Effective April 2003, the Diagnosis Procedure Combination(DPC)was introduced in 82 special functioning hospitals in Japan, and it has been gradually extended to general hospitals that meet certain prerequisites. Unlike the DRG/Prospective Payment System used in the United States and other countries, the Japanese DPC is a per diem prospective payment system that consists of two components:(1)inclusive payments based on the DPC system and(2)fees based on the conventional fee-for-service system. Inclusive payments include fees for basic hospital stays, medical checkups, image diagnosis, medications, injections, all treatments under 10,000 yen, and medicines used during rehabilitation treatments. Per diem payment rates are set separately for each of the three periods and decrease as the length of stay increases. The three periods are individually set for each DPC code. Fees for all categories other than those covered(1)are paid on the basis of the conventional fee-for-service system.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of the DPC-Based inclusive payment system on the length of hospital stay for patients undergoing cataract surgery, using a new Tobit-type model. This model can be used in various survival analysis, as an alternative to conventional Cox’s proportional hazard model, and it can be easily estimated by a standard statistical package program. Data were collected from five general hospitals before and after the introduction of the new payment system. To reduce the heterogeneity in the treatment used, we limit the data to patients who underwent cataract surgery and insertion of a prosthetic lens in one eye(n=2,533).
We found that the length of the hospital stay did not change for hospitals, where the length of hospital stay for the surgery had been already short before the introduction of DPC. On the other hand, the length of hospital stay decreased for hospitals where lengths of hospital stay for the surgery had been long before the introduction of DPC. These findings indicate that the new DPC inclusive payment system worked properly for long-stay hospitals, and support the idea of continuing to improve the payment system to provide hospitals with proper incentives for the efficient use of medical resources.
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