In his Triumphant Democracy（1886）Andrew Carnegie claimed that American people found something lacking for the original Britons in some races including the German and the French, while he celebrated the British as a basic material to create the American republic. But he came to put more great value on the Teutonic origin for both Britain and America to envision the idea of an Anglo-American reunion in his article, A Look Ahead（1893）which was the new concluding chapter in the revised edition of Triumphant Democracy. Carnegie changed his view again in 1905, the year following the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France. He seemed to take the concept of republic as an important one which could include the three nations, Britain, France, and America while he continued to keep the idea of Teutonic because he thought that it could unite Britain and America with Germany, the Teutonic Power in a peaceful union. In this paper I argue how Carnegie shifted the emphasis in his writing on the balance between the notion of republic and that of race.

Harold Laski, well-known as an advocate of the pluralistic theory of the state, presented his theory as the antithesis of T. H. Green's idealism. Nevertheless, Laski inherited Green's idea of 'rebellion as the duty of citizens'. Green's influence on Laski has rarely been the focus of attention in Laski studies because the central role the idea of positive duty of rebellion plays in his thought has been neglected. By examining the relationship between Laski's acceptance and critique of Green, this paper shows that Laski's pluralistic theory was developed as an effort to revive Green's theory of resistance.

Many of our mental states are directed toward something or have an “intentionality”. In the Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume describes passions like pride as intentional. My aim is to interpret this intentionality of passions in an appropriate way. Many have interpreted it as an “extrinsic” property of passions, but they cannot explain some distinct characters of intentional passions. Criticizing these interpretations, a new interpretation has appeared, which understands intentionality as an “intrinsic” property of passions. This is a strong interpretation except for dismissing a passionʼs significant role: directing our cognition. Modifying this point, I offer an alternative “intrinsic” interpretation.

Hume sometimes refers to an idea of a relation, and according to Humeʼs Copy Principle, this means that there must be a correspondent impression of the relation. However, such an impression, if any, would also raise certain interpretative problems with regard to the consistency of Humeʼs philosophy. In this paper, I try, first, to suppose and characterize the impression of a relation and to complement Humeʼs theory of relation with reference to “intuition,” “necessary connection,” and “calm passion.” Then I attempt to appraise the consistency between Humeʼs theory of relation and his Copy Principle, from the viewpoint of his philosophical purpose.