In its concluding observations on the combined third to sixth reports of Japan (CERD/C/JPN/CO/3–6) (March 2010), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:

“expresses its concern about the persistent discrimination suffered by the people of Okinawa. The disproportionate concentration of [U. S.] military bases on Okinawa has a negative impact on residentsʼ enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights.”

In 1972, when the U.S. returned the administration of Ryukyu/Okinawa to the Japanese Government, Tokyo enacted, and has since enforced, the “Law on Special Measures for the Promotion and Development of Okinawa.” This law stipulates that Okinawa Development Agency (ODA), a department of the Japanese Government, will formulate and determine the Okinawa Promotion and Development Plan. Simultaneously, however, the law has neither given jurisdiction to this Agency nor any planning or administrative responsibility for any affairs concerning the U. S. military bases in Okinawa. Therefore, in formulating the plan, ODA marginalizes local voices with bureaucratic procedures that do not offer eliciting opinions from the people of Okinawa on issues related directly to the reduction of the U.S. military bases.

The Japanese Government has, in fact, never recognized the people of Ryukyu/Okinawa as indigenous people, and has, thus, never felt the need to acknowledge their rights to the land, coastlines, and other natural resources that constitute the “ancestral domain,” nor does Tokyo give special protection to these treasures. Contrarily, the government claims the construction of military bases is based on Japanese law, making decisions while denying democratic participation to Okinawa people.

Such discrimination is integral to the present Japanese political and judicial system. Therefore, the people of Okinawa have no access to redress through domestic political and judicial procedures. These are key reasons why Ryukyuan/Okinawan people claim their human rights and the right to self-determination at United Nationsʼ human rights bodies and international society.

Since the “return” of Okinawa (Ryukyu) to Japan in 1972, the U.S. military has maintained its bases in Okinawa with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces also deployed. Thus, Okinawa has continued to be militarized even under the pacifism of the Japanese Constitution. The uneven distribution of U.S. military bases in Japan under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which is supported by the Japanese majority, has resulted in the concentration of assaults around the bases, also known as the “Okinawa Problem.” However, the damages are difficult to perceive in mainland Japan. The root of the “discrimination,” as the Japanese Government and mainland residents continue to push the problems arising from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to Okinawa, is based on colonialism.

In connection with the discrimination against Okinawa, is based on colonialism. In connection with the discrimination against Okinawa, this paper describes the “structural discrimination toward Okinawa” as an accumulation of contradictions between the Constitution of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system. The paper indicates that the deployment and strengthening of the Self-Defense Forces in the Ryukyu Islands to the south of Amami constitute the new Suteishi Sakusen (“Sacrifice Operation”).

Additionally, this paper examines the discrimination against Okinawa within the following forms: discrimination against Okinawa based on colonialism, hatred against Okinawa, the non-application of the Constitution toward Okinawa, the non-application of the Constitution toward the colonies under the Meiji Constitution, and the problem of colonial awareness inherent in the people of Okinawa.

This paper focuses on colonialism that underlies the discrimination through a multifaceted examination of the discrimination against Okinawa. The author believes that understanding the current situation in Okinawa and thinking about colonialism will lead to Japan recognizing and liquidating colonialism and becoming independent.

This article questions the basic framework of “dependence/independence” arguments that are often made in relation to military-base issues in Okinawa. To execute this, four perspectives are raised.

Firstly, the background of the “island-wide” protest movement in Okinawa is presented. It is argued that the fundamental problem at the root of divisions and conflicts in Okinawan society was the question regarding how it ought to define its possibilities within the “reality” of subjection to the overwhelming occupying power. The “island-wide” movement broke out in the mid-1950s, as the policy to pursue “possibilities within a realistic framework” through cooperation with the occupying forces came to an end.

Secondly, the article discusses the channel for pacification that emerged between the Japanese Government and Okinawa. The Japanese Government was concerned that the heightening of “island-wide” criticism of the occupation in Okinawa might negatively affect public sentiment toward America in the mainland. Accordingly, it began to search for a method to subdue Okinawan opposition through economic assistance. In turn, a political stance in Okinawa emerged toward the end of the 1950s, aiming for gradual reform of the “reality” under the occupation by obtaining assistance from the Japanese Government.

Thirdly, the implication of the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance on the issue of trade liberalization is discussed. As the new Security Treaty was effected in 1960, liberalization of imports became a salient matter. To meet American demands, Japan embarked on liberalizing its domestic sugar market in 1963. Therefore, the rapidly expanding sugar production in Okinawa began to decline, causing further depopulation in rural areas and migration of laborers out of the island. Thus, the security alliance, whose premise was the inevitable fortification of Okinawa, also imposed a heavy burden on the island through trade liberalization.

Fourthly, the question of state protection for local industries is raised. In relation to the rescue of the sugar industry, the arguments as to whether local industries in Okinawa were worth national protection had been frequently proposed since the 1920s. However, the fundamental question raised by those arguments remained when the sugar market was liberalized in the 1960s.

In Japan, Yankee refers to a cultural group of underclass youths. This paper explores the process by which Yankee youth enter the construction industry through local communities on the periphery of Okinawan society. I argue that, because of family and social connections, this process qualitatively differs from that of Yankee youth working in the manufacturing industry on the periphery of mainland Japanese society. Differences arise from the division between the construction industry, which is the key industry in Okinawa, and the manufacturing industry, which has a stronger foothold in mainland Japan.

After World War II, Japanese management styles and welfare systems were established by the majority blue-collar class. Specifically, they were led by large manufacturing companies and supported by subcontractors. Mainland Yankee youth enjoyed a relatively smooth transition from school to factory employment because of the close relationship between them.

In Okinawa, manufacturing plays a smaller role in the industrial structure, and construction companies are generally small- and medium-sized businesses that subcontract from large general contractors. These companies have sought to survive in an unstable environment by employing their juniors from the local community. Through this process, a culture and social relationship between local seniors, “shiijya,” and juniors, “uttu,” has emerged.

On the mainland, schools perform an employment distribution function and families and companies perform a welfare function. However, in the process of Yankee youth transitioning into the construction industry, schools and families no longer perform these functions. Amid systemic and historical constraints, those who pursue employment in the construction industry have developed unique social relationships and culture.

The social relationships sustaining cultural reproduction within the construction industry are distinct from those on the mainland. This qualitative difference occurs outside the cultural reproduction of the mainland’ s blue-collar class, which is sustained by company, school, and family. Neglecting to address this unjust situation and these unjust relationships, and continuing to appropriate that relationship back to its source, leads to continuing structural discrimination.

More than 23 years have elapsed since the 1996 agreement of returning the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). This article examines structural factors that prevented the return. It argues that the dual hierarchical relations between the U.S. and Japan, and between Japan and Okinawa, caused a delay in returning MCAS Futenma until today. By reviewing changing geo-strategic surroundings, especially the rise of China, and discussing how the U.S. has responded to such changes, this article seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. military strategy and priorities have shifted over the years. It maintains that the increasing military capacity of China, most notably its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, forced the U.S. to reconsider the roles of its own forces in Okinawa and, as a result, prompted the fortification of Guam. The rise of China has also affected the military strategy of Japan, particularly of its so-called “gray-zone” defense of remote island territories. Under these emerging situations, the U. S. Marine Corps reevaluated its position in Okinawa, especially its Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), as deterrence and the only combat-credible U. S. asset pre-deployed in Japan. As MCAS Futenma hosts 24 MV-22, also known as Osprey, which are essential for the MAGTF to accomplish its mission, its return has been postponed until its core functions are relocated to alternative sites. Existing literature views that Japanese domestic politics are directly responsible for the delay. On one level, this article complements such a view by identifying the structural factors that indirectly affected the relevant decisions of the U. S. and Japanese governments in withholding the return of MCAS Futenma. However, the article concludes that the “failure” must be seen as a result of complex interplays among myriad levels of factors including the U.S.–Japan, Japan–Okinawa, and intra-Okinawa relations and politics.

Okinawa Hibakushas are atomic bomb survivors who returned to Okinawa after experiencing the bombing either in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. There were 348 people recorded as Okinawa Hibakusha in 1979, and the number decreased to 132 by the end of March 2019.

Okinawa Hibakushas have a different history from that of Hibakushas in the mainland of Japan. Okinawa Hibakushas had been neglected by the Japanese Government for approximately 20 years. Hiroaki Fukuchi published a book titled “A-bomb Survivors in Okinawa” in 1981. Almost no studies have been completed on Okinawa Hibakushas since Fukuchiʼs publication, thus requiring more research. The objective of this article is to reorganize the testimonies from interviews with Okinawa Hibakushas and reconsider the value of those testimonies.

Main findings from the interviews with three Okinawa Hibakushas were summarized into three points. First, they criticized not only the atomic bombing but also war and military conflict as a broader concept of violence. Second, the lawsuit established by Okinawa Hibakushas played a significant role in pioneering the activities by Hibakushas living outside of Japan. Extraordinarily, those who were under the U.S. control fought against them when mainland-Hibakushas were still struggling to obtain rights. Finally, inheritance of atomic bombing experiences is an urgent matter; its importance is emphasized in Okinawa and the mainland. Discourse on atomic bombing experiences in Okinawa used to be difficult, as their primary focus was on the Battle of Okinawa. Moreover, people of Okinawa have been segregated from their mainland counterparts. Therefore, bringing their voices to the mainland will further develop the discussion over Okinawa Hibakushas.

This article aims to suggest the usage of a framework of “slow violence” as an analytical perspective rather than structural violence (SV). In doing so, the article presents two problems of Galtungʼs peace theory: 1) the concept of SV could sometimes be too abstract to visualize what“non-peaceful states”would be, and 2) his analyses have historically been predominantly centered on human affairs. This article focuses on why Peace Studies have been unable to sufficiently tackle those problems as an urgent concern. The consequence of this neglect has been presentday mankindʼs escalating violence against other living beings and the earth itself. Avoiding this pitfall, it discusses in Sections One, Two, and Three how the concept of slow violence is more appropriate than SV when an issue like the relationship between humans and non-humans is at stake. Here, the factors that SV has failed to grasp are highlighted. Section Four introduces the background argument of slow violence centered on the coming “Planetary Peace Studies” from a perspective of the Sustainability Development Goals (SDGs). Section Five presents two examples that serve to deepen our understanding of slow violence: the cases of acquisition and exploitation of fossil fuels in Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. Sections Six and Seven describe the spatiotemporal characteristics of slow violence, and draw attention to three key moves that can prevent various forms of slow violence from escalating: on-shoring, scientific research on critical zones, and the vertical pure gift. In conclusion, the article suggests that renovating the idea of traditional spatiotemporal recognition is necessary to elevate Peace Studies to Planetary Peace Studies.

In all, 63 years have passed since the official recognition of the Minamata disease, but its problems still remain unresolved. After clarifying the historical formation process behind the problems and the structural discrimination executed by the national government and the perpetrator, Chisso, I have proposed a new system, which I believe will significantly contribute to peace studies.

In this study, I have investigated the real-life conditions of an uncertified patient of the fetal Minamata disease generation on the basis of his life history and support circumstances. Owing to his aggravating symptoms, declining of ADL, and the aging of his family, the patient and his family are now facing nursing-related issues. My study aims at elucidating the shortcomings of the national governmentʼs certification system and the issues in the Minamata Cityʼs social welfare system.

In Section 1, I have summarized the status and conditions of patients with fetal and infantile Minamata disease and discussed uncertified patients. Further, I have reported the characteristics of the patients diagnosed with Minamata disease.

In Section 2, I have examined the cityʼs welfare systems for people with disabilities. Moreover, after officially recognizing the Minamata disease, the primary issue with respect to who would shoulder the responsibility of supporting the lives of patients with Minamata disease became crucial. Hence, Hashimoto Hikoshichi, the then mayor, appealed to the national government to shoulder the responsibility of these patients; however, this appeal was not accepted. Therefore, Minamata City was compelled to open Meisuien, a privately operated public facility. Furthermore, I have interviewed uncertified patients of the fetal Minamata disease patient generation and their families to comprehend their social environments.

In Section 3, Table 2 illustrates the numerous challenges encountered by Minamata City. I have introduced two events that make it difficult to maintain athome life with the welfare service for disabled people. I then highlight the harsh conditions that people with disabilities, including uncertified patients, face under Minamataʼs welfare system, alongside struggling to maintain their lives at home. In addition, I have concluded the study by providing an assessment of the Minamata disease certification system and suggesting improvements in the welfare service to resolve the issues related to Minamata disease.

In its concluding observations on the combined third to sixth reports of Japan (CERD/C/JPN/CO/3–6) (March 2010), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: “expresses its concern about the persistent discrimination suffered by the people of Okinawa. The disproportionate concentration of [U. S.] military bases on Okinawa has a negative impact on residentsʼ enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights.”

In 1972, when the U.S. returned the administration of Ryukyu/Okinawa to the Japanese Government, Tokyo enacted, and has since enforced, the “Law on Special Measures for the Promotion and Development of Okinawa.” This law stipulates that Okinawa Development Agency (ODA), a department of the Japanese Government, will formulate and determine the Okinawa Promotion and Development Plan. Simultaneously, however, the law has neither given jurisdiction to this Agency nor any planning or administrative responsibility for any affairs concerning the U. S. military bases in Okinawa. Therefore, in formulating the plan, ODA marginalizes local voices with bureaucratic procedures that do not offer eliciting opinions from the people of Okinawa on issues related directly to the reduction of the U.S. military bases.

The Japanese Government has, in fact, never recognized the people of Ryukyu/Okinawa as indigenous people, and has, thus, never felt the need to acknowledge their rights to the land, coastlines, and other natural resources that constitute the “ancestral domain,” nor does Tokyo give special protection to these treasures. Contrarily, the government claims the construction of military bases is based on Japanese law, making decisions while denying democratic participation to Okinawa people.

Such discrimination is integral to the present Japanese political and judicial system. Therefore, the people of Okinawa have no access to redress through domestic political and judicial procedures. These are key reasons why Ryukyuan/Okinawan people claim their human rights and the right to self-determination at United Nationsʼ human rights bodies and international society.

Since the “return” of Okinawa (Ryukyu) to Japan in 1972, the U.S. military has maintained its bases in Okinawa with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces also deployed. Thus, Okinawa has continued to be militarized even under the pacifism of the Japanese Constitution. The uneven distribution of U.S. military bases in Japan under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which is supported by the Japanese majority, has resulted in the concentration of assaults around the bases, also known as the “Okinawa Problem.” However, the damages are difficult to perceive in mainland Japan. The root of the “discrimination,” as the Japanese Government and mainland residents continue to push the problems arising from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to Okinawa, is based on colonialism.

In connection with the discrimination against Okinawa, is based on colonialism. In connection with the discrimination against Okinawa, this paper describes the “structural discrimination toward Okinawa” as an accumulation of contradictions between the Constitution of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system. The paper indicates that the deployment and strengthening of the Self-Defense Forces in the Ryukyu Islands to the south of Amami constitute the new Suteishi Sakusen (“Sacrifice Operation”).

Additionally, this paper examines the discrimination against Okinawa within the following forms: discrimination against Okinawa based on colonialism, hatred against Okinawa, the non-application of the Constitution toward Okinawa, the non-application of the Constitution toward the colonies under the Meiji Constitution, and the problem of colonial awareness inherent in the people of Okinawa.

This paper focuses on colonialism that underlies the discrimination through a multifaceted examination of the discrimination against Okinawa. The author believes that understanding the current situation in Okinawa and thinking about colonialism will lead to Japan recognizing and liquidating colonialism and becoming independent.

This article questions the basic framework of “dependence/independence” arguments that are often made in relation to military-base issues in Okinawa. To execute this, four perspectives are raised.

Firstly, the background of the “island-wide” protest movement in Okinawa is presented. It is argued that the fundamental problem at the root of divisions and conflicts in Okinawan society was the question regarding how it ought to define its possibilities within the “reality” of subjection to the overwhelming occupying power. The “island-wide” movement broke out in the mid-1950s, as the policy to pursue “possibilities within a realistic framework” through cooperation with the occupying forces came to an end.

Secondly, the article discusses the channel for pacification that emerged between the Japanese Government and Okinawa. The Japanese Government was concerned that the heightening of “island-wide” criticism of the occupation in Okinawa might negatively affect public sentiment toward America in the mainland. Accordingly, it began to search for a method to subdue Okinawan opposition through economic assistance. In turn, a political stance in Okinawa emerged toward the end of the 1950s, aiming for gradual reform of the “reality” under the occupation by obtaining assistance from the Japanese Government.

Thirdly, the implication of the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance on the issue of trade liberalization is discussed. As the new Security Treaty was effected in 1960, liberalization of imports became a salient matter. To meet American demands, Japan embarked on liberalizing its domestic sugar market in 1963. Therefore, the rapidly expanding sugar production in Okinawa began to decline, causing further depopulation in rural areas and migration of laborers out of the island. Thus, the security alliance, whose premise was the inevitable fortification of Okinawa, also imposed a heavy burden on the island through trade liberalization.

Fourthly, the question of state protection for local industries is raised. In relation to the rescue of the sugar industry, the arguments as to whether local industries in Okinawa were worth national protection had been frequently proposed since the 1920s. However, the fundamental question raised by those arguments remained when the sugar market was liberalized in the 1960s.

In Japan, Yankee refers to a cultural group of underclass youths. This paper explores the process by which Yankee youth enter the construction industry through local communities on the periphery of Okinawan society. I argue that, because of family and social connections, this process qualitatively differs from that of Yankee youth working in the manufacturing industry on the periphery of mainland Japanese society. Differences arise from the division between the construction industry, which is the key industry in Okinawa, and the manufacturing industry, which has a stronger foothold in mainland Japan.

After World War II, Japanese management styles and welfare systems were established by the majority blue-collar class. Specifically, they were led by large manufacturing companies and supported by subcontractors. Mainland Yankee youth enjoyed a relatively smooth transition from school to factory employment because of the close relationship between them.

In Okinawa, manufacturing plays a smaller role in the industrial structure, and construction companies are generally small- and medium-sized businesses that subcontract from large general contractors. These companies have sought to survive in an unstable environment by employing their juniors from the local community. Through this process, a culture and social relationship between local seniors, “shiijya,” and juniors, “uttu,” has emerged.

On the mainland, schools perform an employment distribution function and families and companies perform a welfare function. However, in the process of Yankee youth transitioning into the construction industry, schools and families no longer perform these functions. Amid systemic and historical constraints, those who pursue employment in the construction industry have developed unique social relationships and culture.

The social relationships sustaining cultural reproduction within the construction industry are distinct from those on the mainland. This qualitative difference occurs outside the cultural reproduction of the mainland’ s blue-collar class, which is sustained by company, school, and family. Neglecting to address this unjust situation and these unjust relationships, and continuing to appropriate that relationship back to its source, leads to continuing structural discrimination.

More than 23 years have elapsed since the 1996 agreement of returning the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). This article examines structural factors that prevented the return. It argues that the dual hierarchical relations between the U.S. and Japan, and between Japan and Okinawa, caused a delay in returning MCAS Futenma until today. By reviewing changing geo-strategic surroundings, especially the rise of China, and discussing how the U.S. has responded to such changes, this article seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. military strategy and priorities have shifted over the years. It maintains that the increasing military capacity of China, most notably its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, forced the U.S. to reconsider the roles of its own forces in Okinawa and, as a result, prompted the fortification of Guam. The rise of China has also affected the military strategy of Japan, particularly of its so-called “gray-zone” defense of remote island territories. Under these emerging situations, the U. S. Marine Corps reevaluated its position in Okinawa, especially its Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), as deterrence and the only combat-credible U. S. asset pre-deployed in Japan. As MCAS Futenma hosts 24 MV-22, also known as Osprey, which are essential for the MAGTF to accomplish its mission, its return has been postponed until its core functions are relocated to alternative sites. Existing literature views that Japanese domestic politics are directly responsible for the delay. On one level, this article complements such a view by identifying the structural factors that indirectly affected the relevant decisions of the U. S. and Japanese governments in withholding the return of MCAS Futenma. However, the article concludes that the “failure” must be seen as a result of complex interplays among myriad levels of factors including the U.S.–Japan, Japan–Okinawa, and intra-Okinawa relations and politics.

Okinawa Hibakushas are atomic bomb survivors who returned to Okinawa after experiencing the bombing either in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. There were 348 people recorded as Okinawa Hibakusha in 1979, and the number decreased to 132 by the end of March 2019.

Okinawa Hibakushas have a different history from that of Hibakushas in the mainland of Japan. Okinawa Hibakushas had been neglected by the Japanese Government for approximately 20 years. Hiroaki Fukuchi published a book titled “A-bomb Survivors in Okinawa” in 1981. Almost no studies have been completed on Okinawa Hibakushas since Fukuchiʼs publication, thus requiring more research. The objective of this article is to reorganize the testimonies from interviews with Okinawa Hibakushas and reconsider the value of those testimonies.

Main findings from the interviews with three Okinawa Hibakushas were summarized into three points. First, they criticized not only the atomic bombing but also war and military conflict as a broader concept of violence. Second, the lawsuit established by Okinawa Hibakushas played a significant role in pioneering the activities by Hibakushas living outside of Japan. Extraordinarily, those who were under the U.S. control fought against them when mainland-Hibakushas were still struggling to obtain rights. Finally, inheritance of atomic bombing experiences is an urgent matter; its importance is emphasized in Okinawa and the mainland. Discourse on atomic bombing experiences in Okinawa used to be difficult, as their primary focus was on the Battle of Okinawa. Moreover, people of Okinawa have been segregated from their mainland counterparts. Therefore, bringing their voices to the mainland will further develop the discussion over Okinawa Hibakushas.

This article aims to suggest the usage of a framework of “slow violence” as an analytical perspective rather than structural violence (SV). In doing so, the article presents two problems of Galtungʼs peace theory: 1) the concept of SV could sometimes be too abstract to visualize what“non-peaceful states”would be, and 2) his analyses have historically been predominantly centered on human affairs. This article focuses on why Peace Studies have been unable to sufficiently tackle those problems as an urgent concern. The consequence of this neglect has been presentday mankindʼs escalating violence against other living beings and the earth itself. Avoiding this pitfall, it discusses in Sections One, Two, and Three how the concept of slow violence is more appropriate than SV when an issue like the relationship between humans and non-humans is at stake. Here, the factors that SV has failed to grasp are highlighted. Section Four introduces the background argument of slow violence centered on the coming “Planetary Peace Studies” from a perspective of the Sustainability Development Goals (SDGs). Section Five presents two examples that serve to deepen our understanding of slow violence: the cases of acquisition and exploitation of fossil fuels in Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. Sections Six and Seven describe the spatiotemporal characteristics of slow violence, and draw attention to three key moves that can prevent various forms of slow violence from escalating: on-shoring, scientific research on critical zones, and the vertical pure gift. In conclusion, the article suggests that renovating the idea of traditional spatiotemporal recognition is necessary to elevate Peace Studies to Planetary Peace Studies.

In all, 63 years have passed since the official recognition of the Minamata disease, but its problems still remain unresolved. After clarifying the historical formation process behind the problems and the structural discrimination executed by the national government and the perpetrator, Chisso, I have proposed a new system, which I believe will significantly contribute to peace studies.

In this study, I have investigated the real-life conditions of an uncertified patient of the fetal Minamata disease generation on the basis of his life history and support circumstances. Owing to his aggravating symptoms, declining of ADL, and the aging of his family, the patient and his family are now facing nursing-related issues. My study aims at elucidating the shortcomings of the national governmentʼs certification system and the issues in the Minamata Cityʼs social welfare system.

In Section 1, I have summarized the status and conditions of patients with fetal and infantile Minamata disease and discussed uncertified patients. Further, I have reported the characteristics of the patients diagnosed with Minamata disease.

In Section 2, I have examined the cityʼs welfare systems for people with disabilities. Moreover, after officially recognizing the Minamata disease, the primary issue with respect to who would shoulder the responsibility of supporting the lives of patients with Minamata disease became crucial. Hence, Hashimoto Hikoshichi, the then mayor, appealed to the national government to shoulder the responsibility of these patients; however, this appeal was not accepted. Therefore, Minamata City was compelled to open Meisuien, a privately operated public facility. Furthermore, I have interviewed uncertified patients of the fetal Minamata disease patient generation and their families to comprehend their social environments.

In Section 3, Table 2 illustrates the numerous challenges encountered by Minamata City. I have introduced two events that make it difficult to maintain athome life with the welfare service for disabled people. I then highlight the harsh conditions that people with disabilities, including uncertified patients, face under Minamataʼs welfare system, alongside struggling to maintain their lives at home. In addition, I have concluded the study by providing an assessment of the Minamata disease certification system and suggesting improvements in the welfare service to resolve the issues related to Minamata disease.