This paper proposes that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's theory of phenomenology is an effective approach to issues related to body and learning in the philosophy of education. The body has been the focus of much educational research because it assumes the role of “subject” in communicating, teaching, and learning. However, treating the body as subject may not be the best way to describe the work of the body because it presupposes the dualism of subject and object.  This paper investigates the concept of an “embodied agent” instead of that of the “body subject.” The notion of an embodied agent, which addresses the way we actively belong to the world, was defined by Nick Crossley, a sociologist who developed the phenomenological theory of Merleau-Ponty in a sociological context in order to’ challenge the philosophical difficulty associated with the subject—object dichotomy. Regarding the body as an embodied agent leads to the proposition that the agent works as a “social body” which learns according to its particular situation and through continuing correspondence with others. The embodied agent also works as a “cognitive body” which not only improves the abilities of its own single body, but also has the potential to transform the relationship between itself and the world or environment in which the agent is immersed.  Merleau-Ponty’s insight reveals that the body provides ways of comprehending the meanings of the world. This, in turn, elucidates the active work of the body in communicating, teaching, learning, and other educational activities.

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 The purpose of this paper is to point out the significance of the idea of “moralization” in Kant’s On Education. This idea is linked with his practical philosophy, and is of great help to understand his view on cosmopolitan education.  Previous studies, however, have not shown that linkage because there has been a considerable difficulty in interpreting On Education. As this book was published after Kant’s death, past studies have pointed out the contradictions or differences between its content and Kant’s other practical philosophy, especially his Critique of Practical Reason. Under this circumstance, On Education has been given a negative estimate.  In this paper, 1 propose that On Education has a great innate value, and has its own position in the system of Kant’s critical philosophy. A clear understanding about the details of “moralization” in Kant’s theory of education not only leads to a realization of the linkage between Kant’s critical philosophy and On Education, but also promotes a better understanding of Kant’s cosmopolitan education. “Moralization” contains two important components, the first being the idea of “to think yourself (Selbstdenken),” and the second being is that of “to think critically.” These two components are not only the basis of Kant’s critical philosophy, but also correspond closely with his standpoint of cosmopolitanism. Previous studies missed this point, and On Education was regarded, at least by itself, as unimportant, This paper thus shows the new value of Kant’s On Education by interpreting “moralization” as both “the cultivation of reason” and “cosmopolitan education.”

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 Sowohl von Dilthey als auch von vielen positivistischen Psychologen ist scharfe Kritik an der Psychologie von Johann Friedrich Herbart geübt worden. Dilthey kritisierte einerseits, dass Herbarts Psychologie mechanistisch konstituiert sei und ein wirkliches Leben des Menschen nicht verstehen könne. Die positivistischen Psychologen behaupteten andererseits, dass seine Psychologie zwar mechanistisch, aber nicht genug emipirisch charakterisiert sei, um psychische Tatsachen als Mechanismus interpretieren zu können. Beide Ansichten scheinen zwar richtig zu sein, aber sie ignorieren ein romantisches Motiv, das eine wichtige Rolle in Herbarts Psychologie spielt und von der mechanistischen Erklärung nicht klar verstanden wird. Das ist die symbolische Funktion der „Kugel“.  Generell wurde Herbarts Psychologie in den pädagogischen Forschungen der letzten Jahren vernachlässigt. In ihnen wurden die romantischen Schriften seiner früheren Zeit als wichtig erachtet, und die psychologischen Schriften seiner späteren Zeit unterschätzt. Meiner Ansicht nach sollten seine letzten Schriften als relevant angesehen und analysiert werden, da das oben genannte romantische Motiv in ihnen genau erwähnt ist.  In seinen psychologischen Schriften vergleicht Herbart die Konstruktion von Begriffen mit der Konstruktion der „Kugel“. Auch in seinen pädagogischen Schriften stellt er die Aufgabe des Erziehers als Konstruktion der „Kugel“ dar, d. h. als Konstruktion der „gleichschwebenden Vielseitigkeit” des „Interesses”. Warum rückt Herbart die symbolische Funktion der „Kugel” ins Zentrum seiner Psychologie und Pädagogik ? Ein Relevanter Grund dafür scheint mir zu sein, dass er dadurch das „Sollen” innerhalb des „Seins” aus seiner „Pädagogisher” Perspektive vorstellen wollte.

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 Am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts erschien eine Reihe von Versuchen, die man „Gedächtniswissenschaft“ nennen kann. In enger Beziehung dazu hat Sigmund Freud die Probleme der Kindheit behandelt und seine Entwicklungstheorie entfaltet. Er hat eine Position eingenommen, in der sich die Probleme des Gedächtnisses und die der Entwicklung miteinander kreuzen. Dort hat Freud keine einfache Entwicklungstheorie versucht, sondern eher eine anti-entwicklungstheoretische Entwicklungstheorie.  Dieser Beitrag zielt darauf ab, diese Theorie Freuds als anti-entwicklungstheoretische Entwicklungstheorie herauszukristallisieren, indem die Konzeption des „seelischen Apparates” und des Begriffes „Nachträglichkeit“ überprüft wird. Sich mit den Gedächtnisproblemen beschäftigend, entwickelte Freud die Konzeption des „seelischen Apparates”. Hierbei sah er die „Nachträglichkeit“ als eigene Zeitlichkeit im Zwischenbereich von Gedächtnis und Entwicklung an. Der Kern der Theorie Freuds, die sich auf eine allgemeine Entwicklungstheorie nicht zurückführen lässt, besteht aus zwei Momenten, d.h. der „kleinen Maschine“ einerseits, und der „entstellten Zeit“ anderseits. Um die antientwicklungstheoretische Entwicklungstheorie der „Nachträglichkeit“ zu analysieren, wird die Frage gestellt, wie der „seelische Apparat” laut seiner Theorie funktioniert, und wie die Zeit in der „Nachträglichkeit“ verläuft.  Im ersten Abschnitt werden der „Apparat“ und die „Nachträglichkeit“ im Zusammenhang mit der „Gedächtniswissenschaft” betrachtet. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird der Diskurs von Jacques Lacan erwähnt, der durch die Erweiterung der Problematik Freuds die Konzeption der symbolischen Maschine erforschte. Im dritten Abschnitt wird Freuds Versuch mit Lacans verglichen, um die charakteristische Funktionsform des „seelischen Apparats“ Freuds aufzuklären. Hierbei ist die „Nachträglichkeit“ als Zeit zu betrachten, in der die Grenese einer „Frage“ im „seelischen Apparat“ anfängt. Durch diese Untersuchung wird versucht, die besondere Zeitlichkeit in Freuds Diskurs und die darauf basierende Entwicklungstheorie aufzuzeigen.

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 The purpose of this article is to examine Joseph Tussman’s philosophy of higher learning, in which students are led from “docility” to “freedom.”  Tussman directed the Experimental Program at UC Berkeley from 1965 to 1969 and developed an alternative education plan for the first two years of college. The purpose of the program was to educate students to be “free” citizen’ of a democratic society. To be “free” in society, each member must participate in a system of societal agreements and be not only a subject but also a maker of the law. An individual must develop his of her deliberative potential. To this end, it is necessary to develop the “arts,” such as reading, writing, and discussion. According to Tussman, students failed to develop the “arts” because they lacked “docility.” The program coped with this problem by having all the teachers ‘and the students study the same materials. This common, compulsory curriculum was a necessary condition for the development of a “learning community” that helped students to develop the “arts.”  Tussman’s philosophy of higher learning has two implications. The first concerns the balance between college and university. At that time, there was a criticism that undergraduate education was neglected while there was too much emphasis on the research function of universities, Tussman sought to liberate college from the domination of the university and to provide a balance between college and university by emphasizing the education for “freedom.” The second had to with “participatory democracy,” for which, there was a growing call in the late 1960s. Tussman responded to the call not by admitting student contribution to educational planning, but by developing their “arts” for a democratic society.

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Since 1990's, a growing number of studies have dealt with the im. portance of citizenship education, backed by the active discussion oy publicness. In most these studies, citizenship to be educated is considered mainly from the point of view which emphasises on participation oy political action. However, is it not the case that publicness has its basis also in activities of mind, which are not necessarily political?  This paper argues for the public significance of nonpolitical thinking, and this argument is developed through examining the theory of thinking in Hannah Arendt’s later writings. A particular focus is placed on her view on the relation between ‘thinking’ and the ‘public’. Arendt points out that there is a tension between them, and stresses repeatedly that these two must not be confused with each other. That is because, according to her, thinking has non- and anti-political qualities. However, she overturns her own argument lastly, insisting that thinking is nonpolitical, and that it is therefore political.  Thus 1 shall make the following points. Firstly, shall make clear what Arendt intended by making a strict distinction between thinking and the public. In doing so, I explore her concern on this issue. Secondly, I shall ask in what sense thinking is non- and anti-political. | examine the three characteristics of thinking for which Arendt argued that is to say, its search for the general, its withdrawal from the ‘world, and its solitude. Thirdly and lastly, this paper will shed hight on why nonpolitical thinking can be political. By interpreting Arendt's accounts in The Life of the Mind and Responsibility and Judgment, I clarify the paradoxical relation between thinking and the public, This paper ¥ thus present one perspective to reconsider the concepts of publicnes .and citizenship.

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 There is a strong interest in the concept of the gift in the study of educational philosophy in, Japan, Satoji Yano insists that education as becoming should, on the level of individual experiences, be considered as “a pure gift” which demands no return. According to Marcel Mauss, the pioneer of ethnological research on “gift exchange” in Essai sur le don and Fragment d'un plan de sociologie générale descriptive, the act: of giving always involves receiving and re-giving. It is necessary to reexamine. the relation between Mauss’s concept of “gift exchange” and Yano’s concept of “pure gift.” In this paper, I make attempts to examine Mauss’s concept of “gift exchange” and to reconstruct his educational thought.  Mauss describes three characteristics of “gift exchange.” First, it occurs between groups, not between individuals. Second, there are three _ obligations in “gift exchange”: the obligation to give generously, the obligation to receive, and most essentially the obligation of the receiver to re-give. Finally, “gift exchange” is driven by the spiritual force which dwells in donated things.  “Gift exchange” is a total social fact which runs through education. In this paper, I discuss this point in examining Mauss’s view of education as tradition. Typically, through the initiations, the novice is given new language and recognized as a member of community. This is tradition, In other words, transmission in terms of the spirituality of things.  In tradition of Roman law, the Latin word res represented something that is not inert. Mauss explains that education is tradition of knowledge, while knowledge is to be defined as an animated thing. For Mauss, education is thus the reciprocal process of giving, receiving and re-giving convivial knowledge. It is not until things are woven in the network of “gift exchange” that they are associated with knowledge. That is the reason, I argue, why tradition of knowledge in education is none other than “gift exchange.”

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