When it comes to pinpointing the key concept that guides Takeuchi Yoshinori’s thought and gives it its direction, we can say, I think, that it is the idea of trans- descendence.
Takeuchi’s research covers Shinran’s Kyogyōshinshō, Early Buddhism, Philosophy of Religion, Phenomenology of Religion, etc., and the idea of trans-descendence resonates, while changing its form, in all these fields, as it were, as the carrying bass note.
Takeuchi himself, however, stops at suggesting this concept, without formally discussing it. Therefore it gives the impression of floating in Takeuchi’s thought world, a bit like an iceberg the bulk of which is hidden under the water surface. I would like, therefore, to examine how it appears in each of the above mentioned fields and, by joining these forms together, to bring out the main motives of Takeuchi’s thought.
The concept of Trans-descendence was first used by Jean Wahl. Takeuchi borrowed the term from him, but gave it a different meaning. In Jean Wahl the term denotes a descent into a level of deep experience that opens up reality, as seen in artists; Takeuchi uses it to signify a deepening of the awareness of the human finitude. He attempts, namely, with the help of this concept, to clarify the nature of the transcendence, which opens up through the self-awareness of finitude.
Ordinarily, the attention to human finitude is thought to lead away from transcendence or even to negate it. There is, however, a transcendence that stands by being negated. Such a transcendence is what Takeuchi calls “trans-descendence (inverted transcendence).” This transcendence does not obtain by going beyond the finite; it opens up in the midst of the self-awareness of finitude. In order to show the special nature of this transcendence, Takeuchi often contrasts it with the “transcendental” standpoint. If the transcendental standpoint consists in having a foothold in the topical opening that reveals itself at the bottom of the existence of the self, according to Takeuchi, the particularity of the transcendence that is trans-descendence is to be found in grasping the existence of the self in the encounter with a “Thou,” that breaks through that topical expansion and comes from the other side of it.
Takeuchi attempts to show this transcendence, which opens up in the self-awareness of finitude, in the fields of the Philosophy of Religion, Early Buddhism, Shinran’s thought, and so on. How would it be grasped in each of these fields?

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In the system of Watsuji’s Ethics, totality is given priority over individuality. Yet individuality is highly valued in his essays on fine arts and culture. Although Kyubun TANAKA and Sumihiko KUMANO have each tried to revive Watsuji’s Ethics as a theory of cultural pluralism, they ended up criticizing Watsuji. After discussing these two contemporary interpretations, I attempt in this article to clarify Watsuji’s project for the construction of a new ethics after the end of the war. I base my interpretation on one of Watsuji’s post-war essays, “The Inspiration of Matisse.” Matisse’s novel style of painting, which was restricted neither by Western nor by Japanese traditions, appeared to Watsuji as an ideal example of a style that could serve as an inspiration to the Japanese. But the Japanese of those days lacked the spirit of infinite inquiry into another’s otherness. I argue that if “trust,” one of key concepts of Watsuji’s Ethics, is reinterpreted as such a spirit of infinite inquiry, this could provide a basis from which to construct a new theory of cultural pluralism.

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On a eu souvent tendance à insister sur la place privilégiée qu’occupe la question du visage d’autrui dans la pensée de Lévinas, au détriment de la fécondité de ses concepts économiques (la maison, la possession, le travail, l’activité, ...etc.). Certes, Lévinas n’a cessé de souligner l’extériorité absolue du visage d’autrui ; cela ne nous permettra cependant pas de considérer l’économie essentiellement égoïste comme secondaire. Au contraire, on ne peut retrouver le véritable sens de l’extériorité qu’à partir de l’égoïsme dans l’économie. D’où le principal objectif de notre article qui consiste à expliquer comment se concrétise le mouvement du moi économique vers l’extérieur.
Pour amorcer cette étude, il convient avant tout d’attacher de l’importance au concept d'œuvre qui est exposé en détail dans Totalité et Infini. Du point de vue purement métaphysique, on pourrait dire que l’œuvre n’est qu’un moment du mouvement égocentrique, dans la mesure où ce mot œuvre se borne à désigner l’acte de travail et ses résultats. Mais, si l’on remarque qu’elle peut servir un autre et se retourner contre son auteur, il faut se demander si l’œuvre ne met pas l’égoïsme en péril.
En effet, l’œuvre livre la volonté qui l’a produite aux volontés étrangères, ce qui implique l’ambiguïté de l’œuvre orientée vers les autres au sein de son égoïsme. Une des idées éthiques qui dépassent cette ambiguïté, c’est celle Œuvre en tant qu’orientation absolue vers l’Autre. L’analyse des caractères de l’Œuvre nous mènera à un nouvel aspect de l’extériorité.

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Nishida’s philosophy has often been criticized for overlooking the problem of history. In particular, his fundamental notion of “acting intuition” is often accused of lacking any element of historicity. The term “acting intuition” may lead one to imagine a kind of religious or aesthetic intuition that transcends the historical world in a mystical way. However, I believe that this sort of interpretation is a misunderstanding based merely on a superficial reaction to the term. When one carefully examines the notion of “acting intuition” as it is developed in the context of Nishida’s thought, it becomes apparent that this notion contains nothing mystical; in fact, it is thoroughly connected to the historicity of human beings.
Moreover, not only is historicity implied in the notion of “acting intuition” itself, it is in fact this very notion that provides Nishida with a perspective from which to reveal the historicity involved in several problems of philosophy that have often been treated merely ahistorically by philosophers. These include the problem of knowledge, the problem of life, and the problem of religion. In his later texts Nishida discusses these problems from the viewpoint of “acting intuition,” and he is thereby able to treat them in such a manner as to show their intimate connection with the historicity of human beings.

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