The subject of information law research is ever expanding. What has spurred it is the Personal Information Protection Commission (abbreviated PPC), which was established on January 1, 2016, by reorganizing the former Speciﬁc Personal Information Protection Commission (abbreviated SPIPC) set up on January 1, 2014. The PPC has been in charge of monitoring and supervision regarding the proper handling of personal information as well as speciﬁc personal information (my number). Information created or acquired by the PPC is publicly available on the website in principle, so it is possible to use them for research. Here, let me take the speciﬁc personal information protection assessment (SPIPA) as an example. This corresponds to privacy impact assessment (PIA) implemented in foreign countries. Although not incorporated in the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (Act No. 57 of 2003) (Personal Information Protection Act), the Act on the Use of Numbers to Identify Speciﬁc Individuals in Administrative Procedures (Act No. 27 of 2013) (My Number Act), introduced the speciﬁc personal information protection assessment from the beginning. The SPIPC made rules, policies and guidelines of the SPIPA under the My Number Act in 2014. They have been very useful in implementing the SPIPA and will contribute to adoption of a system of the PIA in the Personal Information Protection Act in the near future.
This article provides an analysis of the legal framework of the military-industry complex in the United States, especially an inner circle comprised of the U.S. government and the large military companies, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, BAE Systems, Northrop-Grumman and General Dynamics. The United States v. Reynolds decision of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in 1953 introduced common law state secrets privilege as an evidence rule to allow the government to reject production of documents and other evidences at the trial. The case law of Reynolds has been well adopted in the legal system in the U.S. in that many cases cited Reynolds and resulted in dismissal of the cases mainly against the government, but also against the companies. Furthermore, at General Dynamics v. United States in 2007 SCOTUS declared that the most important secrets, such as stealth technology, should be exempted from judicial review as such, like the “political questions” or contracts with espionage agents, so that the conﬁdentiality should be protected even from attorneys and judges. As a result, not only the government, but also major military companies are protected from actions in contract, tort or otherwise raised by third parties including employees and injured by accidents. On the other hand, such major companies need to be large enough as they cannot rely on judicial remedies, but can only count on their own role of “repeat players” as stated in the decision of the SCOTUS. Such a legal framework provides the basis for forming the inner circle comprised of the government and major military companies [called as the “military-industry complex.”
This paper considers a framework of AI and Governance (Regulation) from the viewpoint that AI (Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI)) society is about to arrive. Things to consider now is not the way governance is required where AI permeates every corner of society, but a governance framework which would ﬁt to the situation of the transitional period in which AI will be utilized from now on that would gradually change the system of the society. At present, it is important to think of the areas where substitution by AI is difficult and consider a possible framework and create a framework that could apply to a ﬁeld which includes system that AI cannot quickly replace the existing system but may change in the future. That is, considering a future regulatory framework with awareness of the existence of such difficulties. At the same time, however, governance structure should consider the areas where people have to take responsibility even in the future, and thus protect such sectors that should not be substituted for AI with regulation.
This paper examines law on the security of connected devices (hereinafter referred to as
"IoT Security Law
"), which is the California State Act enacted in September 2018 and will be enforced from January 2020. The IoT security law is the ﬁrst state law to regulate the security of devices connected to the Internet (connected devices), and California is the ﬁrst state in the country to enact IoT security law. This law is supposed to be added to Part 4 of the California People's Law, Section 4, which stipulates the obligation of the operator, but no penalty is placed when it violates it. While there is a discussion to evaluate this law as implementing security by design or privacy by design, this law adds only three articles to the Civil Code. Therefore, some doubts about ambiguity and the effsectiveness of regulation have also been pointed out.
This study includes 1) Introduction 2) The analysis of a contract about privacy from the viewpoint of substantive law, 3) The analysis of a contract about privacy from the viewpoint of procedural law, 4) The future discussion point of a contract about privacy. In Vol. (4), analysis of 'privacy contract' is continually discussed from the viewpoint of procedural law, especially administrative procedural law.
Cet article a pour objectif de présenter un petit commentaire par un constitutionnaliste japonais sur un ouvrage récent de Professeur Alain Supiot (La Gouvernance par les nombres [Paris : Fayard, 2015]). Dans la société post-industrielle, les salariés sont juridiquement de plus en plus autonomes, mais en même temps, matériellement subordonnés. La question de cet article concerne la raison pour laquelle Supiot suit ce raisonnement paradoxal. Pour répondre à cette question, je compare la thèse de Supiot avec un autre texte, celui de François Ewald (III). Avant ces comparaison et synthèse, je compte préciser ma question au lumière des deux contextes et de comparaison avec le droit japonais (I, II). Je pense que l’enjeu est de savoir si le péril de stabilisation de rapports de force est sérieux ou non.