Socrates' theory of the 'Unity of Virtue and Knowledge' implies that in order to lead a virtuous (good) life, all that is needed is to know what a virtuous (good) life means. But Socrates was firmly convinced that the knowledge of living virtuously (hereafter called 'kowledge') can never be fully attained by man. Hence, the 'knowledge' in the context of 'Unity of Virtue and Knowledge' is a human knowledge (anthropinê sophia) which possesses the following double meaning :
One is the realization of the fact that man cannot attain the 'knowledge' concerning virtue (the Good); the other meaning implies that nevertheless and keeping in mind the above-mentioned realization, one should continue to strive after that 'knowledge'.
By the question, 'what is virtue' Socrates makes his partner in the dialogue stand in a non-daily, contemplative, critical-existential, spiritual situation quite different from the daily routine situation governed by opinion (doxa) and there makes him discover the 'human knowledge' (anthropinê sophia).
Because how to live the good life (virtue) cannot be known by man, the answer remains forever a question. In other words, the 'knowledge' how to live the good life (virtue) remains always connected with a question. In that sense, searching for the good life (virtue) and the intellectual inquiry into its content remains always one and the same thing. That, in my opinion, is what is meant by Socrates' 'Unity of Virtue and Knowledge'.

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It is very important to consider Herbart's educational thought in connection with aesthetic judgement. The notion of taste is not only one of the central ideas in Herbart's pedagogy, but also an important notion in pedagogy as a whole.
In the course of the development from “The Aesthetic Presentation of the Universe as the Chief Office of Education” (1802) to “General Principles of the Science of Education Deduced from its Aim” (1806), it looks as if the viewpoint of education for taste were receding or as if it were included into the problems of thought circle. However, Herbart keeps the viewpoint of education for taste throughout. Therefore we are permitted to consider the teaching and the training aim expounded in “General Principles of the Science of Education” in terms of his ideas on aesthetic judgement.
We may say, by way of conclusion, that education for taste is a consistent and original viewpoint in Herbart's pedagogy and that it constitutes a realistic attempt to promote the integration of our inner life.
We may interpret this attempt under the following aspects :
1. The premise of aesthetic judgement ;
2. The aim of instruction and aesthetic judgement ;
3 The 'solid moral character' and aesthetic judgement.

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This paper deals with the problem of the 'helping relationship' and tries to clarify the real position of Buber when in the dialogue between him and Rogers, he raises objections against the latter. The aim of our discussion is to bring into focus the peculiar nature of Buber's thought who takes a third stand between two positions-on the one side Buber's opposition to the indoctrinating type of the Zwangsschule-which he shares with Rogers, and on the other hand Buber's opposition to the Freie Schule leaving room for growth.
First, we consider Buber's argument that there is a limit to the proposal of Rogers who insists that a relation of equality exists between the giver and receiver of assistance (help).
Secondly we examine, rising up to Buber's human ontology, the problem of the attitude required of the assisting person through Roger's concept of 'acceptance' in contrast to Buber's concept of 'confirmation' (Bestätigung) of 'potentiality'. We discover there in the relation to the assisted person the confirmation of a power directed toward the realization of truth (Wahrheit) as the basic attitude of the assisting person.

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