The purpose of this paper is to study the supply control and price policies of mandarin oranges since 1974, when the prices began to decrease from over production. The means of supply control has been determined by: 1) production, 2) use and 3) shipment. 1) Production controls were carried out 6 times by means of acreage reduction. The acrage under cultivation was reduced to 41% during this period. 2) Use control involved juice processing or canning. The processing percentage was 36% at the maximum and 8% at the minimum depending on the yield and the price. 3) Shipment controls were placed through the restriction in quantity in the auction markets. In spite of these efforts, price was not recovered. The consumption of mandarin oranges was decreasing more rapidly than the reduction in acreage and in production. In addition to this, imports of fresh oranges and orange juice were increased tremendously. To recover the price, there is a need to optimize production, to control the auction market quantity through processing and to increase the demand through high quality.

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The aim of this paper is to review the causes influencing the latest demand and supply conditions and their respective problems. First, the examination was made on America, Denmark and Taiwan about international demand and supply trends and trade structure. The increase in pork imports from America are especially examined as the export offensive with Japan is growing. After the 1980's the Japanese demand and supply structure of pork has changed. As a result, first, the consumption of pork has decreased J second, the supply, in turn, has decreased; third, the import of pork has remained constant. Overseas demand and supply trends drive the Japanese pork market. Now, the Japanese meet processing companies shift both raw materials and products from their origin of supply. This has greatly influenced the Japanese reorganization of the pork market. Therefore, it's important to connect the domestic policy with effective 'price policy' border measures.

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The purpose of this study is, (1) to review the process of the Milk Demand-Supply Adjustment Plan (MDSAP) which was implemented in 1979, and (2) to percept the future issues of the plan under import liberalization of the World Trade Organization. The MDSAP has been implemented by the Central Council of Dairy Farmers (CCDF), without legal support of the government. The CCDF is a co-operative organization which is composed of 47 presidents from each prefectural milk marketing board and holds about 94 percent of the market share of raw milk shipped into Japan. The methods of implementing the plan have been modified, so the process can be divided into 3 stages. 1st period 1979-82. The gap of demand-supply for milk increased with over supply due to weak demand for consumption, sharp increases in domestic production and imported milk products, and the effects of economic stagnancy after the oil-shock (1974-78). The CCDF installed a milk production quota scheme and encouraged dairy farmers to feed surplus milk to calves. Milk promotion activities by the board, caused the consumption of milk to rise. 2nd period 1983-87. The demand for milk increased throughout this entire period. The CCDF expanded the base quantity, suspended feeding surplus milk to calves and encouraged producers to ship more milk. The CCDF also applied "side payment" to some marketing boards as a means of maintaining producers' prices. 3rd period 1988-Today. The CCDF changed the method of forecasting the demand quantity. The new method uses two criteria: an absolute base quantity and a variable base quantity. The board suspended the absolute base quantity in areas of decreasing production, while the variable base quantity is allocated to areas with increasing production. In the future, higher custom duties should be imposed on Japan's imports of milk products in order to protect domestic dairy farmers. The reason for this, is that domestic dairy farmers typically face higher production costs.

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In November 1995, the "Food Control Law" was abolished and the "Law for Stabilization of Supply/Demand and Price of Staple Food" (the "Staple Food Law") was established. While the purpose of the law is obvious from its title, it does not live up to its name as governmental food control has been decreasing dramatically under the new law. The aim of this report was to expose the flaws of the Staple Food Law by, first of all, discussing the measures laid out in the law to adjust supply and demand and to stabilize price of staple food, and second, by examining the change in the role of the government in controlling rice price policy. This report also proposed a new price policy vision for rice as well as a new income policy vision for farmers after the abolishment of the Food Control Law. According to the Staple Food Law, producers have no obligation to sell rice to the government. They are, in essence, able to sell rice to anyone, and do not have to participate in the Rice Diversion Program. Because of this, the government can not control the price and supply and demand of rice. As a result, the prices of rice have begun to fluctuate greatly, rather than remain stable as they did under the Food Control Law. In order to stabilize these fluctuating prices, it is important that the government regain the degree of control over rice that it had under the Food Control Law by taking such measures as regulating the quantity of imported rice, storing rice as much as possible, purchasing more rice, and so on. In conclusion, the government should also compensate any loss of producers' income due to the fall of rice prices, as well as establish a public corporation to adjust rice supply and demand by purchasing rice from the market when the price becomes too low and selling rice to the market when the price gets too high. Finally, the government should subsidize disadvantageous paddy fields in order to preserve the rural environment.

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我が国において1988年ころより生鮮野菜輸入が急増してきた。さらにWTO体制のもと、関税率の引き下げや輸入植物検疫の簡素化など、その動きは加速されようとしている。国内市場における輸入野菜のシェアはまだ小さい。しかし、かぼちゃやブロッコリーなどでは端境期だけでなく、収穫期にまで輸入野菜が供給され、高松中央卸売市場においても県内産品と競合している。輸入増加の要因は、円高、国内産地の生産力低下、需要の膠着化などである。また、量販店が周年的に安定した品揃えを保とうとすることが、需要膠着化の一因となっている。しかし、輸入野菜では、多国籍企業が世界に複数の生産拠点を持ち周年的安定供給を実現し、日本国内では仲卸業者との連携により、量販店に対応できる流通システムを構築した。しかし、香川県内の野菜流通をみる限りでは、卸売市場を経由し地域の量販店に流れるのが主要な経路であり、輸入野菜の流通システム化は一部分でしかない。一方、香川県内の農協は、輸入野菜に対し以下のような対策を講じている。(1)経営感覚の優れた農家、組織の育成。(2)省力化のための機械化。(3)規格、包装などの簡略化による低コスト化。(4)輸入野菜との違いを印象づける製品差別化。(5)消費者の安全志向、自然志向に対応した商品開発。製品差別化や量販店への対応には、量販店や消費者との情報の交流が可能な新たなマーケティング・チャンネルの構築が必要となっている。農協による流通システム化はこの点に後れをとっているが、県連が単協の直売所間の品揃えを調整するなどにより、地域流通での系統農協間の調整が可能となれば、輸入野菜にない国内産地の優位を活かした販売も可能である。

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Vegetable imports in recent years have been increasing steadily in Japan. The total import quantity from 1989 through 1994 increased by 1.77 times. Particularly worthy of note is that geographically close Asia, especially mainland China, has in recent years played a significant role as a major source of these import. The purpose of this paper is to make clear, through the case study of vegetables imported from China, the following problems: 1) business condition within the vegetable trade, 2) distribution channels, and 3) price formation of imported vegetables. In order to do this, the related investigations were carried out at the coastal region of mainland China four times during 1995. The main conclusions of this study are as follows: 1) In 1994, the imports of fresh vegetables from China were 81,000 tons and frozen vegetables amounted to 161,000 tons, this was to become the second highest, after the United States, over all of Japan's vegetable imports. This is due to China's cheaper production costs and geographical advantage. 2) The production and export of vegetables are mainly concentrated in the coastal region on China. 3) A multistage contract system was adopted in the case of onion imports.

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The purpose of this article is to try to throw light on the current conditions and problems in the Local Wholesale Market of fruits and vegetables under the reorganization of the distributional surroundings at wholesale markets by taking an instance of the South Osaka Area. The distribution of fruits and vegetables in Osaka markets has a double character; one of the Central Wholesale Markets playing a leading part by carrying out an enormous distribution through-out a wide range, the other, of the Local Wholesale Markets accordingly playing a secondary auxiliary part by performing regional distribution. The relationship between the Central Wholesale Markets and the Local ones has so far been viewed as that of opposition caused by great differences in power for assembling and marketing between them. But, it is now clear that relationship between them has undergone a new change and development because of: 1) large-scale shipment of products, 2) limited markets where products are on sale, 3) and retail markets controlled by supermarkets that is rapidly encroaching on them. This result has been brought about by efforts made not only to take advantage of the assembling and distribution function of the Central Wholesale Markets, but also, at the same time, to fulfill the regional distribution function belonging to the Local Wholesale Markets. In concrete terms it is symbolized by a strategy: 1) to buy from intermediate wholesalers only a needed amount of products for which their districts are made famous, along with 2) strengthening ties with producing regions by adopting contract-cultivation for the purpose of stabilizing the sales amount of fresh Fruits and Vegetables produced in that region as they are highly demanded by supermarkets.

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