Under the National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme in Japan, a municipality insurer can issue a short-term health insurance card (hereafter, short-term card) or an eligibility certification card (hereafter, certification card) to those who fall behind in their premium contributions for a year and longer without any justifiable reason, instead of a normal health insurance card (hereafter, normal card). However, short-term cards that entitle to usual 30% copayment are not often issued to the qualified beneficiaries. Certification card holders have to pay a full amount of health care costs. This policy arrangement may seriously restrict health care access of certification card holders, though few quantitative studies investigate this issue to date. This paper examines whether and in what way access to health care among short-term and certification card holders is limited relative to normal card holders by analyzing administrative claim data provided by a municipality insurer. The analysis has uncovered the following four findings:
First, when age and income are not controlled, short-term and certification card holders reduce their probability of visiting physicians respectively by 23-28% and 52-53%, compared to normal card holders.
Second, in comparison with those normal card holders who fall behind in their premium contributions, the probability of visiting physicians among short-term card holders is almost the same, and the probability among certification card holders is reduced by 27-28%.
Third, those short-term card holders who receive a large amount of medical care benefit in a previous year did not receive certification cards, suggesting that the municipality does not issue a certification card for those who have larger needs of care, even if they fall behind in their premium contributions.
Fourth, a low-income group among short-term card holders is likely to have their short-term cards replaced with certification cards; 1.0% decrease in income results in 0.6-0.7% increase int he probability of being delivered the certification card.
These results indicated that the decreased probability of visiting physicians is observed in the phase of delinquency in payment rather than in the phase of having short-term or certification cards. Furthermore, the association between the increased probability of issuing a certification card and the decreased income level of short-term card holders suggests that they actually face the liquidity constraints. The NHI premium rate for low-income groups should be carefully reviewed, as the liquidity constraint seems to cause arrears of premium payment.
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