The law of civil procedure is generally known as the adjective law. It may be said that the historical and social character of this law is apt to be disregarded, because its highly reasonable and technical character of judging a contentious case properly, fairly, speedily and economically is emphasized.
The present writer is of opinion that it is necessary to analyze the system of civil procedure or civil trial historically and socially in connection with the social structure as a whole. The writer thinks an action should be grasped as the relation between the citizens (i. e. parties) and the state (i. e. court) through the medium of a dispute. Examining the connection between the citizen and the state in the civil procedures of modern states, phenomenally we can observe the following phases. In the first step, parties have the leadership in lawsuit, which was adopted in the French Code of Civil Procedure of 1806. The preference of parties to the court in settling a dispute and the passive and non-interventional attitude of the court are conspicuous here. The features of the second step can be found in overcoming the predomination of parties in actions and emphasizing the idea of lawsuit as the cultural subject of a nation in actions, namely, the idea of the official inquiry theory (Offizialprinzip). The Austrian Code of Civil Procedure of 1895 marked this phase. Since then an inclination to the official inquiry theory in the laws of civil procedure has gradually appeared in each country. The adversary and officialist systems in the law of civil procedure undoubtedly reflected the difference of the state and social institutions of these two countries. The former was formed as the law of civil procedure of the state which took the process of “the civil revolution from below”, one of the two courses in the formation of the modern state. The latter was brought out as that of the state which selected the course of “the civil revolution from above”.
This difference in the formation of civil states exerts a great influence on the law of crvil procedure, as is the case of Japan who took the latter course.

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In modern bourgeois states, two types of criminal procedure have evolved historically and exist now; a continental type of officialist criminal procedure called “half-inquisitorial and half-accusatory”, and an Anglo-American type of more accusatory and adversary criminal procedure.
The continental type of criminal procedure has its essence in the procedure before trial (especially in the procedure of Voruntersuchung) which maintains the inquisitorial procedure approximately as it is, and therefore, this can be called inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter, in that it makes Untersuchungsrichter a substantial judge for all criminal procedures. It is generally known that this “inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter” takes its original form in the French Criminal Procedure of 1808, and that the Prussian Criminal Procedure of 1847 and the German Criminal Procedure of 1877 belong to this type. But these two types of modern criminal procedure have been made several revisions in each country.
In Japan the Criminal Procedure of 1880 and that of 1890 received the French Criminal Procedure of 1808, and the Criminal Procedure of 1922 was under the great influence of the German Criminal Procedure. As regards the old Criminal Procedure of 1922, entirely amended by the new Criminal Procedure of 1948, the previous “inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter” was revised and evolved to “inquisitorial proceeding by a prosecutor”. However, the reformations and revisions in each country did not result in the abandonment of the “original type”.
From this discussion, our problems can be set up as follows. First, what is the fundamental cause of the formation and development of these two types? Secondly, what is the cause of the development from “inquisitorial proceeding by Untersuchungsrichter to the “inquisitorial proceeding by a prosecutor”?
In this paper, I dare focus my research on the second problem with a perspective of the first problem.

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The existing law of guardianship invests not only a family court with the power to appoint guardians for an infant without an assigned guardian or for an interdict without a legal guardian, but also charges it with some duties as the only supervising institution of guardianship. It may be said that, on the above-mentioned points, a family court is charged with the important duty of protecting an interdict and bringing up an infant bereft of a person in parental authority.
But, if it should be asked whether the present family court can carry these duties through, the official in charge of practice will answer negatively. There are many obstacles in attaining an idea of supervising system of guardianship; e.g. the lack of personnel, financial foundation in the practice aspect, legal-institutional inertia, etc. And, on the ground of these obstacles, there are many cases in which unhappy infants or interdicts meet with harsh usage by wicked guardians, and in which they are disposed legally of their property.
The aim of this article is to indicate some poblems from the standpoint of the family court research official directly taking charge of the supervising practice of guardian.

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The objet of this article is restricted to the relation between private ownership and anti-trust policy. The writer refers here to the following points at issue. The first part is concerned with private ownership and competition. So far, many writers have regarded “nationalization and anti-trust policy”, and “planning and competition”as alternatives. Can it be true? The writer thinks it possible to join these antitheses.
In the second part, the structure of ownership and the behaviour of firms are analyzed. In the theory of Industrial Organization, inquiry has been made into the relation between market structue and market conduct, but the mutual relation among the structure of ownership, market structure and firm conduct should also be examind.
The third part is connected with corporate ownership and the citizen. What kind of interests do natural persons have in the order of competition through business corporations?

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Many endeavors have been already made to study the real situations of organization of the police or performance of policemen's duties and to seek the factors determining these realities. Especially, many works to throw light on the real situations of illegality accompanied with the performance of policemen's duties have obtained cxcellent results. In a task as important as seeking the real situations of illegality, we have to study the legal (negative) sanctions and other reactions, which will bring on the prevention of delict. In the field of judicial police functions, legal sanctions, such as the punishment of illegal policemen, the reparation to victims, the restriction of competency in confession and the denial of competency in illegally obtained evidence, are presently functioning to prevent illegality. However, in the field of administrative police functions, especially of Keibi-koan Keisatsu (namely, “public safety police”) as the political police, we can hardly find the sanctions mentioned above. It is a problem of legal sociology in police study to analyze the situations of legal sanctions and other reactions to illegality accompanied with the activity of “public safety police”, especially to make clear the reasons why the legal science as a conscious legal-policy science does not effectively respond to them, and to clarify the factors determining these present situations.
It remains an important problem to study the realities of organization of the police or performance of policemen's duties, and to seek the factors determining these realities. As regards this problem, we must overcome the difficulties in obtaining materials for our studies, because if we publish our research work it becomes difficult to collect them. In my own experience, when I researched the realities of Petition and Permission required for the marriage of policemen (regulations as adopted in early Meiji era), my interviews were not refused by policemen. Therefore, I could pursue my investigation without any hindrance. However, as I published “Marriage of Policemen” on the above-mentioned problem (1951), “Philosophy of Policemen” bearing on a law consciousness or life consciousness of policemen (1952), “What is Neo-Tokko?” (“Tokko” means the special political police in old Japan) on their activities to gather informations (1954), and the result of research of “Scoresystem” (a sort of merit system) on policemen (1955), my study caused policemen's precautions and it went difficult to obtain materials for my study. These articles are collected in “Police in Japan” (eighth and revised edition, 1969). I think it is also an important problem of legal sociology in police study to research how to meet such difficulties.

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1. In this article, the writer first examines the discussions on the matter of the law concerning divorce presented by both the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Chunrch in the Royal Commission (Morton Commission) in 1952, and then shows why they opposed adding the hopeless breakdown of marriage as a judicial ground for divorce. The writer approaches the subject from the viewpoint of the sociology of law. This work is a primary step to the investigation into the process of the formation of the Divorce Reform Act 1969.
2. At that time, both Churches were mostly concerned with how the increasing divorce rate could be reduced. They, therefore, asserted: “Whether explicitly on Christian ground or simply on grounds of national well-being, the [legal] principle [on marriage] should be to adhere as far as possible to Christian standard”.
3. In the memorandum submitted to the Commission, the Church of England, in opposing the addition of the hopeless breakdown of marriage as a judicial ground for divorce, proclaimed as follows: “The purpose of the law must be to encourage the true principle of life-long marriage and to inculcate it into the mind of citizen”. And the law can discharge that function efficiently as long as the “doctrine of matrimonial offence” is maintained. From this point of view, they opposed adopting the “doctrine of breakdown of marriage”. They were afraid that the adoption of this doctrine would suggest that marriage was not a life-long union. In short they were afraid that this doctrine would deprive law of “moral incentive”.
4. The witness of the Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, agreed with the suggestion, made by a Commissioner, that the breakdown of marriage should be the only judicial ground for divorce. This was not because they understood that the reform based on the suggestion was the judicial acceptance of the social reality of marriage breakdown, but because the reform, by reducing the judicial ground for divorce, would make a divorce less frequent. The Roman Catholic Church was convinced that people would be able to overcome their matrimonial difficulties if divorce were made very difficult to obtain.
5. The writer concludes that both Churches almost overlooked that a stringent law which was too oblivious of human experience was broken anomalies and concessions, flouted by widespread by defeat and deceit, and then failed to help morality and promote stability of the institution of marriage and family.

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