Philosophy (Tetsugaku)

Politics as Rituals for the dead, or Nation-state and Democracy

Takeshi OHBA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 1-14
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.1

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Democratic rights have been, since the Periclean democracy on, closely tied to, not to say bestowed by, a power of sovereign state to let person die : the power that mobilizes the masses by making them citizens of a nation-state. This power to let people die has become domestically invisible after a turn to the Foucaultian bio-power by virtue of democratic politics. However the power remains to let poeple die who are not counted as citizens of a nation-state : those who failed to build their nation-state, those who are not yet born, and those who suffer from difficulties which cannot be solved by an agreement among nation-states. Philosophical issues are; 1. how democracy can be something more than a device for aggregation of each's subjective and egoistic prefference, 2. how a democratic decision can and should go for our, i. e. first-person decision. These invite us to re-consider about social construction of selfhood.

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Ist das Bestehen des demokratischen Staates moglich ?

Yutaka SASAZAWA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 15-27
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.15

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Während die Demokratie im allgemeinen als wünschenswert angesehen wird, verlieren die Grenzen der Staaten, auf denen die Demokratie beruht, ihre Bedeutung allmählich unter den internationalen Wirtschaftsverhältnissen. Kann die Demokratie angesichts des fortschreitenden Verlusts der Grenzen fortbestehen ? Meiner Meinung nach ist der Produzent dieser Situation in Wirklichkeit die Demokratie selbst, indem sie einerseits den Menschen als rational, andererseits den Staat als das die Interessen des Volkes Sichernde voraussetzt und dadurch die hauptsächlich ihren eigenen Interessen nachjagenden Menschen erzeugt. Diese demokratischen Menschen überschreiten die Grenzen leicht, so daß der Staat in ihrem Erwerbsleben immer mehr an Bedeutung einbüßt. Wenn wir diese Sachlage überwinden wollen, müßten wir das Menschenbild, das die Demokratie bisher vorausgesetzt hat, verändern und ein neues Staatsbild, das den Menschen einen neuen Sinn gibt, vorlegen.

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Democracy

Its Epistemological Basis and Boundary Conditions

Itaru SHIMAZU

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 28-41
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.28

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Plato's main strategy to attack democracy and to defend the regime of philosopher-king was to compare politics with gymnastics or shoe-making where there are specialists recognized as such. Sophists denied his premise that in politics discovering the right answer matters, on behalf of relativism of truth and justice, saying what matters there is rather consensus. But in the long tradition of political philosophy simple regime of demos was not very popular and some ingredients of 'mixed regime', philosophers thought, are necessary.
But in contemporary mixed regime who would be aristos and what would they be expected to know better than demos? Well, they should know better the limits of government first of all. This is the problematic of liberal or constitutional democracy where these limits are set by the concept of human rights. It is argued that here we are limiting the kind of association as being societas or civil condition prohibiting any approach to government in analogy with universitas or enterprise association. They are aristos in the sense that we do presuppose there are better men and women whom we are to entrust the government. That means we are in the weakest sense of the word no-egalitarian, finding sense in trying ourselves to be better and in looking for better people for better politics.

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Minds, Brains, and Functionalism

Yukihiro NOBUHARA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 42-54
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.42

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According to functionalism, different mental states of an organism are realized by its different physical states. Each mental state has its own distinct physical state as a realizer. I argue that this view of atomistic realizations of mental states is made questionable by some considerations from ecologism and connectionism. My supposition is that at least in some cases a group of mental states are realised holistically by some same physical state. Functionalists emphasize the unreducibility of the mental to the physical. I argue that holistically realized mental states are more unreducible to physical states than atomistically realized ones because some quasi-reductive relations such as token identity and a kind of derivablity hold in the case of atomistic realizations.

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The Place of Mind in the Causal World

Masashi NAKAHATA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 55-73
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.55

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Recently some philosophers have cast doubt on the causal relevancy of the mental. In particular, they complain that functionalism and anomalous monism fail to make the mental causally efficient. However, both the critics and the defenders of these views share a common picture of causation that generates the problem of mental causation : they sharply contrast causation with normativity or rationality and take it to be prior to and independent of our explanatory practice. Rejecting this assumption, this paper argues that there is a deep connection between psychological explanation and the attribution of causal powers of the mental.

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Interdisciplinary Re-examination of Conceptual Framework of Environmental Ethics

Shuichi KITOH

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 74-88
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.74

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Every principal approach to environmental ethics-anthropocentrism, biocentrism, or ecocentrism-depends on the man-nature dichotomy. But, all the animals, plants and natural objects are not separated from human beings and their activities. And recent studies of related disciplines, ecological anthropology, environmental folklore, and environmental sociology bring the fruitful suggestions about this aspect. Consequently, in this article I try to re-examine the conceptual framework of mainstream environmental ethics from the interdisciplinary standpoint, and to plot the framework of new type environmental ethics based on the relationship between man and nature. To analyze wholeness of relationship between man and nature, two elements of relationship, social-economic links and cultural-spiritual links, are introduced. And it is demonstrated that every human activity which varies from “susbsistence” to “play” has the two elements, inseparably. Commons and property is also essential problem of environmental ethics. This problem is examined from the standpoint of new conceptual framework of environmental ethics.

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Einige Fragen an Herrn Prof. Kito und Vorschlag

Hirokazu YOSHIMOTO

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 89-92
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.89

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Fragen :
1. Was ist derjenige Mechanismus, der einige Ketten (=links) entweder systematisert oder zerlegt ?
2. Wie ist die Beziehung zwischen der inneren Qualiät des Bezugs zur Natur und der Seinsweise des Netzspiels von Ketten?
3. Ich meine, daß der Grundzug der gegenwärtigen europäischen Zivilisation, der alle Sachen auf Quantität reduziert, das Netzspiel zerlegt. Um das Problem der Umweltethik zu diskutieren, braucht man nicht solchen Gesichtspunkt? Was meinen Sie dazu ?
4. Ich glaube, statt aus der Lokalität auszugehen, ist es vielmehr wichtig, jenen Grundcharakter der europäischen Zivilisation als solchen zuerst zu bedenken, der die Differenz der Lokalität vernichtet und also sich global verbreitet. Was ist Ihre Meinung ?
5. Ist es nicht sehr schwer, die Technologie zu akzeptieren, ohne das Netzspiel von Ketten zu zerlegen ? Ist es dann moglich, das Problem der Umweltethik auf Technologieethik zu reduzieren ?
Vorschlag :
Mir scheint es notig, den Begriff jener Individualität in die Theorie der sozialen Kette aufzunehmcn, die jede Kette einmalig und originell in sich versammelt.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japane ...

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 93-166
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.93

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Gesetz und Gerechtigkeit in Platons “Kriton”

Yasunaka MATSUDA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 167-176
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.167

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Sokrates in Platons Dialog “Kriton” wird von vielen Interpreten als autoritärer Denker betrachtet, der den bedingungslosen Gehorsam gegen staatliche Gesetzte behauptet. Einige Autoren haben dagegen in Sokrates Worten den Vorbehalt für den auf berechtigtem Grund beruhenden Ungehorsam eingesehen und versucht, ihn als liberalen Denker zu interpretieren. Nach dieser Deutung wird der Ungehorsam der Bürger gerechtfertigt, wenn der Staat oder sein Gesetz sie dazu zwingt, Unrecht zu tun. Das Verhältnis zwischen Gesetz und Gerechtigkeit in “Kriton”, nach dem nur selten gefragt worden ist, wird problematisch, wenn man sich daran erinnert, daß die Forderung der Gerechtigkeit und die der staatlichen Gesetze nicht immer miteinander übereinstimmen. Es wird zu seigen sein, deß Sokrates Gehorsam gegen desu Gesetz in “Kriton” auf seiner Überzeugung beruht, deß man auf keine Weise Unrecht tun darf, und deshalb der “librale” Sokrates dem “autoritären” Sokrates nicht widerspricht.

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The Method of Hypothesis in the Phaedo

Hiroaki KURIBAYASHI

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 177-186
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.177

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The method of hypothesis in the Phaedo consists of setting up a hypothesis and regarding as true whatever seems to accord with it, and as false whatever does not. It has been disputed what relation the “accord” expresses. In my opinion, it is not the deducibility (Robinson), and it is not the relation between a theory-hypothesis and its applications (Gallop, Rowe), either. So I propose a new interpretation in this paper : it is the relation between the premises and the conclusion of a rational inference. A inference is called rational when its premises give good reasons for believing the conclusion.

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True Belief and Cognition-An Interpretation of Theaetetus 208c4-209d3

Satsuki TASAKA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 187-196
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.187

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In the last passage of the Theaetetus (208c6-210b3), Socrates tries to define knowledge of an object as true belief with the logos which means the description distinguishing it from any other object. At first half of this passage (208c4-209d3), Plato put in question how to specify an object as what it is without having its logos.
In my view of this paper, Plato explains a specification of an object in one's belief context. If one has a true belief about an object, he can be directly conscious of a distinction in his belief between it and any other object without having its logos. His cognitive experience is based on the dintinction, which he has obtained in his memory and cannot be known to others.

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Aquinas on 'Active Intellect' and 'Human Individuality'

Naoki KUWABARA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 197-206
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.197

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Contrary to the tradition of Islamic philosophers, who interpret Aristoteles' active intellect as transcendent cosmic intellect, Aquinas interprets the active intellect as immmanent in human individual soul. This interpretation suggests that Aquinas rejects the Neo-Platonic scheme of epistemology, which was current among the Islamic philosophers. On the other hand, he takes Platonic position about the subsistence of soul. This ambiguous attitude to the Platonism cannot be explained in Platonism-vs-Aristotelianism sheme. I have tried to clarify that the Aquinas' basic position, recognized throughout this ambiguity, is his emphasis on the human individuality.

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John Locke's Philosophy of Natural Science

Hitoshi TAMURA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 207-216
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.207

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The aim of this paper is to show the consistency of Locke's philosophy of natural science. Most of Locke scholars have wrongly assumed that his way of ideas contains an intrinsic difficulty about the reality of the external world. This paper makes it clear, however, that Locke deals with epistemological problems in terms of the distinction between facts and theory, not between the internal and the external. Locke does not admit that human beings can obtain a justified universal theory about the physical constitution of the world. But he happily affirms that they can be justified, by means of “simple ideas of sensation”, in believing in particular facts about the external world. Locke's conception of science is essentially Baconian and his way of ideas, a Cartesian inheritance, is shaped up within his Baconian scheme.

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“Realität” und “objektive Realität” bei Kant

-Kraft als Realität-

Masayuki INUTAKE

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 217-226
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.217

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Vor und nach seiner Periode der Kritik erhielt Kant durchgehend den traditionellen Sinn von Realität. Nach dem bedeutet die Realität die Wesensbestimmung des Dinges, das außer dem Verstand existiert.
Anderseits bestimmt Kant den Sinn von der objektiven Realität der Vorstellung als die Bestimmtheit der Existenz des Objekts, das durch diese Vorstellung vorgestellt wird.
Durch diese Erkenntniskritik fragt Kant nach der Realität des Gegenstandes der Erfahrung, d. i. dem Wesen der Natur, und antwortet, daß es die Kraft ist. Diese Kraftbegriff wird in der “Phänomenologie” der Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft als die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Beschreibung der objektiven Bewegung des Körpers, d. i. der Erfahrung der Bewegung dargestellt.

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Unendlichkeit und Zeit

Die Entstehung der Zeitlehre in Hegels >>Glauben und Wissen<<

Toshihiro OYABU

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 227-236
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.227

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In >>Glauben und Wissen<< finden wir den Prototyp der Hegels Zeitlehre, die in dem Kapitel >>das absolute Wissen<< der >> Phänomenologie des Geistes<< geschrieben ist. Dadurch erläutert er die Notwendigkeit der Zeit für das Bewußtsein oder den Geist, daß er die Ursache des >>Jacobis Grunddogmatismus<< und des >>Betrugs der Imagination<<klärt. Er ableitet die Zeit des Geistes aus dem >Zusammenhang der drei Formen der Unendlichkeit<. Das Bewußtsein erhaltet die >>Abstraktion der Zeit<<, wenn das Bewußtsein von den Attributen das Denken isoliert und es nicht als Attribut der wahren Unendlichkeit, als welches es diese selbst ausdrückt, begreift, sondern es, abstrahiert von ihr, als leeres Denken, subjektive Unendlichkeit fixiert und diese Abstraktion in relative Beziehung auf die empirische Unendlichkeit der einzelnen Dinge setzt.

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Hegels Phänomenologiesystem und Aristoteles' De Anima

Yuichiro OKAMOTO

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 237-246
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.237

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Diese Abhandlung versucht, Hegels Phänomenologiesystem aus der Deutung des Aristotelischen Nous zu erklären. Hegel studiert 1805/6 in Jena intensiv Aristoteles' theoretische Philosophie, während er zu dieser Zeit die Phänomenologie des Geites verfaßt. Er nimmt die Theorie des Aristotelischen Nous in sein Phänomenologiesystem auf.
Hegels Phänomenologiesystem tritt in zwei Gestalten auf. Es ist 1. Phänomenologie und 2. Logik. Diese Zweiheit des Phänomenologiesystems entspricht der Zweiheit des Aristotelischen Nous. 1. Phänomenologie und 2. Logik werden 1. als passiver Nous, und 2. als aktiver Nous aufgefaßt.
Durch diesen Versuch können wir ans Licht bringen, was die Vernunft in der Phänomenologie des Geistes eigentlich ist.

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Die Probleme der Zufälligkeit in der positiven Philosophie Schellings

Takashi HASHIMOTO

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 247-255
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.247

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Schuzo Kuki legt in seiner Philosophie großes Gewicht auf die Zufälligkeit.
Er teilt die Zufälligkeit in die kategorische, die hypothetische und die disjunktive ein, und er erklärt die disjunktive Zufälligkeit am Beispiel des „Urzufall“s, den er aus Schellings „Philosphie der Mythologie” zitiert.
Kuki interpretiert den „Urzufall“ als die Idee, aber in der positiven Philosphie Schellings bezeichnet dieser nicht die Idee, sondern das wirkliche Ereignis, das die Mythologie erklärt.
Die Absicht dieses Aufsatzes ist, die Eigentümlichkeit der positiven Philosophie Schellings, die ich „die Metaphysik der Wirklichkeit” nenne, klarzumachen.

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Perspicuity and Aspect

On Wittgenstein's Notion of Übersehen

Hiroki SEKIGUCHI

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 256-265
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.256

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Although Wittgenstein insists on the importance of the notion of a perspicuous representation (übersichtliche Darstellung) in his Philosophical Investigations (section 122), this notion has scarecely been clarified by Wittgenstein scholars. The aim of my paper is to throw light on this notion. A clue is found in the sections 90-92 of Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein explains the aim of his invesitigations by contrasting them with the investigations which aim at exact representaions of the use of our words. Another clue is found in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, where Wittgenstein says that changing notation of a proof-pattern that is not perspicuous into one that is perspicuous changes our way of looking at it. From these clues I try to show that the opening sections of Investigations (i. e. a famous example of five-red-apples and a primitive language-game of section 2) should be seen as a typical place where Wittgenstein uses a perspicuous representation as the method of his philosophy.

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Quine on 'the Indeterminacy of Translation' and 'the Underdetermination of Empirical Theory'

Toshihiro OHISHI

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 266-275
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.266

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The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is that manuals for translation can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. On the other hand the thesis of the underdetermination of empirical theory means that empirical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all possible data. According to Quine, there is a parallel between these two theses, but the parallel fails in certain respects. However, the reasons Quine gives for the parallel-failing are not valid, because they presuppose the problematical doctrine of physicalistic ontology. Although these reasons may be invalid, I still believe that the thesis of indeterminacy plays a singular role in justifying a refusal of the hypostatization of meaning. It is in this respect that the thesis of indeterminacy ultimately differs from the thesis of underdetermination.

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La réversibilité et l'altérité dans la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty

Tomohiko YARA

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 276-285
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.276

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Merleau-Ponty qualifiait la réversibilité de «vérité ultime». «La réversibilité» exprime la fonction ontologique d'alterner les deux termes <le voyant-le visible>, <le touchant-le touché>, tout en les faisant demeurer dans la même chair. Et plus il soulignait l'importance d' «une réversibilité toujours imminente et jamais réalisée en fait». Je ne parviens jamais à me toucher touchant. Il y a quelque chose qui déborde cette réversibilité. Le but de cette essai est rechercher le sens de l'imminence de la réversibilité. Est-ce la latence de l'Être ? ou la transcendance de l'Être ? ou la transcendance même au-delà de l'Être ? La possibilité de déchirer l'ontologie de la chair serait montrée, qui est «l'impensé» dans la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty.

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Philosophical Epistemology and Naturalism

Shunkichi MATSUMOTO

1996 Volume 1996 Issue 47 Pages 286-295
Published: May 01, 1996
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1996.286

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'Philosophical Epistemology'is a name I have given here for the position which keeps an internalistic point of view on the problem of determining ontological status of the act of thinking of us human and of the epistemological evaluation of its product. On the other hand, 'Naturalism'is the position which tends to adopt an externalistic point of view on the same problem. And their claims often conflict sharply each other. In this paper, I tried to make distinct the conflicting point between the both and, taking myself the former position, to criticize the latter and to defend the even today undeniable effectiveness of the internalistic standpoint, which would be maintainable at least as a'regulative principle', I think.

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