Studies in the Philosophy of Education

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between J. S. Mill's utilitarianism and his educational thought. For Mill, utilitarianism must ground educational thought so long as it shows the purpose of human life.
The following points will be discussed in this paper.
1. The feature of Mill's utilitarianism is to introduce not only the first principle, “the Greatest happiness principle, ” but also “secondary principles” such as liberty and virtue. Each “secondary principle” has its own priority unless it conflicts with each other. Education and instruction are regarded as “secondary principles” as they enable people to learn the tendencies of actions. Education restricts the application of “the principle of liberty, ” which is one of the “secondary principles.” “The principle of liberty” affirms the liberty of “self-regarding” action, but nonage and children, who cannot act rationally, are not qualified to be endowed with this liberty.
2. According to Mill, utilitarianism requires moral education for its realization and justification. This moral education must be conducted by developing one's own individuality. The purpose of this moral education can be accomplished not only by providing systematic education, but also by using the forces of social institutions, public opinions, and religion.

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In recent years, “representation learning, ” which assumes that knowledge presupposes representation, has been criticized. In this criticism “Wittgenstein'sparadox” has been used to point out the logical impossibility of “representation learning” : as long as the notion of “representation” is assumed, the paradox would happen inevitably and spoil “representation learning.” However, the paradox HERE is considered to be merely a theoretical fiction for it does not happens in normal cases, and hence, does not spoil learning. In view of the criticism, this paper attempts to show, by analyzing elaborately Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations, that “Wittgenstein's paradox” can not be seen simply as a fiction. In Wittgenstein's rulefollowing considerations, the notion of “inner-binding” and that of “outer-binding” are crutial. The former is a disposition that is built through “training”. This disposition enables one to judge the “sameness” and to be convinced of the necessity of that sameness. The latter is “institution” that is established through the repetition of “peaceful accordance”. The two bindings sometimes do not conflict with each other.This is exactly the case in which rule-following operates.
“Inner-binding” has not been formed yet in an earlier stage of “rule” learning.Therefore “outer-binding” conflicting with the inner does not appear. But the two can come to differentiate themselves from each other as learning progresses and as the inner has been formed. The conflict between the inner> and the outer is equivalent to the case which “Wittgenstein's paradox” describes. Accordingly the possibility of differentiation exists latently and the paradox is not a theoretical fiction.
The latent possibility of “Wittgenstein's paradox” indicates that learners are not in a position to distinguish the two. This suggests that learning is uncertain and learning theories are not transparent to learners.

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