Izutsu has left works in different fields of Islamic studies, especially in semantic studies of the Qur’ān and in mystical philosophy. To clarify what aspects of Islamic thought he was interested in, I took up two mystic thinkers he discussed, namely, ‘Aynal-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī (d.1131) and Mullā Ṣadrā (d.1640). ‘Ayn al-Quḍāt offers two different points of view concerning to Reality, the domain of reason (ṭawr al-‘aql) and the domain beyond reason (al-ṭawr warā’ al-‘aql). A mystic wayfarer does not proceed to the higher realm beyond reason without receiving of divine illumination. Mullā Ṣadrā logically formulates the thesis of the fundamental reality of existence together with those of the analogical gradation and the substantial movement. His reasoning is supported by his mystical experience, in which he intuitively grasped that diversified phenomena of the world were different forms of manifestation of Existence as the sole Reality. Both of them in Izutsu’s understanding equally stress importance of mystical experience in their thought. In his last book on the Qur’ān (Koran wo yomu, 1983) Izutsu presents a unique idea that some passages of the Qur’ān can be understood as originating from the depth of consciousness, which is the main field of activity for mystic imagination. He finds a mystical aspect in the Qur’ān. In this way Izutsu’s study of Islam is characterized by his focusing on the mystical aspect.

This paper examines the place of Toshihiko Izutsu’s approach in Sufi studies. Non-specialists in Sufism seem to generally assume that Izutsu’s approach falls in line with mainstream Sufi studies around the world, and that Ibn ‘Arabī and the school he founded were subjects for Izutsu’s works, which has subsequently become a theme of primary interest in Sufi studies. These views are misguided, however. Approaches to Sufism may be classified as (a) sharī‘a-oriented vs. ḥaqīqa-oriented Sufism, (b) elite Sufism vs. common people’s Sufism, and (c) Islamic Sufism vs. universal Sufism. Izutsu mainly focused on ḥaqīqa-oriented universal Sufism as practiced by elites; however, the general understanding of Sufism among scholars in the Islamic world does not always share this focus, instead emphasizing the ethical aspects of Sufism, which are closely related to sharī‘a-oriented Sufism. Moreover, they devote attention to not only the elites, but also the common people, especially regarding tariqa and saint veneration, both of which are generally believed to have close connections with Sufism. Their main concern is Sufism in the Islamic milieu, rather than universal mysticism.

This article is a hermeneutical attempt to clarify the characteristics of the perspective of Toshihiko Izutsu’s philosophical semantics and its characteristics, which constitute the method of his “Oriental Philosophy,” while referring to his study of Islamic thought. After his return to Japan from Tehran for the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Izutsu developed his philosophical reflections toward the construction of his “Oriental Philosophy.” In developing his ideas and framework of “Oriental Philosophy,” it is noteworthy that while writing his major work Consciousness and Essence (in Japanese, Ishiki to honshitsu), he developed his interpretation of the Qu’rān from the viewpoint of his Oriental Philosophy, characterized by the multi-layered structures of reality and consciousness. His philosophical reflection is characterized by the theory of semantic articulation by language, according to which the state of the absolutely unarticulated reality precedes that of every semantic articulation of reality. After he was invited to the Eranos Conference as a lecturer in 1967, he delivered his lectures there twelve times for the fifteen years. Through his creative “reading” of the traditional Oriental thoughts, Izutsu attempted to extract fundamental patterns of Oriental philosophical reflection and to construct “Oriental Philosophy” semantically on the basis of the “synchronical structuralization” (in Japanese, kyōjiteki-kōzōka) of Oriental thoughts.

To place Tsunashima Ryosen’s thought in the context of the philosophy of religion in Japan, the study clarifies the development of his philosophy of religion with the deepening of his religious experience. Until 1903, his philosophy of religion intendedto elucidate the reasons behind the objective reality and authority of religious symbols created by subjectivity. However, as he began to feel the existential God in 1903, he considered such thought unnecessary. Instead, he aimed to verbalize the human conditions of the Son of God by means of Christian and Pure Land Buddhist ideas. Furthermore, he began to practice Christian and Pure Land Buddhist prayer. In this manner, he developed his philosophy of religion as a post-religious philosophy that utilized the philosophy of religion and religious traditions. To the best of my knowledge, such thought is worthy of being placed at the origin of the philosophy of religion in Japan.

How should the concept of justification, which was central to the ethical philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), be positioned in the religious context? In Christianity, “justification” means that “a person is recognized as righteous by God.” However, in Kant’s philosophy, it can be realized only through human autonomy. In that sense, it is somewhat different from the Christian concept.

The issue of “justification” has sparked controversy between Catholics and Protestants, since the Reformation in the 16th century. However, the adoption of the 1999 “Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,” originally by Catholics and Lutherans and since then by other Protestant groups, has largely resolved this disagreement.

Building on that “reconciliation,” this paper explores the possibility of a similar “reconciliation” between Kantian philosophy and Christianity by comparing the views of “justification” expressed by Kant and in the “Joint Declaration.” For Kant, “justification” flows from the ideal grace that enables human autonomy, whereas in the “Joint Declaration,” the grace of God itself provides the “justification.” But I argue that the difference can be the common ground for both at the same time. On that ground, I see the realization for reconciling the positions of Kant and Christianity.

This paper investigates the problem of atonement in the thought of the Russian religious thinker, Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov (1829-1903), who planned the task of universal resurrection, which is to be carried out by humankind and not solely by God. Several studies accused Fedorov of making light of Divine Grace. However, I argue against this view mainly from the perspective of the recapitulation theory of atonement, which was formulated by Irenaeus of Lyons and elaborated in the history of Eastern Christianity. Based on this theory, Fedorov postulated that the Deed of Christ continues through the activity of humans.

This paper also analyzes Fedorov’s criticism of some of his contemporaries’ Christological comments, such as Albrecht Ritschl and Leo Tolstoy. The analysis indicated that Fedorov considered Jesus Christ as the Son of God, who sacrificed himself for humanity’s salvation. Additionally, this paper discusses the implications of Fedorov’s remarks about Jesus Christ’s resurrection and the raising of Lazarus in the context of modern thought, especially Ernest Renan’s work. He was mentioned in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s famous letter (to Nikolai Peterson, Fedorov’s disciple), which motivated Fedorov to write his first work.

Overall, this paper shows how Fedorov responded to modern people’s skepticism and built a new Christology without renouncing its traditional framework.

This paper demonstrates and develops Peter Thomas Geach’s identity-relativism as an analytic theological theory that provides a promising understanding of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. According to identity-relativism, it is the case that the Father and the Son are distinct persons while they are the same God, for numerical identity is to be relativized by what is commonly called sortal concepts such as divine persons and God. To show the consistency of this theory, I proceed to the discussion in the following way. In Section 1, I provide an overview of what is called the logical problem of the Trinity and its solutions proposed thus far. In Section 2, I introduce Geach’s identity-relativism as a theory applicable to the Trinity, and show its notable advantage of avoiding both polytheism and modalism in solving the logical problem. In Section 3, based on an account related to counting Gods and its criterion, I propose possible responses to criticisms of identity-relativism and suggest the simplicity of God taken as a sortal concept. In Section 4, by specifying a logical mechanism that enables the compatibility of identity and distinctness between the Father and the Son, I argue that identity-relativism provides a superior explanation to the Trinity in comparison to similar theological accounts such as constitutionalism and the strategy of sameness without identity. Through this series of discussions, I aim to show how to be an identity-relativist about the Trinity, namely how to reconcile the Trinitarian theology with identity-relativism.

Il est de notoriété commune que le thème de la politique apparaît chez Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) dès ses premiers textes. Cependant, au travers du concept du « visage d’autrui dont je réponds » et de sa formule « Politique après ! », la politique est reléguée au second plan derrière l’éthique, qui est la première question philosophique chez Levinas. C’est pourquoi il nous paraît nécessaire de nous demander quelle est la place de la politique après l’éthique, c’est-à-dire comment la première émerge de la seconde.

Afin de répondre à cette question, nous nous appuyons sur son discours talmudique « Au-delà de l’État dans l’État » (1988). Levinas y définit la démocratie comme une incarnation de l’éthique, et non comme un régime politique. Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) a également traité le problème de la démocratie dans son texte « Le Mot d’accueil » (1996), présenté lors d’une conférence en mémoire de Levinas. Dans ce texte, il décrit la relation entre l’éthique et la politique comme un « hiatus » en se référant à la définition de la démocratie donnée par Levinas. Cependant, l’interprétation du terme « démocratie » par Derrida semble différer de celle proposée par Levinas. En effet, chez Derrida, la démocratie se conçoit exclusivement comme un régime politique à part entière, tandis qu’elle peut s’incarner dans la politique quel que soit le régime chez Levinas.