How risky is the cooperation between platformers and the government, especially law enforcement agencies, such as the police? What are the risks with the cooperation?
 The article examines the cooperation and risks by checking Japanese, German and EU legal situations to control harmful expressions on social media.
 In Japan, there are no apparent rules for cooperation between platformers and police.
 However, the police requested platformers stop a harmful account in the actual case. The author thinks there needs to be some rules to control such activities by police.
 “NetzDG” in Germany regulates platformers ahead of the other countries. Digital Services Act in the EU, which regulates platformers more widely than “NetzDG,” will be valid from 2024. Digital Services Act and “NetzDG” have a lot of methods in common, but there are some differences because they have differential purposes.
 And the author also focuses on “Gesetz gegen digital Gewalt” as German new legal rules. The bill will still be considered, but it includes new regulations with the judicial proceedings to stop accounts for harmful speech.
 Finally, the article shows the road map of cooperation and risks between the platformer and the government. There are differential risks in each phase of preventive police activities, grasping the key to crime and criminal investigation.

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 How risky is the cooperation between platformers and the government, especially law enforcement agencies, such as the police? What are the risks with the cooperation?
 The article examines the cooperation and risks by checking Japanese, German and EU legal situations to control harmful expressions on social media.
 In Japan, there are no apparent rules for cooperation between platformers and police.
 However, the police requested platformers stop a harmful account in the actual case. The author thinks there needs to be some rules to control such activities by police.
 “NetzDG” in Germany regulates platformers ahead of the other countries. Digital Services Act in the EU, which regulates platformers ore widely than “NetzDG,” will be valid from 2024. Digital Services Act and “NetzDG” have a lot of methods in common, but there are some differences because they have differential purposes.
 And the author also focuses on “Gesetz gegen digital Gewalt” as German new legal rules. The bill will still be considered, but it includes new regulations with the judicial proceedings to stop accounts for
 Finally, the article shows the road map of cooperation and risks between the platformer and the government. There are differential risks in each phase of preventive police activities, grasping the key to crime and criminal investigation.

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 This paper examines countermeasures against influence operations related to elections in the United States. Influence operations and countermeasures against them are often conducted behind closed doors, making it difficult to examine them using publicly available materials. Furthermore, the relationship between countermeasures against influence operations and hybrid warfare is not clear. In the United States, technology to counter influence operations is being developed, and federal funds are being invested in attribution and AI technology development. Attribution is required for interference in federal elections. Influence operation countermeasures are also incorporated into election security. CISA promotes MDM as part of election security. Despite debates in the Constitution and international law as to whether the military should be used to combat election interference, the military is deployed to combat election interference from foreign governments and entities. However, PCA restrictions require separation of the military and police. Finally, this paper discusses the problems with Japan’s influence operations measures.

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 The Chinese government under Xi Jinping has expanded its influence operations aimed at manipulating the discourse abroad to its own advantage. Private actors are increasingly collaborating with the government and playing a role in these operations. Despite the uncertainty of whether direct cooperation with the Chinese government exists, TikTok has been subjected to regulations in recent years, particularly in Europe and the United States. It is because its influence, potential problems, and lack of transparency have raised international suspicion. The regulations of TikTok, on the other hand, have been controversial, with opposition from a wide range of actors, including social media platform operators. This paper discusses the role of media and SNS platforms in shaping the narrative that the Chinese government is trying to create, and then identifies the concerns that TikTok raises to governance and societal coherence. It then examines the regulations of TikTok in Europe and the United States, and recommends steps that Japan should take.

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 The global trend of increased government access to information is evident, with Japan also implementing its own system. However, it is the expansive and more comprehensive nature of the Chinese government’s government’s access rules that has captured the interest of Japanese corporations. This article offers a comprehensive overview and analysis of the Chinese government’s information access regulations, with a particular emphasis on the rules applicable to platforms.

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 In this paper, the author examines whether or not there is an infringement of personal rights against those who use avatars, focusing “Virtual YouTuber (VTuber)” as examples. VTuber is a person who posts videos or live-streams on the Internet appearing as a CG avatar not her or his living body. While the popularity of VTubers has exploded in recent years, there have been a number of cases of slander, libel, and invasion of privacy against VTubers.
 However, since VTubers usually do not disclose their real faces or real names, if they are regarded as “online personalities” or “people in virtual space” that are not connected to real people, they may not be adequately protected from such infringements. Based on the court cases currently available to the public, the author proposes legal theories that better fit the reality of VTubers and their listeners. First, I discuss the issue of whether slander against a VTuber can be attributed to the person behind the avatar. Second, I discuss whether the target of the slander can be identified as a specific person in real life.

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 In China, the “metaverse” is no longer a concept or field worthy of capital speculation, and public opinion on the mass media and interest in related academic research is waning; rather, it is shifting to generative AI and its applied industries. While academia still supports research on legal issues in the metaverse, the perception of relevant knowledge and research perspectives have already reached a kind of bottleneck, and arguments from the perspective of critical thinking continue to emerge. However, practice always brings some historical accumulation and lessons learned. In this paper, the author examines the issue of metaverse under the framework of a broader theoretical analysis, tracing how the subject (if any) to which this concept refers has raised or developed new regulatory issues and how Chinese law and policy have responded.
 The metaverse is a set of discourses or a kind of concept that imagines an immersive virtual world in which the boundaries between the real and virtual are dissolved and specific technologies are used to help users interact and collaborate. Metaverse is just a novel version of the concept of cyberspace that emerged in the 1980s, but since it can exist at different stages of technological and industrial development, there is still a problem of not being able to articulate exactly what it refers to and where it exists. The problem is that it is not yet possible to clearly explain the specific object covered by the concept. Even if a conceptual framework such as cyberspace is used to analyze the metaverse, there is no need to change the analytical framework with each investment or bubble cycle. From a legal angle, there is no need to redesign a set of rules just because a new concept appears. What matters is whether the reality on which the concept itself depends raises new issues. This is synonymous with the classic “Law of the Horse” question: whether “Law of the Horse” is a new concept worth using as far as the category is concerned. However, different groups (e.g., anarchists, engineers fantasizing about a technological utopia, Silicon Valley investors, darknet traders) have different views for the particularities of cyberspace. They all argue that certain “spaces” created by information technology have special interests that differ from those of traditional spaces and therefore cannot be subject to existing power structures and governance rules. The logical process of their justification is to first establish an anarchist ideology (“Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace”) in a political position. Subsequently, Internet companies assert their particularity through business expansion. Interestingly, this argument does not deny the existence of power itself, but rather hides that power behind a seemingly neutral technological architectural design, which is ultimately held and controlled by the founders of the architecture.
 　Countries have competed to establish the legitimacy of cyberspace in order to ensure their competitiveness, and have gradually built institutional systems ranging from Internet infrastructure to codes of conduct. The metaverse still relies on the existing Internet architecture, serving users through the same digital infrastructure. Its business model, too, appears not to have been newly designed, but only improved at the content layer, so investment has tapered off. The question then becomes, who actually has the drive to continue using this concept? What do they want? What rules are needed to protect rights and interests? How are the associated risks to be controlled and regulated?

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 This article focuses on the Digital Services Act (DSA), which is part of the “Digital Constitution” and is closely related to freedom of expression and democracy, especially on the Internet, as a way to constitutionalize the digital media environment, and which has set a direction for a governance model for Digital Platforms.
 Then, this article introduces a critique of the individual rights-based approach partially adopted by the DSA and recommended by digital constitutionalists, pointing out that it has “blind spots” for the governance of Digital Platforms. And, this article introduces several approaches that focus on the “separation of power” as an alternative constitutional governance model, in light of the limitations inherent in these rights-based approaches. Finally, digital constitutionalism, positioned as a “translation” of modern constitutionalism into the digital space, is not necessarily limited to the individual rights-based approach but has the potential a concept to lead digital policy, more boldly encompassing methods of realizing constitutional values.

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 In the first half of this series of papers, we have analyzed past legislative history to clarify the interpretation of the phrases “any information related to an individual”, “can be easily matched with other information” and “can identify an individual” in the Japanese Personal Information Protection Law, and to presume the proper interpretation of the definition of “personal information”
 In the latter part of the series, we will clarify what the purpose of this law is and what is envisioned in the “rights and interests of individuals” by examining the literature of the past 50 years in Western countries, prove that the presumed interpretation is reasonable, and discuss how the Japanese Personal Information Protection Law should be revised.

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 Japanese government revealed The new National Security Strategy on December 16, 2022. It stated the concept of active cyber defense and the consideration of granting the government the authority necessary for its implementation. While this can be regarded as a major step forward in terms of Japan’s cyber security, there are still many issues to be addressed before it can be realized. In particular, it is a serious issue that the mission, role, and authority of the SDF, which plays a central role in national defense, in the cyber domain remain unclear.
 This paper focuses on responses to so-called “gray zone” situations that do not lead to armed attacks and clarifies the limitations and legal challenges of actions that the SDF can take in the cyber domain under the current domestic legal system. It then proposes the role of the SDF in active cyber defense and necessary legal amendments.

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