The purpose of this paper is to clarify the differences between Augustine’s concept of free will （arbitrium voluntatis） and the Stoic concepts of hormē （ὁρμή） and prohairesis （προαίρεσις）. First, based on prior research, we confirmed that Augustine generally uses the term voluntas （will） interchangeably with the Stoic hormē, and the term arbitrium （choice） as roughly equivalent to Epictetus’ prohairesis. Second, we focused on how human freedom is secured against fatalism or divine foreknowledge to reveal differences between Augustine and Stoics. The analysis shows that, while Epictetus does not assign priority or value to things indifferent （adiaphora, ἀδιάφορα）, Augustine, like earlier Stoics, acknowledges distinctions of value among them. This is likely because Augustine did not directly adopt the concept of prohairesis from Epictetus but instead received it indirectly through Aulus Gellius. Furthermore, a key difference between the Stoics and Augustine is that, while there are similarities in the explanations of the psychological processes leading to action, Augustine develops a unique interpretation regarding the compatibility of free will with determinism. This difference marks a significant departure from Stoic philosophy, illustrating Augustine’s distinctive approach to reconciling the concept of free will with divine providence.

While Henry of Ghent’s defense of the real identity of esse and essentia against Giles of Rome is well documented, scholars have overlooked how this debate stemmed from his distinctive interpretation of ‘est.’ Through analyzing Quodlibet X, q. 7, where Henry reconciles the doctrine of real identity with creation from nothing, this paper examines the true implications of his position.

Henry rejects his opponent’s view of esse as a ‘form actualizing essentia,’ arguing that such a view would require essentia to pre-exist creation as a substrate receiving such form. This would make creation not a production from nothing, but rather a production based on the potentiality inherent in essentia. Therefore, esse must not be understood as something inherent in essentia as a form or act, but rather as something that merely indicates a relation with God as the cause. Henry explains this mode of esse’s presence in essentia using the term “external participation.” Esse is not “possessed” as a proper nature impressed upon essentia, but merely indicates the status of essentia as “being created by God as its cause” through its relation to God who exists external to the essentia. This understanding leads Henry to incorporate the notion of divine causation into the meaning of ‘est’ itself, marking a fundamental departure from his opponent’s position.

Cette étude vise à remettre en question la distinction binaire entre les approches confessionnelles et non confessionnelles, fréquemment utilisée dans les travaux consacrés à l’enseignement religieux. Dans certaines recherches européennes, le terme « confessionnel » est employé de manière générale comme synonyme de « denominational », mais en réalité, ces qualificatifs peuvent être clairement distingués : l’un consiste en principe à éduquer la foi, tandis que l’autre signifie simplement que le contenu de l’enseignement est centré sur un culte déterminé. La prise en compte de ces nuances est essentielle afin d’analyser le sens du terme « non confessionnel », considéré comme l’opposé de « confessionnel », dans le contexte d’aujourd’hui où l’enseignement religieux est de plus en plus en voie de « déconfessionnalisation ». L’Alsace-Moselle en est un cas typique : là-bas, ce sont les représentants religieux eux-mêmes qui définissent leur enseignement comme « non confessionnel ». Cette situation témoigne d’une diversification de l’enseignement religieux « non confessionnel », où l’enseignement peut être qualifié de « non confessionnel » dès lors qu’il abandonne son caractère « confessionnel », quel que soit l’organisme qui le propose.

Jikigyō Miroku （1671-1733）, an ascetic who belonged to the Kakugyō school of Fuji worship, wrote several short texts in the six months between his last major work and his suicide on Mount Fuji. These shorter works, although miscellaneous, have developed from his three main publications. While it is difficult to arrange these shorter texts in chronological order, they can be said to comprise a fourth major work of Jikigyō. One of these shorter texts contains a plea to a friend. Jikigyō asked his friend to bring two scrolls of inscriptions of Mt. Fuji that he had written himself to the shogunate through his daughter, so that they could be shown to the emperor and the shogun. The inscriptions were placed in four boxes and passed from owner to owner. More than fifty years later, they were brought to the elder statesman （rōjū） Matsudaira Sadanobu. Shōgun Tokugawa Ienari saw them and returned them, but the owner, Tanabe Jūrōemon, a religious master （oshi）, was later criticized by the Fuji-kō parishioners for his handling of the boxes. Currently, the whereabouts of the four boxes are unknown, but Jikigyō’s request has been partly fulfilled.

This article delves into the prewar evolution of the concept of shūyō （self-cultivation） in the ideology of Zen lay practitioner Katō Totsudō （1870-1949）. The analysis centers on the discourse present in his work Shūyōron （1909）, the late Meiji periodical Seishin shūyō, and its successor journal Shinshūyō, which continued into the Taisho period. As the notion of shūyō gained traction in the self-improvement realm of the 1890s and 1900s, Totsudō deliberated on autonomous shūyō as a means of refining one’s character to contribute to the nation’s prosperity. In the Taisho era, Totsudō responded to national imperatives by introducing a new facet to popular education, labeling it as “constitutional cultivation” （rikkenteki shūyō）―a response to Emperor Meiji’s legacy, to the public focus on kokutai fueled by the Southern-Northern Courts Controversy, and to the influence of Taisho Democracy. He adjusted his explanation of shūyō accordingly. In essence, he sought to nurture a civilized citizenry while upholding the principles of the “Family State.” Thus, this transition between the Meiji and Taisho periods signifies a shift from autonomous shūyō to shūyō as an instrument of the Imperial State.