On January 10, 1984, North Korea formally proposed a “tripartite conference” with the U. S. and South Korea. As typified by the “equal basis participation” of South Korea, the proposal is more flexible and realistic than ever. Implicitly, however, Pyongyang's proposal for “threeway talks” mainly aims at the attainment of talks with Washington. North Korea therefore might not have direct dialogues with the South without the attendance of the U. S.
South Korea, which harbors a strong suspicion about North Korea's intentions to solve the separation issue peacefully, soon rejected the proposal, whereas the U. S. did not oppose it straightforwardly. Considering this response by the U. S., together with the flexible posture towards North Korea in the past two years, we cannot deny the possibility that the Reagan Administration might eventually take up Pyongyang's proposal to bring some progress in the approach to detente on the Korean Peninsula.
North-South unification is of course the most significant Korean issue, but so far there is no probability that unification can be accelerated. For the time being, groping for some way to detente is the only thing that can be done. Fortunately, the “mechanism to deter increased tension” seems to have been rooted on the Korean Peninsula. Detente can hardly be attained soon, though, at least the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula has decreased considerably. This observation is proved firmly by the fact that the bombing incident in Rangoon in October, 1983, did not escalate into a big dispute. In addition, movement to “
de facto cross-recognition” by big powers has become conspicuous recently.
As the situation changes like this, North Korea, which had been adopting a stubborn attitude, shows signs of flexibility. If North Korea continues to follow such policies, hope for detente on the Korean Peninsula may emerge in the late 1980s.
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