In the provisions of the United States constitution the number of House members in each state is ruled to be reallocated on the basis of population shift every ten years. In addition the federal law requires the equal size of population in each district, and making districts is ruled by state law. However, redistricting had been delayed because of political reasons until the land-mark decisions were made by the United States Supreme Court in the early 1960 s. After the Baker vs. Carr case (1962) and the Wesberry vs. Sanders case (1964), redistricting drastically started from federal to local level.
There are several conditions for making districts, namely the equal size of population, minority voting rights, compactness, contiguity and the respect of county and city border. Among these conditions the equal size of population and minority representation are absolutely emphasizes while the other conditions are relatively ignored. This causes a serious problem, the so-called gerrymandering. Redistricting seriously influences the political fortune of incumbent representatives and the power of political parties. Politicians desire to draw the district lines in their favors, and party officials want to increase seats of their party and to decrease the opponent. Conflicts and quarrels frequently happens in the process of redistricting. We see often dead locks and confusions in the seasons of redistricting.
Redistricting itself is one of the most important way of realizing democratic electoral system. In reality, however, the contemporary American way of redistricting faces serious troubles. In order to maintain and promote democratic electoral system the rules and practices of redistricting must be reformed.

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A project is judged potentially worthwhile if, in terms of the discounted value of the future stream, its benefit exceeds its cost. The benefit may not be capable of quantification in pecuniary terms, while the cost will be measured in terms of the actual money cost of the project. Such a standard of judgment should be applied to programs to increase green in urban residential areas, provided that the quantification problem is solved by some means or other.
When a household chooses a residential land, it takes account of its neighborhood setting. Since the rent of a land is supposed to be a function of its environmental attributes as well as its site characteristics, the valuation of the environmental attributes of a household can be derived from the relation. The purpose of this paper is to utilize the hedonic approach to estimate the benefit of a tree-planting project.
Cross-sectional data for Nagoya City for 1985 are employed. A program to raise a tree cover ratio to the level of 20 percent is taken up. Indices of environmental characteristics including the ratio are reported at the elementary school district level. The results indicate that the benefit of a household is 12 million yen on an average and that the school districts' benefits range from 3 to 58 billion yen. The project seems to be worth undertaking in the sense that it may possibly have great merit, although the evaluation of the program with more confidence needs cost-benefit analysis.

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The aims of this paper are the making econometric models of regulation and tracing of cyclical regulating behavior. We shall not make a generalized model of regulation, but focus on the Japanese retail industry. Since the Japanese retail industry responds to regulation based on the law, we can easily investigate its characteristics.
As shall we show here, we can easily observe the cyclical behavior of the regulation based on Sam Pelzman's paper (1976) . According to his hypothesis, we shall set up the calibrating schema as follows :
The public decision-makers adopt policies in small shopper's favor when they are facing the economic depression, but if the economic situation is positive, they change to policies in the consumer's favor. Therefore the cyclical behavior of regulation for large retailer's location can be statistically observed in relation to shortrun economic fluctuation.
The outcome of the calibration and simulations indicate the presence of a cyclical fluctuation of regulating behavior adopted by public authorities and the presence of a time lag in it. Although these results are theoretically noted by Sam Pelzman's paper, the empirical tests are not provided there. This paper clearly supports them with a statistical evidence.

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