Pakistan is geographically situated between China and the Gulf. In order to balance its strategic position against the major security threat of India, Pakistan formed a special and stable strategic alliance with China against common threats since the period of the cold war even though the two countries have neither a political ideology nor political system in common. On the other hand Pakistan established another special relation with Saudi Arabia on the basis of Islamic identity. With its expanding economic capacity, China proposed a project by the name of “new silk road economic corridor” with the intention of expanding and multiplying trade routes with the Middle East and Europe.

Within this framework Pakistan is expected to expand the role of an alternative land route that connects the Gulf and China for use if unfavorable emergencies occur in the Malacca route. However, the continuous political uncertainty in Afghanistan after the pullout of US-NATO fighting forces at the end of 2014 and sporadic outbreaks of terrorist acts by Pakistan Taliban in Pakistan have increased China’s anxiety regarding Uyghur issues at home. Avoiding military options for the moment, China is trying to find ways to play an active role in the security issues of Afghanistan with help from Pakistan if available.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Pakistani government formed in the general election of 2008 completed its full term and transferred authority to the newly elected government in 2013, something never observed before in Pakistan’s history. Coincidently, in Afghanistan the presidential election was carried out peacefully in 2014 in spite of the Taliban threat. Although it is too early to make any definite conclusion, constitutional processes, in spite of their defects, reflected to some extent wishes for normal life of the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan who were disgusted with weak governance and the prevalence of terrorism.

India’s status in the world has been elevated since the beginning of this century, supported by its accelerated economic growth. In order to grow from a regional to world power, the foreign policy of a nation needs to be adapted to the new circumstances. In this context, the new relations between India and the Middle East attract our attention. We must also consider the repercussions of domestic politics on the subject, particularly since the advent of the BJP government under Narendra Modi in 2014.

Ever since the BJP government came to power in 2014, India has begun to question the assumptions of political principles such as “secularism,” established under the Congress party government since the country’s independence in 1947. The new orientations could be termed as a paradigm change or a watershed in the political framework in the history of independent India. In the domestic field, the BJP government challenges the Indian “secularism” and pursues a sort of “ethnic democracy,” a concept introduced in Israel. Concerning its foreign policies India is gradually discarding its use of the traditional non-alignment principle and pursues a combination of multiple alliances taking into account the rising influence of China.

The ruling party, BJP, is the political wing of the RSS, an influential Hindu right-wing ss organization promoting Hinduism as the national identity of the Indian nation. The BJP and RSS particularly target the Muslim community in their campaign to promote “Hindutva,” a Hinduized national integration concept. The Indian “secularism” traditionally emphasizes equal consideration of every religious community in India. However, the Modi government in 2019 annulled the constitutional clauses that guaranteed special allowances to the Jammu and Kashmir state with Muslim majority and introduced an amendment to the citizenship law which excluded Muslims while considering granting citizenship to illegal refugees.

Under these circumstances, the Modi government pursues three different policies toward the Middle East. The first policy is to promote trade and investment, primarily from the viewpoint of mutual economic interests. India’s dealings with the Gulf countries and East Africa are typical cases where the Modi government employs this policy. The second policy is to enhance India’s regional dominance and neutralize any interventions from neighboring Muslim countries in India’s domestic policies concerning the Muslim citizens in the country. The third policy is a newly emerged special relationship with Israel, which has strategic, technological, and ideological implications in the reorganization of power structure in the South West Asia.

Azerbaijan, a land locked country in South Caucasia, gained independence in 1991 after the break-up of the USSR. It is surrounded by Russia, Iran, Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey and is compelled to depend on a balancing act in its diplomacy to protect its sovereignty and survive. In April 2018, it reiterated its intention to host the 2019 Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Baku and take on the position of chairmanship of NAM for a 3-year term. It is to be noted that Azerbaijan took this decision at a time of heightened tensions in the region when the US unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, popularly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Azerbaijan has a border with northwestern Iran and has had a complicated relationship with it based on historical, ethnic, and religious ties. At the same time, Azerbaijan is the major supplier of oil to Israel, which is increasingly antagonistic to Iran. For the last decade, Israel and Iran have tried to gain Azerbaijan’s favor by offering arms or adjusting their diplomatic stance to take into account the geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan. Iran switched from its tacit support to Armenia on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict to a more sympathetic understanding of Azerbaijan’s position.

The Nagorno Karabakh issue has been the focal point of security and sovereignty for Azerbaijan, which claims that Nagorno Karabakh and its neighboring areas have been occupied illegally by Armenia. Since the latter half of 2018, Israel has raised the level of military cooperation with Azerbaijan by supplying more advanced arms, such as drones, while Iran strengthened its military links with Azerbaijan by enhancing its military contacts and cooperation. For Azerbaijan, the simultaneous deepening of military cooperation with the two influential and mutually antagonistic regional powers—Israel and Iran—is not inconsistent because it seeks to upgrade its own military capacity.

The NAM has not been given serious attention in the world politics since the end of the cold war. At the same time, the objective reality that the number of member states has increased cannot be denied. The purpose and definition of the NAM is still vague and allows member states to arrive at different versions of its objectives. The mediating capacity of the NAM to solve conflicts among the member states is, at best, marginal. However, the NAM is a forum where the participants—most of whom experienced colonial rule—can express strong or mild dissatisfaction with the present world regime, dominated by the West. In this sense, the role of NAM could be still flexible and effective under certain conditions in the fluid world political system. Azerbaijan utilizes the NAM to achieve a balance in its diplomatic relations in the present turbulent situation and strengthen its political position on the Nagorno Karabakh issue.

Since the 1990s, Israel’s industrial development has entered a new phase owing to active engagement in Information and Communications Technology- related ventures. In the first decade of the 21st century, Israel succeeded in presenting her image as a “startup” nation, attracting worldwide attention. Israel’s economy, which was highly industrialized, tried to adapt itself to economic and financial globalization. In 2010, Israel was accepted as a full member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 brought to the fore not only the instability of the global financial system as a whole but also the latent weak potential of economic growth, especially in developed countries that lacked innovative, leading industries. In this framework, microlevel initiatives in Israel carried out using active venture capital to explore new niches and new, innovative, high-tech fields attracted the attention of various countries. These fields include the wider areas of software development in ICT—such as big data analysis, cyber security, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things—in addition to biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry. It is important to note that Israeli industrial development has been influenced not only by economic necessity but also by national security needs. This latter priority guided the selection and concentration of resources within Israel’s limited national budget and investment capacity.

Academic research and development also contributed to improvement in the technological aspect of the military industry. Technological know-how spillover from the military industry contributed to some extent to an emerging, domestic, microlevel high-tech industry. The military operations engaged in by the Israel Defense Forces in conflict zones in the Middle East, including operations in occupied territories, provided an opportunity to enhance the quality and practicability of weapons produced. The increasing volume of military grants from the US also supported the military industry in overcoming difficult financial phases. Therefore, Israel’s model of a “start-up” nation is not applicable directly to other nations, as the model was not neutral, owing to the state’s guidance and intervention on security issues. Although the new neoliberal macroeconomic circumstance is favorable to the “start-up” of new ventures, the indirect support by the state through various policies also contributed to the building of a positive environment for them. New markets for Israeli weapons and high-tech gadgets such as drones are expanding rapidly, particularly in huge emerging markets such as India and China. Although the export potential of military equipment is immense, it obliges Israel to be involved in delicate and complex international political relations among the importing countries. This is a new challenge in this unstable and risky world, as high-tech and military equipment always bears political implications beyond economic interests.

With its geopolitical implications, Israel’s presence in the Middle East is conspicuous. Over the last two decades, Israel has rapidly expanded its sphere of influence to other parts of the world through economic transactions. Its dramatic development has been supported by its economic globalisation and high-tech industry. Israel currently belongs with the developed economies as a member state of the OECD, with a per-capita income of US$ 35,000, and is often referred to as a “success story” that other countries can draw lessons from for their own economic development.

Part One attempts to analyse the factors, mainly related to economic policies, which contributed to the paradigm shift in Israel’s development strategy from the Zionist socialistic ideology to the neoliberal globalising policy orientation. The turning point was the economic reform introduced in 1985, which enabled the Bank of Israel to play an independent and leading role in monetary and fiscal policies against the rampant hyperinflation at the time. However, it should be noted that the reform package was a co-product of Israel and the US administration, supported by financial assistance attached to the reform. For the US, an economically stabilized Israel was an essential strategic asset against the Soviet Union. Since then, various reforms were introduced gradually, such as liberalisation of the labour market, privatisation, liberalisation of the financial market, and capital transfers. However, the voluminous favourable grant from the US was essential in absorbing balance of payment constraints and various social tensions through the transition period. Therefore, Israel’s transition to a neoliberal globalised economy was not a model that could be easily imported by other developing countries in the region.

The active initiative taken by Russian President Vladamir Putin by bombarding the antigovernment forces in Syria at the end of September 2015 startled the world by its precalculated boldness. Russian intervention has radically changed the dynamic of the war by empowering the Syrian government of Bashar Assad, and has resulted in a ceasefire agreement which starts on 27th February 2016, led by Russia and the US. No one can predict at present the next stage of conflicts in Syria or whether it will result in a positive solution to the tragic wars there. However, there is no denying the fact that Russia has played an important role in the development of the game. This paper analyzes the motivations of Putin in intervening in the Syrian crisis and the factors which have enabled Russia to play an enlarged role in the Middle East, seemingly beyond its objective capabilities. Legacies of international networks built during the Soviet period; shrewd tactics in making use of the inconsistency and vacillation of US policies, particularly towards the Middle East; its historical experience of interaction with the Muslim cultures, including domestic ones; its geopolitical perception of world politics, and the export of energy resources and military weapons as tools of diplomacy are some of the factors which explain Russian behavior. At the same time, the personal leadership and accumulated experience of President Putin in formulating Russian diplomacy and in manipulating different issues in a combined policy should be taken into account. His initiative in Syria succeeded to some extent in turning world attention away from the Ukrainian issue, aimed at changing the present sanctions imposed by the West. Another phenomenon to be noted in the international arena is the newly developed mutual interaction between Russia and the Arab countries in the Gulf. Frequent visits to Russia by autocratic leaders, including kings, emirsand princes do not always reflect a shared common interest between Russia and the Arab leaders. On the contrary, in spite of sharp and fundamental differences in their attitude toward the issues related to Syria, Iran and Yemen, the Arab leaders find it necessary to communicate with Russia and to know Russia’s expected strategies and intentions towards the Middle East, apart from its oil and gas policies. The Iran deal on the nuclear issue in July 2015 may have been a factor behind the phenomena.