Why, in the contemporary Japanese governmental structure, is the Religious Affairs Division located within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology? To answer this question the present article explores the historical development of the arguments used by the Ministry of Education to justify it exercising jurisdiction over religions.

The article first examines developments in the second decade of the Meiji era, when conflict arose between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Education regarding jurisdiction over religious schools. This dispute was resolved provisionally through a political decision by the chief government minister, the Daijōdaijin. The article next focuses on the third decade of the Meiji era, when the issue came up again in the midst of social and diplomatic change. At this time the Ministry of Education developed arguments in support of it exercising jurisdiction over not only religious schools but also religious organizations.

The final section of the article examines more closely the distinctive features of the Ministry of Education's arguments. In contrast to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which saw the administration of religious matters as an extension of the administration of temples and shrines, the Ministry of Education argued that religious matters should fall within the same category as the administration of matters concerning art, schools, and education.

This paper focuses on how the understanding of the Tannishō by members of the Kōkōdō, especially Akegarasu Haya, is reflected in Kurata Hyakuzō's Shukke to sono deshi, which takes that scripture as its basis. Akegarasu, Tada Kanae, and Sasaki Gesshō—the so-called “three crows” of the Kōkōdō—each produced images of Shinran that also served as explorations of the concept of selfhood. Akegarasu and Tada's readings of Tannishō emphasize the awareness of self-guilt and emphasis on “absolute other power.” These attitudes appear strongly in their representations of Shinran, where he is presented as confessing his own ignorance and evil. Sasaki's biography of Shinran also emphasizes these elements. These images of Shinran have points in common with the image of Shinran in Shukke to sono deshi.

However, on a very fundamental point—the good or evil of Shinran—Shukke to sono deshi is significantly different from Akegarasu's reading of the Tannishō. Shinran in Shukke to sono deshi aims toward goodness, and seeks after the realization of the ideal of birth in the Pure Land as a fulfillment of the nenbutsu (a “prayer,” or good act). Kurata regarded Shinran as a good person and draws a unique image of a Shinran who earnestly aspires to goodness.

Kurata could not rely on the ideal of Christian love or “absolute other power,” and he created the image of a Shinran who strives to be better.

Nāgārjuna, who established the philosophy of emptiness, denied the existence of essentia; however, he did not explain existentia clearly. In other words, though he denied the unique nature of each individual independent of anything else, he did not give an adequate explanation of the presence of the individual. This study considers why the existence of the individual as emptiness is actually occurring in reality, as explained in “the Tattvārthapatala” of the Bodhisattvabhūmi by Asanga, in order to suggest the correct comprehension of the property of emptiness.

In doing so, the relationship between recognition and vastu will be considered by focusing on the term vastu, which combines the aspect of the ultimate nature of all things (which is the ultimate truth of the philosophy of emptiness) and the aspect of the underlying basis of linguistic expression of the individual.

Through considering the relationship between vastu and recognition, the basis of the emergence of the individual will be discussed. The conclusion is that the relationship between the individual and vastu is non-committal, and that the individual is separated from absolute reality by a name—recognized as a specific entity that is separated from other things. It will be found that this phenomenon is a temporary situation. In other words, in terms of “the Tattvārthapatala” of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the eternal, immortal vastumātra is alive in the phenomenon of individuality.

Meister Eckhart redet an verschiedenen Stellen über eine Kraft in der Seele. Diese Kraft, die Gott in seinem bloßen Wesen erfasst, lässt sich als Intellekt verstehen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll diese von der Kirche als häretisch verurteilte Lehre ausgelegt werden.

Eckhart zufolge kann man das Erkennen mit der Substanz Gottes identifizieren: Das Erkennen als solches ist unerschaffbar (intelligere est increabile). Es ist aber zu unterscheiden zwischen dem Erkennen als Grundlage des göttlichen Daseins und dem Erkennen als Tätigkeit der Geschöpfe. Der Mensch erkennt zwar mit dem Intellekt; diese Tätigkeit bestimmt ihn jedoch nicht. Daraus folgt: Unser Intellekt als Intellekt ist von aller näturlichen Bestimmung befreit, hat kein Sein, das dem näturlichen Seienden zukommt. Dieser Lehre von der „Seinslosigkeit“ unseres Intellekts liegt das Verständnis zugrunde, dass der Intellekt die Dinge in ihren Ursprüngen erkennt, im Erkennen Gottes. Die Offenheit zu Gott, die unserem Intellekt zuerkannt wird, weist uns darauf hin, dass er das Abbild der reinen Substanz Gottes ist.