im Ganzen bestimmt. Dieses Wie im Ganzen ist die Welt der Bedeutsamkeit, die das Seiende im Ganzen in der Weise der Bewandtnis offenbart. Aber diese Welt der Bedeutsamkeit verändert sich durch die Vermittelung der Angst in die Welt der Unbedeutsamkeit, nämlich ins Nichts. Das Nichts offenbart das Seiende im Ganzen in der Weise der Unbewandtnis.
Die Welt ist die Lichtung des Tages, und das Nichts ist die Lichtung der Nacht. Und die Lichtung, die durch die Lichtung der Nacht hindurch herauskommt, ist das Sein. Der Weg zum Sein offenbart sich durch die Welt und das Nichts. Dies ist der Schritt des Denkens bis zum Sein in Heidegger.

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Existentialism and the Problem of “Body”

Katsuhisa Iizuka

1965 Volume 1965 Issue 15 Pages 198-206
Published: March 31, 1965
Released on J-STAGE: May 07, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1965.198

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The “Body” has been mainly discussed as a problem of its relation to soul. In Descartes' dualism it was entirely identified with the physical thing and was opposed to soul. For this reason the problem of connection of those two entities was succeeded by the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism. Bergson, however, pointed out that the hypothesis was derived from the principles of the mechanical view of nature. He severely criticized Cartesianism from his own standpoint and introduced the idea of “pure perception” into his treatise concerning the connection of mind with matter, but could not necessarily shake himself free from the cognitive viewpoint. It is existentialism that dealt with body in the pre-reflective dimension of being. In fact, it argued body not as an object of epistemology, but as our existence itself. And thus, the conclusion of this paper is this : existentialism has made an epoch in the history of the problem of body.

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