The taxation system of one country is an game rule of all economic activities in it, so is called one of main constitutional rules as its national government observes. But this rule is not always observed and kept by its national government, but always tax payers.
1. Certain groups or people have their own preferences about a tax system, some types and structures of taxes.
2. Tax payers, Political Entrepreneurs, Beaurocrats, opinion leaders and others have their own preferences about them.
3. These preferences about them are different from each other and the group who are for some taxes will be taken into one coalition members.
4. People will prefer a tax system which are free for them to choose oppor-tunities about time, manners, and soon about ways of tax payment because of their coalition.
These four are the basic points of this paper and then the analysis shows that these facts about these points exist really in Japan. So, this analysis will be simple fact finding ones, which show the characteristics of existing Japanese tax systems.
The view points, which are taken in this paper, are about the manners how tax-payers behave within it.

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The effects on public expenditures structures, which are brought about through political procedures, they say, have been analyzed with the typical public choice manner in Europe and the U. S. A. But the accurately considerable effects have not yet been observed in the structures of public expend-itures in Japan. Then this paper has this time the purpose to find and quantify it in Japanese structures of public expenditures, especially pref ectural expenditures concerning with social security programs for the aged, children and the poor.
The method to find and quantify the effect of it is the principal components analysis, which is refined to be dual steps for the institutional factors and for the political factors.
The results less show that the political factors make the effects on public expenditures by only about one percent of differences of public expenditures structures among all 47 prefectures in Japan.
Other expenditure items will be analyzed next time.

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It is sometimes argued that although Arrow's proof of the general impossibility theorem remains mathematically valid, its practical application will seldom be of much importance when a large number of people are involved relative to the number of alternative issues to be voted upon. Such an assertion is based, in part, on the calculation of the probabilities of there being no majority winner in a direct voting system.
However, real-world democracy is almost always representative (indirect) democracy, particularly when a large number of people are involved. Therefore, inferring outcomes of real-world democracies from the results of analyses of models based on direct democracies is not warranted.
This paper, first, proves that the proba-bilities of there being no majority winner are always greater under a representative than a direct democracy of the same voters and, second, shows numerically that the probabilities increse dramatically when an indirect instead of direct voting method is used, and suggests that the cyclicity of the majority decisions may well be the rule rath-er than the exception in most real-world democracies. Thirdly, it shows that the problem of cyclical majority arising under an indirect democracy is not related to the fact that the underlying individuals' preference orders of that society would produce a cyclical majority under a direct democracy. This absence of a unique preference order independent of the patterns that partition citizen-voters into electoral districts casts doubt on the rationale of direct as well as representative democracy. However, a direct democracy may have practical merit over an indirect democracy. Namely, the former have less chances of being confronted by the embarrassing problem of a cyclical majority.

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