The number of foreign banks entering Indonesia has increased in recent times, and they now account for over 30% of the Indonesian banking system. This rapid entry of foreign banks poses a concern as in the event of a financial crisis they could pull out funds and destabilize the supply of loans. This concern is due to the fact that, before the Asian currency crisis, Indonesia was dependent on short-term foreign borrowing and suffered huge losses. Above all, the lending behavior of foreign banks during the global financial crisis is a key element in any discussion of financial stability in Asia. Therefore, this study will investigate the fear of destabilization by comparing lending behavior between foreign banks and local banks. This study uses financial data of the respective banks and will try to examine lending behavior before and after the global financial crisis caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Thedetection of differences in changes of foreign currency loans and local currency loans between foreign banks and local banks employs standard statistical methods: the Kruskal-Wallis test, the Steel-Dwass test, and regression analysis. Furthermore, we will answer the question as to whether the entry of foreign banks destabilizes the loan supply by studying factors which explain the differences in lending behavior. It is found that both foreign as well as local banks showed an increase in the disbursment of local currency loans in spite of the global financial crisis. In particular, acquired local banks increased their loan amounts by more than 10% due to the availability of dense branch networks.We did not find that foreign banks destabilized local currency loans. In contrast, both foreign banks and joint-venture banks decreased their issuance of foreign currency loans. The explanation is that parent banks which suffered losses restructured their businesses. Moreover, some joint-venture banks whose home countries had not been hit by the financial crisis decreased foreign currency loans. However, attention should be paid to the behavior of foreign banks and joint-venture banks because their share of foreign currency loans is high. Meanwhile, acquired local banks increased the provision of foreign currency loans dramatically. This huge increase covered the decrease in loans by foreign banks and joint-venture banks and contributed to the stability of the loan supply. These results proved that the entry of a string of foreign banks does not destabilize the loan supply even in the event of a global financial crisis.
This paper analyzes the objectives, content, and causes of the bankruptcy of the national policy practiced by the Sheng Shih-ts’ai regime in the 1930s, and examines how it influenced the identity of the Uygur people in south Xinjiang. Under the patronage of the Soviet Union, Sheng introduced ‘Soviet model’ national policies, which helped the development of each ethnic group’s culture in Xinjiang. These policies were based on the theory that the development of individual ethnic groups would eventually lead to the formation of a new unified nation. ‘Uygur reformers’ gave a degree of support to these policies, and education based on the native language developed. In Kashgar region, native inhabitants planned to establish autonomous power through an education movement. However, these attempts at political and cultural autonomy conflicted with the reinforcement of control by the provincial government in 1936. The provincial government permitted development of the culture of ethnic groups, but did not allow these groups to have any autonomy. Sheng’s political objective was to resist the Japanese invasion by relying on Soviet aid. After establishing his regime in Xinjiang, his principal political ambition was to become the political leader of the socialists in China, and if possible, the political leader of the whole of China.Therefore, he expressed his loyalty to Stalin from a relatively early stage. The purge that Sheng initiated in October 1937 was based on his fear of a coup, and was an imitation of Stalin’s purges. National policy, however, broke down because of it. The Uygur people in south Xinjiang, who faced oppression, were forced to participate in the campaign against Japan. Many of them, however, anticipated that outsiders, such as Japan and the Nanking nationalist government, would overthrow the provincial government. The least they hoped for was political and cultural autonomy. Sheng’s regime specified certain issues that needed to be settled in order for the central government of China to integrate Xinjiang.
This paper examines the significance held by the 1950s for the history of the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s postwar economic development. It focuses on points of continuity and discontinuity between the 1950s and the ROK’s economic development from the 1960s onward, from the perspective of the US Eisenhower administration’s (1953–1961) policy toward the ROK and the response of Syngman Rhee’s administration (1948–1960). In this era, the US applied its economic development policy toward Northeast Asia to Japan, Taiwan, and Okinawa, and created the beginnings of postwar economic development in Japan and Taiwan. As a result, similar changes connected to economic development in the 1960s also became visible in Korea. However, the application of the US policy was, as an exception, flawed in the ROK. Since this ‘exceptionality’ appears to relate to the discontinuity between the 1950s and 1960s, this paper seeks to explain the process and reasoning that created this ‘exceptionality’. The paper analyzes US–ROK relations in the 1950s in terms of: (i) trade promotion policy in the Eisenhower administration’s economic development policy toward Northeast Asia; (ii) the ROK’s response to US economic development policy; and (iii) the US’s pattern of policy-making. The officials from both the US and the ROK recognized the necessity of exporting labor-intensive products and gradually undertook measures to achieve this from the mid-1950s. In addition, US officials in the ROK simultaneously came to recognize the necessity of readjusting the ROK’s exchange rates to a realistic, single rate for export promotion. The Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on trade was one significant reason for these changes in recognition.These changes appear to demonstrate continuity in US–ROK dialog during the process of shifting the ROK’s economic policy to export-led growth in the 1960s. However, US economic development policy in Korea appears flawed when the Korean case is compared with other cases in Northeast Asia.This circumstance resulted from Syngman Rhee’s resistance to the US policy of import-substitution, and its complex intertwinement with US recognition of the need for economic and price stabilization, political instability in the ROK, and the ROK’s standing in the Cold War.
Western international relations theory (IRT) has held a dominant position since the discipline of international relations came into existence. However, as Barry Buzan emphasized in his critique of the Eurocentrism of IRT, the voices and perspectives that represent the experience of the non-Western world are essential to understanding today’s pluralistic world. The purpose of this paper is to understand the development of non-Western IRT and the perspective of China as a rising superpower by examining the process of the ‘Westernization’ and ‘Sinicization’ of IRT in China since the 1980s. The ‘Westernization’ process of IR study in China (re)started in the 1980s when China undertook a policy of reform and opening-up. Since then, most of Western IRT has been introduced into China, including American IRT, the English School, critical theory, and feminism. Not only has a large body of Western IRT work been translated into Chinese and published, but also some important IR journals have turned their attention to IRT. As a result, Marxism has been weakened and lost its dominant theoretical position, and Western IRT, especially American IRT, has become the mainstream. Consequently, Chinese views of ‘national interests’, ‘sovereignty’, and ‘security’ have changed or are changing under the strong influence of Western IRT. However, in the mid-1980s, through learning Western IRT, a debate among some Chinese scholars arose in relation to the ‘Sinicization’ of IRT. In the first phase, the focal point was on ‘Chinese-style IRT’. Later, the debate evolved into new forms regarding ‘Chinese theories’ and a ‘Chinese School’. Since 2004, an understanding that ‘Chinese theories’ and a ‘Chinese School’ need to be constructed has become established among Chinese scholars. However, in juxtaposition to the English School, the construction of a ‘Chinese School’ requires various resources and approaches. Among others, there are two representative arguments. One is put forward by Qin Yaqing, who considers China’s rise as the core research question of ‘Chinese theory’; and the other is by Zhao Tingyang, who intends to provide a Chinese vision of a world order through reinterpreting the traditional Chinese world view, tianxia (天下). Self-awareness as a superpower and the self-awakening of academic independence following the absorption of Western IRT among Chinese scholars are the motivating forces of the emerging ‘Chinese School’. Hence, the construction of ‘Chinese School(s)’ indicates that a rising China is seeking a new world order image, a new self-image and a new identity.
The term Eurasia is more than just a geographical statement; it acquired political meaning in the first half of the 20th century. As the term is capable of various definitions, here we restrict the meaning to former-Soviet lands. This paper examines the political intentions of imperial Japan towards the region in the interwar period in terms of Japanese policy towards Islamic populations and the Axis allies, especially German–Japanese military co-operation. The sources are mainly those that relate to questions about Islam and anti-Soviet feelings during this period. The strategy of supporting those who opposed the regime in Russia dates back to the Russo-Japanese war. Based on this experience, Japan, in an attempt to play a more important role in international issues after the Paris Conference in 1919, tried to make Tokyo an émigré-center, like Berlin, Paris, and Istanbul at the time. From early 1920s Turkic-Muslim people were recruited and formed a community in Japan under the leadership of the influential Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali. Subsequently, Abdurresid Ibrahim arrived in 1933 and took the initiative by replacing Kurbanali in 1938. It was assumed that Japan was utilizing these anti-Bolshevik Muslim factions to foster the anti-Sovietism adopted by the military; this explains the infiltration of Japanese influence into the Muslim groups, especially those suppressed by Soviet Russia. As is well known, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed the Anti-Commintern Pact in November 1936 against international communism in name, but in fact against Soviet Russia. Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese military attaché to Germany at the time, made an agreement with Wilhelm Canaris on behalf of the German army covering two areas: (i) anti-Soviet intelligence co-operation; and (ii) aid to support propaganda of anti-regime minorities based on an order from the Chief of the Army General Staff of imperial Japan. To summarize the agreement: ‘To collaborate with the German army concerning the intelligence of the Soviet Union so that the independence movements of minorities in the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda can be easily supported. This would assist the Japanese army to understand the deficiencies of Soviet Russia and move accordingly in the case of war between Japan and Russia’. Finally, the plans mentioned above did not bear fruit in terms of putting Eurasia under Japanese influence due to the fact that Japanese military operations on the Asian mainland and the German invasion in Russia ultimately ended in failure.