As is shown in the provisions on the categories of EU competence which was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, there are some asymmetries between certain policies in terms of competence allocation in the EU, such as those ⒜ between monetary policy and economic policy, and ⒝ between internal market and social policy. The asymmetry ⒜ has prevented the EU from responding quickly to the European debt crisis, while in the asymmetry ⒝ negative integration by free movement of goods, persons, services and capital has often made national social policies malfunction, with little social harmonisation at the EU level. The Lisbon Treaty has not necessarily offered satisfactory solutions for such asymmetry problems.
In order to explain the asymmetry problems, the “triangular model of European economic integration” is presented. The author modifies Dani Rodrik’s hypothesis of “the political trilemma of the world economy” to apply it to the EU. The following explanation could be theoretically made. The assumption is that it is impossible to achieve economic integration, sovereignty and democracy at the same time. Consequently, there are three options. ⑴ Provided that states choose economic integration and democracy, harmonisation will be made under supranational democracy. To that extent, national sovereignty will be lost (the situation of “European federation”). ⑵ Provided that states choose economic integration and sovereignty, regulatory competition, for example, will be brought about under (pure) mutual recognition, and the market, not national political process, will decide the rules. To that extent, domestic democracy will be lost (the situation of “the Golden Straitjacket”). ⑶ Provided that states choose sovereignty and democracy, it will lead to national treatment. State autonomy and national democracy will be retained, but economic integration will be harmed.
This model is an ideal type. In reality, it can be said that the deeper market integration goes, the more difficult it will be that sovereignty and democracy are achieved at once in a given area. And the three situations ⑴-⑶ can take place at once among different areas, as is seen in the Internal Market and also in the Economic and Monetary Union within the EU.
The “triangular model of European economic integration” implies that, as European integration develops further, national democracy would be more difficult to maintain and that consequently the choice would have to be made between “European federation” and “the Golden Straitjacket” by the EU Member States, who seem to prefer the latter.
The Lisbon treaty which has been described as a “reform treaty of EU” was signed on 13 December 2007, and after being ratified by all member states, came into force on 1 December 2009.
The purpose of this treaty was the institutional reform of the EU including the appointing of a President of the European Council to serve as the “face of the EU”. This paper raises some questions regarding how the EU will change with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.
The purpose of this study is to examine the importance of the treaty’s most innovative features: First, what might be the impact of the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional reform on European governance?
Second, what reforms are actually specified in the treaty and what difference will they make?
Third, what should be done to enhance democratic legitimacy in the EU? In other words, how should the features of this reform be viewed in the historical context of the EU?
We will also look at the kind of discussion held during the preparation of the treaty and consider how the design of institutional arrangements changed from “the Treaty of Nice” and “the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.”
In order to answer these questions, this paper focuses on the historical transformation of European governance, examining some problems involving democratic legitimacy with regard to Institutional Reform, based on the reality of European Integration, and the related trends in contemporary political integration theory.
Against the backdrop of the ongoing globalization of the international community, there is an ever-expanding range of fields in which advancing policies at the supranational level of the EU is the most effective approach for all member states.
Taking this truth to heart, under the Lisbon Treaty the EU is unifying the administration of its foreign relations and diplomacy, effectively raising the international presence of the Union as a whole.
We should point out that the new cooperation form of democracy and accountability exceeding borders in the EU, and the democratic legitimacy of the EU have been strengthened by the lengthy formation processes of the Lisbon treaty. The EU can only claim to have real significance if it is oriented towards a “citizen’s Europe,” with a civil society, and transparency is therefore crucial.
The Lisbon Treaty entered into force as of the 1st of December in 2009 in an unexpected international and domestic environment. The global power shift, from the West to the East as well as from the North to the South, has become visible because of the decline of the economic power of the US and Europe in contrast to the emerging countries including China and India.
The Lisbon Treaty aimed at strengthening the foreign and security policy of the EU by nominating the President of the European Council as well as the High Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy, who is double-hatted with the Vice President of the European Commission. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the sui generis body, is expected to facilitate policy coordination and implementation. By the end of the year 2010, principal posts of the EEAS were appointed. Its overseas delegations are to have political officers and the EU member countries are to contribute their diplomats to them. The EU delegations are to take the role of coordination among the EU member countries’ embassies and missions to the international organisations, which used to be the role of the presidency countries. The European Parliament is increasing its role in EU external relations. The EU has started to review its relations with its strategic partners, which include the US, Russia, Canada, Japan, China, India, Brazil. Mexico and South Africa. In the course of the year 2010, the EU had an extraordinary summit meeting in September with the Foreign Ministers and it was discussed in the European Council in December. It will serve an enhanced role of the EU as a global player. Once the European External Action Service is in full action in several years, it will enhance the role of the EU as a global player.
In this study, an analysis was conducted on EU’s main institutions and policy-making processes that arose from the Treaty of Lisbon.
With regard to the European Parliament, I examined its position, the new powers it has been given to select the President of the European Commission, the changes in seat allocations and the process for deciding how seats are allocated to each country. I also investigated the European Council’s new position in the EU organisation and its new role to replace the national governments of the member states as the EU’s top legislative body, in order to deal more flexibly with the future widening and deepening of the European integration. Furthermore, I refer to the significance of the European Council’s adoption of qualified majority voting and the selection of a President of the European Council. With regard to the Council of the European Union, I investigated the changes in the requirements for having a majority in its qualified majority voting system, the reorganisation of the Council itself, the new role of the High Representative of the Foreign Affairs Council and changes in the rotation of the Councils’ chairpeople. As for the European Commission, I analysed the problem of reducing the number of commission seats, the strengthening of restrictions on the powers of the Commission President and the dual role of the High Representative as Vice-President. With respect to the policy-making, I examined the adoption of ordinary legislative procedure and special legislative procedures and made reference to the decision-making process within the national governments of the member states.
Based on the above, the reforms brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon have lead to four distinct trends: ⑴ the strengthening of democracy at the EU level; ⑵ the placing of restrictions on member states’ sovereignty and influence; ⑶ the European Council as the EU’s top body has begun to embody this role in a real sense through proactive and systematic activities. Finally, there will be a greater clarification regarding the powers, advancement in positions and roles of the heads of the EU’s main institutions-the European Council, Commission and Foreign Council.
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, it has become clear that the EU is a political system that, in reality, governs with the European Council institutionalised at its summit, the European Parliament as well as the Council of the European Union as the legislature and the European Commission as the executive.
The concept of the ‘Social Market Economy’ has been the main idea of the domestic economic governance during the post-war period in Germany. And it is also influenced by the Ordo-liberalism, which is mainly represented by Walter Eucken of the Freiburg School.
This idea was first adopted as one of the purposes of the EU in the Treaty of Lisbon. But the meaning of this idea is not clearly defined in this treaty. Therefore, it might lead to the complicated discussion about the interpretation of this concept. This paper investigates possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’ in the Treaty of Lisbon.
At first we take a close look at the exact definition and the theoretical framework of this thought on the original papers written by Alfred Müller-Armack, who was the initiator of this concept. The essential characteristic is the policy target, in which the balanced combination between the value of individual freedom and social fairness (or social security) should be found within the competitive market economic order.
Several factors of this idea are transposed into the treaty. For example, economic policy of the member states must be made within the principles of the “open market” with “the free competition” (TFEU/Art. 119). And the independence of the ECB (TFEU/Art. 130) and “the stability of prices” (TEU/Art. 3-3) are so strictly established in the Union, that they build the important institutional framework from the view of the ordo-liberalism.
To value the meanings of the concept of social market economy in the treaty, it is also important to point out, that we must consider the social aspects of the integration process.
As the concluding remarks, we could say that the Social Market Economy is a ideal model or distinguishing marks for the economic system of the EU. But it depends on the practice by each of the member states, concerning the way, how they will approach the ideal goal of social market economy with their own policy measures.
The Treaty of Lisbon amends the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. The articles about external relations were also amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, there was not much research about the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) from a legal aspect. The CFSP was mainly based on intergovernmental cooperation and the European Court of Justice was not responsible for that area. This paper will analyze the CFSP from the point of view of law. Some researchers comment that the structure of the CFSP is still based on the intergovernmental cooperation and there are no big changes in this area. However, this article tries to show the positive aspects of the changes in the area of the CFSP owing to the Treaty of Lisbon.
This paper is divided into two main parts. The first part points out that external relations now have a unified framework and how meaningful the express international personality of the EU is. It also refers to the special character of the CFSP.
The second part of this paper bases itself on the first part and analyzes the EU competences in the area of the CFSP from the following four points.
First, this paper treats the character of competence. The competence of the CFSP is not exclusive, shared, or complementary, but sui generis. It is certain that the Member States transferred certain competence to the EU.
Second, in this paper, the following points are shown by examining related articles about CFSP measures. The first one relates a form of measures. The second point relates to the decision-making. The decision-making in the CFSP differs from that in the other policies. The third one relates to the binding measures. It is discussed whether the binding measures of the CFSP mean only the binding character of international law. The last point is how the CFSP’s measures can be implemented properly by the Member States without control by the ECJ.
Third, this paper shows the interference between the CFSP and other policies. Specifically, the key article (the new article 40 TEU) is discussed.
Fourth, in this paper, guarantee of individual rights is taken into consideration from the rule of law.
What was British role in the making of the Lisbon Treaty? Is Britain still “an awkward partner” in the European Union? This article aims to examine British policy towards the European Union from the failure of the ratification of European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007.
Soon after the failures of the Treaty ratification both in France and in the Netherlands in June 2005, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared to introduce “a period of reflection” to freeze the process of ratification. From the next month, Britain had hold the presidency of the European Council. Due partly to his domestic stalemate on the ratification, Blair exploited this opportunity to postpone difficult ratification of European Constitutional Treaty.
This difficulty originated in Blair’s decision for a referendum on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in April 2004. European Constitutional Treaty which was signed on 29 October 2004 caused a big political debate in Britain. Both the Conservative Party and Eurosceptic medias represented by Rupert Murdoch criticized the government for its intention to further transfer political power to Brussels. Having faced with this serious political difficulty, Blair naturally was “off the hook”. He simply felt “the waves of relief”.
Blair’s task was two-fold. First, he had to find a solution to this political stalemate as he would soon preside the European Council. Second, he was necessary to sell a new treaty to British people. To avoid a referendum, the British government needed to find a device which indicated that a new treaty was not “constitutional” one. In other words, a new treaty had to be a “reform treaty” without any new transfer of sovereignty.
A new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, supported Britain to advance towards a “reform treaty”. Both French and British governments were contended with omitting any symbol of “federalism” or “constitution”. Within British government, it was generally agreed that Britain needed to defend the “red line” which prevented further transfer of power to the European Union. After having persuaded Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, Britain successfully secured the “red line”, and this meant that British government did not have to go into a national referendum. With this “success”, the EU could reach an agreement on the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty which would become signed in December 2007.
After the referendum crises of 2005, British government led the argument on the future of failed Constitutional Treaty. The answer was to save the essence of it by abandoning “federal” and “constitutional” features of the Treaty. This British policy was basically motivated by its own domestic rivalry on the future of Europe. Although Britain might be “an awkward partner” within the EU, the Labour governments tried to find out a way to go out of the crises of 2005 by abandoning some of hopes and wishes that people dreamed.
Common foreign, security and defence policy has become one of the main pillars of the European Union. Given the nature of European integration that had more or less focused on economic fields for several decades, this is a new phenomenon. The governing principle of the areas of foreign, security and defence policy cooperation in Europe has been intergovernmentalism, featuring the unanimity principle (which essentially guarantees national veto) and a limited role for supranational institutions like the European Commission. Despite the fact that successive treaty revisions brought more power for the Commission and the European Parliament, the basic principle of foreign, security and defence policy of the Union remains to be guided by intergovernmentalism.
However, this does not mean that the practice of foreign, security and defence policy in the EU has never changed. On the contrary, while maintaining the principle of intergovernmentalism, exemplified by policy and decision-making process that is different from the ‘first pillar’ even under the Lisbon Treaty, the practice has undergone substantial changes over the past few decades. This article, first, revisits the tradition of intergovernmentalism in foreign, security and defence policy cooperation in the context of European integration, and second, examines various aspects of transformations of the intergovernmental principles that can be observed today. The main purpose of this article is to shed a new light on intergovernmentalism and to chart new research agendas in the field.
Such models/theories as ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ (Helen Wallace) and ‘constrained intergovernmentalism’ (Catherine Gegout) as well as the idea of Europeanization and socialization all preset fresh looks at the area. This article also argues that policy models developed in the context of internal policy such as OMC (open method of coordination) can also be applied to foreign, security and defence policy. At the same time, the practice of pragmatic cooperation seen particularly in the ESDP/CSDP field can be applied to other fields as well. More interactions between models/theories traditionally applied to internal policy and those on external relations are necessary more than ever before.
The Marco Polo Project was first proposed in a 2001 transportation white paper which followed from the PACT Project, a project which supported a modal shift (intermodal transport) in physical distribution in Europe from 1992 to 2001. The Marco Polo Project is funded by the European Union. It began in 2003 for the purpose of achieving sustainable and efficient improvement of the EU’s transportation division.
The Marco Polo Project II has been in operation since 2007. More ambitious and larger in scale than its predecessor, it also covers Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and even the Balkan and Mediterranean countries. The Marco Polo Project II includes a budget of 740 million euros to convert the annual 23 billion tons of truck-transported freight to railroad and sea transportation. This conversion is expected to enable the project to achieve its goal of reducing CO2 emissions by 8.4 billion kilograms.
Since the unification of the European countries, the amount of transportation by trucks has steadily increased, and is expected to increase by 60％ by 2013, compared with 2006. Meanwhile, traffic jams, air pollution, and increased CO2 emissions continue to grow more serious. Therefore, it is urgent to swiftly shift from road transportation to railroad and sea transportation.
However, shifting from truck transportation, which is relatively inexpensive and also convenient due to its door-to-door delivery, to railroad and sea transportation faces many challenges. Some of the railroad transportation infrastructure is decrepit. There have also been delays in the construction of port facilities for sea transportation, including container terminals. Furthermore, it is necessary to improve the existing physical distribution facilities and logistics parks to adjust to the modal shift.
This paper verifies the circumstances and significance of the Marco Polo Projects and the modal shift in transportation in Europe so far. It also points out the accomplishments and challenges of the projects, and examines the establishment of physical distribution networks in the European Union.
The use of anti-dumping (AD) measures against foreign imports has long been a major tool of external trade policy for the EU. For more than 40 years, the EU (including its predecessor EEC/EC) is one of the most frequent users of the AD measures.
Recently, however, there are a number of changes in trade environments, which include stricter regulations under the WTO Agreement, growing EU membership, the growing challenge of Chinese exports and the world financial crisis since September 2008. In response to these endogenous as well as exogenous changes, the EU modified its basic law, namely the AD Regulations, for several times. Also, in 2006, then Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson issued a green paper on trade defense instruments aiming for further modifications of AD laws in a manner more suitable to the increasing globalization in trade. Apparently, the current EU policy shows two conflicting directions: one for stricter regulation to prevent abuse of AD measures, and the other for further aggressive use thereof. Quo vadis, EU?
To address this question, this paper conducted positive analysis of EU’s official records on AD investigations (including reviews) and impositions of AD duties in the recent five years (2005-2009). First, we found China as increasingly the major target of AD investigations and duties. Also, the major target sectors have been slightly changing from chemical to steel industry, both of which being the major target sectors for decades. Secondly, we verified two presumptions found by previous studies that the number of AD investigations and AD duties positively correlates to the rise in exchange rates while it negatively correlates to the growth in the GDP.
Using negative binominal regression, we found no significant effects of these two economic factors on the number of AD investigations nor AD duties. On the other hand, by diachronic interpretation of scatter diagrams we found that the excess in the number of AD investigations in 2005-2006 and the scarcity in the number of AD duties in 2006-2007 are in some part attributable to the enlargement of EU. Also, the scarcity in the number of AD investigations in 2009 is in some part attributable to the EU’s restrained response to Lehman Shock.
Membership in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) causes an individual country to lose the possibility to using monetary policy for the stabilization of country-specific shocks, thus leaving fiscal policy as its only remaining instrument. However, fiscal policy is restricted because the member countries receive instructions from the European Commission to coordinate their fiscal policies. In 1993, the Maastricht treaty sets four convergence criteria that must be met by each member country before it can take part in the third stage of the EMU: that is, before it can adopt the common currency, the “EURO.” The convergence criteria are meant to ensure that economic development within the EMU is balanced and does not give rise to any tensions among member countries. One of the convergence criteria was the restrictions on fiscal policy.
In our study we focus on the individual national outcome of fiscal policy instructions given to all member countries of the EMU. We show that fiscal policy restrictions affect developing and developed countries differently. We employ a growth model with optimal fiscal policy and the Convergence Hypothesis, to define reasons for the balance between public and private capital in a developed country as well as the different effects of one-dimensional fiscal policy restrictions on developing and developed countries. Then we empirically analyze conditions of public and private capital and their effects on GDP in EMU member countries. Our findings suggest that one-dimensional fiscal policy coordination prevents smooth development of economic growth in the bottom four EMU countries, defined in terms of GDP per capita. We conclude that the bottom four countries have not reached the economic level of the top eight countries; therefore, identical fiscal policy instructions for the entire EMU will lead to disturbances of the capital conditions and economic growth in the bottom four countries.
The relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean enters a new stage after the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. This phase has been preceded by an active implementation of EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean since the 1960s. The main objective of the ongoing policy is to ensure high economic growth in the Mediterranean area based on the promotion of EU’s FDI into the region which is fully integrated in the production network of Europe. This type of policy has also been the underpinnings of Central and Eastern Europe’s economic development. Having agreed with the similar development policy, Mediterranean countries, especially Morocco, have started an FDI-oriented economic growth strategy.
The general objective of this study is to illustrate the process of EU’s FDI in the Mediterranean, especially Morocco, taking the EU policy as a starting point. In particular, after a description of the characteristics of Moroccan development strategy, an attention is paid to the market level behavior. Specifically, we investigate the present condition of the Moroccan automotive industry and examine the case of Renault based on a fieldwork.
In recent years, the automobile and aeronautic sectors have become one of the most important sectors with respect to the Moroccan Industrial Emergence National Pact and have consequently received large inflows of FDI mainly from Southern Europe’s multinational firms (France and Spain). The economic reforms taking place in Morocco, namely the Tanger MED port facilities, the various free zones and the governmental investment incentives packages, can explain the recent increase of FDI in the country. Besides, contrarily the other Mediterranean countries, Morocco has adopted the “advanced status” in 2008 which aimed at legally making the country closer to EU through the EU acquis.
Our fieldwork has been conducted in SOMACA and Renault-Nissan (Tanger-Project). SOMACA has been, until 2002, an export-oriented firm focusing in the Southern European market and has started the exports of low-cost vehicles (Dacia-Logan) in 2007. Despite the recent financial crisis, Renault is one of the most important firms, especially because our fieldwork has shown that the “Renault-Tanger Mediterranean” Project with a production capacity of 400000 vehicles, a low-cost production base, is the greatest project ever in the Moroccan automotive sector. An examination of the Moroccan automobile industry can consequently help to have an idea on part of the formation of a production network that is taking place in the region.
This paper examines how European public health policy has been developed, and focuses on the historical achievement on Alcohol Policy reached between the EU and its Member States. Since the EU has promoted the free movement of persons, goods, and services, we should ask what influence these free movements have on the public health sector. The EU acts by using soft law and hard law at EU level, not only in its capacity as a free trade zone but also as a European social model.
Since European public health policy has been historically formed as a part of a social protection measure for each Member State, responsibility for health policy remains with each Member State. However, EU is playing on increasingly important role in public health with the development of European integration.
Public Health has emerged not only as a separate policy but also as a important aspect of other policies such as agriculture, employment, competition, and consumer protection.
First, we discuss how public health policy is formed and developed in the EU. Public health policies sometimes concern internal market matters, quality and safety of goods, such as the quality of products affecting health, for example, alcohol, and tobacco, medical equipment, and medical supplies, blood, and organs.
Secondly, this paper focuses on the policy of reducing alcohol-related harm. We would like to review the background of alcohol policy and ask why an alcoholic policy came into being and how the public health policy has given it a legal basis and allowed strategies to be practiced at the EU level.
Finally, we will examine what has been going on in the field of public health at EU level. A new mode of governance called the “Open Method of Coordination (OMC)” has been introduced and adapted in European public health policy as well as other social policies. We would like to discuss what impact the Lisbon treaty brings to alcohol policy both at EU and Member State level, and ask what kinds of stakeholders are exist in alcohol regulation policy.