Annals of Business Administrative Science
Online ISSN : 1347-4456
Print ISSN : 1347-4464
ISSN-L : 1347-4456
Volume 2, Issue 4
Displaying 1-1 of 1 articles from this issue
  • Takashi SHIMIZU, Nobuo TAKAHASHI
    2003 Volume 2 Issue 4 Pages 39-46
    Published: October 25, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: March 14, 2013
    This note will give a complete proof of Axelrod's theorem that characterizes the advantage of Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Despite of its importance in Axelrod's study, the proof of the theorem is incomplete. First, the fault of the proof is depicted and two approaches for complementation are shown. Then, we provide the complete proof using these two approaches.
    Download PDF (233K)