Philosophy (Tetsugaku)

A Proposal For Ecological Peace Studies

Soho MACHIDA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 9-25,L10
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.9

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The environment and world peace cannot be treated as two separate issues. Most existing conflicts are caused not merely by differences between political and religious ideologies, but by limited natural resources. Ironically, however, mankind has finally been given an opportunity to realize world peace, because unless we cooperate with each other, regardless of politics, religion, and ethnicity, we cannot find a way to survive imminent environmental crisis. Facing these threats from global warming, the population explosion, nuclear power, and so on, I argue that we must launch Ecological Peace Studies as a real fusion of the natural and social sciences.

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The Political Philosophy in the Era of Terror

Yoshihiko ISHIZAKI

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 27-43,L10
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.27

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In this paper I discuss problems of war and peace in situations in which war and peace are intermingled and compounded, such as the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and the war on terrorism thereafter.
Modernity can be understood as a movement which aims to overcome the supposed naturalness of a state of war and which ends by actualizing ‘the universal and homogeneous state’ in which everything natural is transformed into the artificial or conventional and in which even the political is eventually eliminated. Although the aim of this state was to produce freedom, equality, and peace, in fact, what is created is a kind of mechanism, something far from a genuine or lasting peace.
Today's world situation is only a new phase of the same collapse of modernity which we have experienced in the tyrannies of the 20th century, such as Nazism, Fascism etc. It is therefore a symptom of the crisis of modernity, prepared and enabled by modern natural right theories and social philosophies, and expressing their peculiar understanding of nature and power. This being so, we may be able to change and improve the world only by rethinking the modern understanding of nature, humanity and power, in a way linked with the insights of contemporary scientific knowledge.
I propose to revive classical rationalism in order to overcome this crisis of modernity, since it has the ability to remedy the faults of modern rationalism which led us to the crisis. This claim that we should revive classical rationalism is tantamount to the attempt to revive political philosophy in its original sense, and it amounts to asserting that political power should coincide with philosophy. Bearing in mind Leo Strauss's interpretation, I discuss the post-modern rule of the philosopher-king as a solution to today's distinctive difficulties.

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Problem of universals and the Avicennian influence on the medieval western metaphysics

Shiro YAMAUCHI

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 45-60,L11
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.45

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In 13th century, Islamic philosophy was considered the basic apparatus in preparing the way for using the philosophy of Aristotle. But during the latter half of that century, Islamic philosophy and the Aristotelian thoughts, which were introduced into medieval Europe through the translations of muslim philosopher's works (Avicenna and Averroes's books), was attacked by many Christian theologians. The most conspicuous assault was the condemnation of the 219 propositions by Bishop Stephan Tempier at Paris on March 7, 1277. The main points at issue were 1) the eternity of the world, the resurrection of the dead and the unicity of the intellect. These points were sometimes considered to constitute the center of Islamic philosophy, i. e. “falsafa”. In this paper, in order to reconsider the relation between Islamic philosophy and medieval occidental philosophy, I deal with the Avicennian concept “esse proprium”. This concept is the revisionary point to the Aristotelian ontology, and has the origin in the Plotinian metaphysics of emanation. Such a setup may provide us a new framework concerning the problem of universals, and furthermore the new approach to the reconsideration of the medieval philosophical interaction between the Islamic and the Christian philosophy.

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The Place of Sadr al-Din Qunawi in the History of Islamic Philosophy

Msataka TAKESHITA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 61-76,L12
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.61

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For the most of historians of philosophy, Islamic philosophy is associated with such great philosophers as Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd. For them, Islamic philosophy came to an end with Ibn Rushd. After the death of Ibn Rushd, there was no philosophy in Islam. However, what came to an end with Ibn Rushd was Hellenistic philosophy in Islam, called falsafa. After the end of Hellenistic philosophy, there appeared Islamic philosophy in the real sense of the term “Islamic”. The three currents can be recognized in the history of Islamic philosophy after the twelfth century. They are the philosophical theology, the school of illumination originated by Suhrawardi, and the school of the Unity of Being originated by Ibn Arabi. Sadr al-Din Qunawi, who was the most important and influential disciple of Ibn Arabi, tried to give a philosophical framework for Ibn Arabi's mystical speculations. Among Qunawi's books, the Miftah al-Ghayb was the most influential in spreading the school of the Unity of Being in Turkey, Iran, and India, and has been commented by many scholars. Although Qunawi's metaphysics shows many resemblances with that of Ibn Sina, there are significant differences between them. According to Ibn Sina, God is the intellect who intellects Himself. However, according to Qunawi, God's knowledge of Himself is the first entification (ta 'ayyun), selflimitation (taqayyud) of the Absolute Existence, which in Itself cannot be associated with any attributes including the attribute of knowledge. Although both Qunawi and Ibn Sina held the principle that from One, no more than one can issue forth, according to Qunawi, what issues forth from One is not the First Intellect as was claimed by Farabi and Ibn Sina, but the General Existence (wujud 'amm) which is shared by all the existents of the world

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Neurophilosophy as Materialism of Mind

the philosophical implications of the eliminativism against folk psychology and physicalistic reductionism

Kazuhiro TAKEDA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 77-95,L12
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.77

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During recent decades, brain physiology or neuroscience have progressed tremendously, hand in hand with computer science and artificial intelligence, providing much more knowledge than ever before about how the human brain works. Depending on this scientific background, a new philosophy of mind called neurophilosophy has emerged.
Neurophilosophy holds that the mind is identical with the brain. But this assertion is different from the mind-brain identity theories of the 1960s or earlier forms of materialism about the mind which simply identified a mental type with a brain type, urging for example that pain is (identical with) C-fiber activation. Neurophilosophy, as a new form of materialism about the mind, asserts that a mental state is (identical with) such and such an activation vector state of a neural network in the brain, described by a mathematical function (matrix) in vector space. On this view, identity/similarity/difference between mental states can be interpreted holistically in terms of the isomorphism/proximity/distance between the neural activation states in the vector state space.
Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland are currently the leading philosopers of this neurophilosophy. They especially emphasize that folk psychology (the view of the mind implied in common sense and first-person language based on introspection) cannot be correlated exactly and precisely with states of the brain. So they insist that folk psychology should be eliminated and that an exact and scientific account derived from brain science will be preferable. In my paper I introduce the Churchlands' neurophilosophy and examine some of its problems. My conclusion is that their form of materialism about the mind can be supported and accepted as valid. Indeed, I think it will surely contribute to the defeat of narrow rationalism and idealism and to the spread of a scientifically based philosophical perspective on mind and language.

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Brain Science and Mechanization of the Mind

Yukihiro NOBUHARA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 97-114,L13
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.97

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Brain science attempts to understand our minds by exploring our brains. What kind of understanding of minds does brain science bring forth? Is it fundamentally different from, or just an extension of, everyday understanding of mind? The aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between these two understandings. Brain science seems to mechanize our minds. It enables us to read or control the mind by treating the brain mechanistically. What, exactly speaking, is it to mechanize the mind? It consists, we may say, in understanding the mind in nomological terms. Brain science explores lawlike relations between brain states and through it attempts to clarify the relations between mental states which correlate with those brain states. So it is the aim of brain science to understand the mind nomologically. As for everyday understanding of the mind, we usually understand it in rational terms by grasping reasonrelations between mental states, though sometimes understanding certain aspects of it nomologically or mechanistically. Here arises the question whether it is really possible to understand the mind both in rational and nomological terms? If rationality is not reducible to nomologicality as Davidson argues in his thesis “the Anomalism of the Mental”, it is not possible to understand the mind nomologically as long as the mind is what is understood in everyday terms. We had better say that brain science, in fact, does not clarify the mind. It merely clarifies the brain.

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Two Sorts of Teleology

Spinoza's Critique on Final Causation

Jun OTSUKA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 115-130,L14
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.115

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In this paper we examine Spinoza's conception of teleology. His vehement criticism against the doctrine of final causation in Ethics does not necessarily entail total abandon of teleological explanation. On the contrary, he adopts in his theory of action an obvious teleology, which we can characterize as “nomological” one. Nomological, because it takes teleological explanation not as a causal relationship from telos to explanandum, but as a deduction from a certain law incorporated in agents. This view is developed from the concept of conatus, which in turn relies on Spinoza's particular understanding of causality and causal law.
In Ethics Spinoza not only criticizes people looking for final causes, but also diagnoses why they do so. He ascribes the origin of this tendency to our innate goal-directedness based on conatus. But in what sense? We analyze this claim by looking closely into his theory of emotion, and show that the concept of final cause is a kind of self-consciousness of one's emotion seen in hindsight. The fact that this subjective feeling can never become adequate knowledge will make clear why we should abandon all kinds of final causation, including one labeled as “thoughtful teleology” and cherished by some interpreters.

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The Explication of Will

Yusuke KANEKO

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 131-148,L14
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.131

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In this paper, I apply Davidson's formularization of action sentences in order to give logical forms to the class of sentences which state or describe one's having willed something (hereafter “will-stating sentences”). Of course, in my paper, I deal with will-stating sentences only in Japanese, but the translations of the sentences into English might be as follows:
(i) One would do such and such.
(ii) One willed that he did such and such. (This is a little awkward, but emphasizes the propositional attitude aspect of will-stating sentences).
(iii) s would F (where “s” stands for an agent, and “F” for an action-type).
These correspond to the sentence (1) in my paper.
In my view, formularizing will-stating sentences belongs not to logic but to philosophy. So the main arguments of my paper are written in prose (§§2-6), and in conclusion, they are arranged into one formula, that is, the sentence (18) in my paper, and the translation of (18) into English is as follows:
(iv) ∃!e₁[(e₁ is s′ conceiving something) ∧(T(e₁)<‹now›(c))∧(T(e₁)⊆D-Term(c))∧∃!e₂{(e₂ is s′ -ing his…as a basic action)∧(T(e₁)<T(e₂))∧(T(e₂)<‹now›(c))∧(T(e₂)⊆D-Term(c))∧(e₁ is the cause of e₂)∧(s believes that e₂ is a cause of F′)}]
Here “s” stands for an agent, and “F” for an action-type. “T” stands for the function which assigns each event the time when it happened. “‹now›” is Kaplan's character. “c” is the context in which sentences (i)-(iii) are used. “t₁<t₂” means that t₁ is a time before t₂. “⊆” is the inclusion relation in set theory. “D-Term” is Iida's discourse term. “-” stands for a basic actiontype, and “…” for a part of s' body. “F′” is the paraphrase of “F” into a corresponding eventtype (for example, if “F” is “killing”, then “F′” is “death”). For further explanation, see my argument.

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An Examination of the Three Major Responses to Jackson's Knowledge Argument

Yasuko KITANO

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 149-162,L15
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.149

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In recent decades, one of the most widely debated questions in the philosophy of mind has been whether consciousness is physical or nonphysical. Jackson's knowledge argument, which argues that there are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from physical truths and infers that physicalism is false, has attracted interest since its appearance in 1982. In this paper, I examine the three major physicalist replies to the argument.
I first clarify what the argument requires of physicalists: they must show that physicalism is as compatible as property dualism with the following two intuitions: (i) no amount of nonphenomenal knowledge suffices for phenomenal knowledge (empiricism about phenomenal knowledge), and (ii) the object of a piece of empirical knowledge is a fact. I next point out that there are two options a physicalist who accepts (i) and (ii) might take: (A) to refute the knowledge argument and nevertheless satisfy (i) and (ii); (B) to show that physicalism can accept the argument and satisfy (i) and (ii). In the final section, I examine the three major (A)-type responses to the argument: the Non-Propositional-Knowledge View; the Old-Fact/New-Mode View; and the Incomplete-Physical-Knowledge View.
The conclusion I draw is this: the first reply fails to establish the invalidity of the argument; the second fails to satisfy intuition (ii); the third succeeds in satisfying both intuitions, but only in a negative way. It therefore appears that (B) is the more preferable option for a physicalist to adopt.

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The Noble Lie and the Profitable Falsehood

Yasukiyo SAITO

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 163-178,L17
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.163

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In the Republic, Socrates says rulers may need to use a false story-a so-called ‘noble lie’ (414b-c)-or a false marriage lottery (460a), in order to persuade citizens to do the right thing. An apparently similar trick is suggested in the Laws by the Athenian to persuade citizens that the just life brings more pleasure than the unjust life (663d-e). He says there that even if the state of the case were different from what has been proved by the argument, the lawgiver would not be able to tell any more ‘profitable falsehood’ for the young. These forms of deception in the Republic and the ‘profitable falsehood’ in the Laws are usually assimilated, and taken to imply that rulers are permitted to make free use of falsehood. My contention is that they serve different purposes for Plato and thus should not be taken to reinforce the same conclusion.
In the Republic, the purpose of realizing the ideal state by creating the philosopher king, who has insight into the Form of Good, justifies the use of falsehood. But such a king does not exist in the state described in the Laws. It therefore becomes all important to persuade citizens and induce them to obey the laws freely. Plato is confident that his argument concerning the just life is true- and in addition, that it is one of his most profitable arguments. In the context of the Laws, Plato tries to achieve his goal by educating citizens to be virtuous through dialectical arguments. If all he wanted to achieve were their unquestioning obedience, he would not have suggested the possibility of the falsity of his argument (663d-e).
Whereas the argument in the Republic centers around the education and rule of the philosopher king, Plato's concern in the Laws is to persuade citizens towards the virtuous life through dialogue, which presupposes a basis of agreement and understanding. Plato's dialogue, the Laws, is intended to be the most adequate and suitable story for the young to hear, and, as such, is free from falsehood.

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The Ethics of Adaptation

on the un-evolutionary premises of Dewey's early ‘Evolution and Ethics’

Haruka SHIBATA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 179-193,L17
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.179

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The aim of this paper is to answer the following two questions: (Q1) How valid is the widely believed proposition that each agent (i. e. an individual or a social group functioning as an agent) should adapt to its environment? and, (Q2) If this proposition needs revision, in what way should we revise it? In order to answer Q1, we trace the historical lineage of thinking about evolution-ethics from Galton through Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley to early Dewey. This survey reveals that the widely believed proposition appeared first in that lineage in the early Dewey's ‘Evolution and Ethics’ (1898), and that it depends on the following two un-evolutionary premises: first, that if X is an agent, what is desired by X is ethically good to X (P1: a familiar form of ethical naturalism), and second, that the responsibility for X's adaptation (or adjustment) to X's environment should be attributed only to X (P2: the principle of self-responsibility).
Whether P1 is valid or not is too large a question to address in this paper, so we will suppose for the sake of argument that P1 is acceptable. However, it is possible to argue, both from evolution itself and from P1, that P2 is not tenable, and that a premise more appropriate than P2 is that whether the responsibility for X's adaptation to X's environment should be attributed to X alone, or to both X and X's social environment (i. e. other agents concerned with X), should depend on whether X prefers to take the whole responsibility or to share it with the social environment (P3: the principle of the agent's choice of responsibility scope).
Thus we can say, in response to Q1, that the widely believed proposition is not valid (at least as we have it from the early Dewey) because it depends on P2. And we can say, in response to Q2, that a more appropriate version of it will be based on evolution, P1 (perhaps), and P3 (probably)-though within the confines of the present paper, P1 and P3 obviously remain conjectural.

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Der Ort der Logik im Spätwerk Nishida Kitaros

mit den Begriffen “Leib und Selbstgewahrnis” als Leitfaden

Masato SHIRAI

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 195-210,L18
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.195

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Die Absicht dieser Untersuchung ist es, das Problem des Logos und damit das der Logik beim späten Nishida sowohl in deren konkreter Wirkungsweise wie auch in der sie begründenden fundamentalen Seinsweise zu verdeutlichen. Zunächst lässt sich der Ort unseres logischen Wirkens als “logischer Leib” im “leibhaften” Vollzug fassen. Der “Logische Leib” ist ein technisches Sein-ein Können, das weder Subjekt noch Objekt als Substanz hervorbringt. Von hier aus betrachtet ist eine Welt, die sich durch die Technik bildet, als solche eines substanzlosen, einmaligen “Faktums” zu denken. Eine solche Welt besteht in ihrer Selbstdarstellung, und zwar als sie selbst im absolut Anderen. Die “Welt als Selbstdarstellung” vollzieht sich aber als Welt der “Selbstgewahrnis”. Damit ist gemeint, dass unser Selbst sich selbst als perspektivische Spiegelung der Welt wahrnimmt. Die Logik bestimmt sich damit als Form dieser “Selbstgewahrnis”. Daraus ergibt sich, dass der Logos der “Selbstgewahrnis” als Spiegel der mit sich selbst identischen Welt das Moment der formalen Logik in sich trägt. Auf dieser Grundlage wird die Untersuchung weiter bis hin zu der Besinnung auf den Logos Gottes vertieft, der als absolut objektiver Ausdruck unsere “Selbstgewahrnis” ermöglicht und unser Selbst dazu bewegt, eine sittliche Haltung einzunehmen. Das Charakteristische des Logos Gottes als Ruf des absolut Anderen besteht darin, dass dieser ein relatives Verhältnis von Selbst und Anderem ermöglicht und als Macht der Negation unser Selbst wie auch die Welt erneuert. Im Innern der absoluten Negativität, dem sogenannten Wort Gottes, wird unser Selbst seiner selbst gewahr und etwas, das sich sittlich verhält.

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Méthode et vertu dans le Discours de la méthode de Descartes

Yoshinori TSUZAKI

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 211-226,L18
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.211

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Dans la deuxième partie du Discours de la méthode (AT, VI, 18-19), la méthode qui exerce l'esprit est conçue de telle manière qu'elle conjure les deux dangers intellectuels majeurs aux yeux de Descartes: d'une part, la crédulité qui signifie qu'on accepte pour vrai ce qui n'est pas vrai et qu'on s'obstine à croire ce qui est perçu comme tel sans aucune vérification critique. Dans La Recherche de la vérité;, Descartes met effectivement en cause le fait que «les hommes [sont] si crédules, qu ['ils appuient] leur science sur la certitude des sens» (AT, X, 510). D'autre part, it faut éviter l'incrédulité, c'est-à-dire la non-acceptation de ce qui pent être vrai. Elle est causée par un doute excessif, «nimia dubitatio» (AT, VII, 549), qui amène à suspendre son jugement et à rester irrésolu. Ces deux défauts étant dissipés, la méthode cartésienne procure à un sujet en quête de vérité la rectitude épistémique. C'est cette vertu intellectuelle qui, trouvant le juste milieu entre ces deux défauts, exige un certain passage, opéré par l'exercice ferme et constant de l'esprit. Cet entraînement progressif consiste non seulement à apprendre et observer cette méthode, mais aussi à en acquérir l'habitude (etos), c'est-à-dire la disposition (hexis) stable et stabilisée. De la simple présence, dans l'entendement, d'une perception claire et distincte, on parvient à l'établissement d'une vraie croyance, à la formation d'un bon jugement, et enfin à l'élaboration d'une science bien fondée.

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Reconsideration of Hume's theory of justice-Why can we understand the problem of the sensible knave?

Takafumi NAKAMURA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 227-246,L19
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.227

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Within Hume's moral theory, justice is held to be derived by convention, and this is often supposed to involve a kind of utilitarianism. But I doubt the validity of this interpretation since it overlooks the role of individual interest. On the other hand, there is a contractarian interpretation of Hume's theory, emphasizing ‘rationality’, which makes a compatibility between justice and self-interest possible. According to this view, the sense of duty is ‘feigned’ by all subjective minds which wish to secure a predictable ‘rule of law’ for the sake of their own interest. This position may be called ‘subjectivistic Humeanism’. Regarding Hume's theory as an ‘error theory’, it holds that ‘promising’ is an instrument to maintain a stable society for the sake of each member's interest.
In this paper, I argue that this subjectivistic interpretation is invalid and mistaken, because it misrepresents the background of Hume's theory of justice, seeing the general background of Hume's philosophy as a kind of anti-realism. I present substantial textual evidence to show that Hume does not endorse any general ‘subjectivism’ or ‘projectivism’, and I place special emphasis on the point that Hume recommended proper recognition of values by our moral sense, setting aside ‘superstition’ and ‘enthusiasm’. The aim of this article is to bring out the realistic worldview underlying his thinking and its moderation, and to demonstrate that it can accord with a liberal theory of justice.

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A Solution to Kripke's Puzzle

Hidetoshi NAGASAWA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 247-260,L20
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.247

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Pierre assents to both ‘Londres est jolie, ’ which can be translated into ‘London is pretty, ’ and ‘London is not pretty.’ Does he believe that London is pretty? This is Kripke's Puzzle. In order to create the puzzle, says Kripke, we need only the disquotational principle and the principle of translation, not the principle of substitutivity. But the principle of translation is also irrelevant, as the case of Paderewski illustrates.
Davidson calls into question the method of disquotation as an approach to the concept of truth, and his remarks apply to the disquotational principle above mentioned. It is the disquatational principle that brings about the puzzle. Davidson's holism suggests that disquotation is not the only way of ascribing beliefs. Therefore we are not in trouble at all because the disquotational principle does not hold. —a fact Kripke seems to ignore.
When Pierre moved to London and saw a part of the city which is not pretty, did he change his mind? We can treat this question in terms of belief revision. Pierre's ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ cannot both refer to the capital of England at the same time, given normal logical acumen. One of them must fail to refer to something in the actual world. Which does fail? We cannot decide. By the same token we cannot answer the question which of the two sentences is true: ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and ‘Pierre believes that London is not pretty.’ What, then, should we say about the puzzle? Our latitude of choice in truth value redistribution and the inscrutability of reference make it impossible to decide whether or not Pierre believes that London is pretty. It is ineradicably indeterminate. In this way, I think that the title of Kripke's paper ‘A Puzzle about Belief’ is misleading, since it inclines us to assume that there is a single determinate solution.

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The Concept of Care in Philosophy of Action

Seisuke HAYAKAWA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 261-276,L20
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.261

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Until now, mainstream philosophers of action have never taken seriously the fundamental fact that human agents are beings who care. Most philosophers have attempted to clarify the features of human agency mainly by analyzing intending, planning, and policy-making. In this paper, however, by introducing and analyzing the concept of care, I have tried to analyze human agency in the light of caring. Recognizing that the meanings of care are manifold, I focus first on one of the most central meanings of caring about/for X; if we care about/for X, we are continuously interested in X, and we consider X as important and significant to ourselves over an extended period of time. I then elucidate the distinctive features of caring by considering what kinds of patterns caring is embedded in, and explaining how these patterns are distinguished from the patterns that characterize future-directed intention, and particularly policy.
The common aspect between care and policy is that both involve a commitment to the repetition of various kinds of activities that concern their intentional object. However, there are important differences between care and policy. One of the essential aspects of policy is to fix the understanding of the object of policy, and to control beforehand the activities that concern the object. In contrast, one of the essential aspects of care is to deepen the understanding of the object by trial and error, and to change our activities flexibly, according to our developing understanding of the object. These features of caring enable us to recognize and understand the receptive modes of human agency, which mainstream philosophers of action have disregarded. We will obtain a more well-balanced conception of human agency if we analyze these receptive modes, as well as the regulative modes which most philosophers of action have concentrated on.

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How is Aristotelian Definition Constructed?

the distinction between horos and horismos in the Posterior Analytics B. 10.

Daisuke HIYOSHI

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 277-292,L21
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.277

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My aim in this paper is to make clear how a definition is constructed according to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B. 10. In this chapter, Aristotle explains how and how many definitions (horismos) are employed in his theory of inquiry, and grounds his analysis in the concept of horos. On my view, horos and horismos are different terms concerning definition, although both have been usually translated as ‘definition’.
I maintain that horos and horismos have each three features, as can be brought out by rendering one type of horos as (D1) ‘a name-like phrase’ (a phrase which signifies a thing). Based mainly on this interpretation, I claim that horos is the defining component which constructs an appropriate horismos, and that horismos is the practice of definition as providing an account of ‘what the thing is’.
A central reason for distinguishing the terms is the difference between the unity conditions of horos and horismos; while the former is a unity by being stitched together, the latter is a unity by revealing one thing of one thing (93b35-7). Moreover, we can find the same component (horos) both in the answer to the ‘what is it?’ question (e. g. ‘the noise of fire being quenched in the clouds’), and in the answer to the ‘why is it?’ question (‘because the fire is quenched in the clouds’). In these examples, another type of horos as (D2) ‘an account which provides an answer to the “why is it?” question’ yields the basis of causal definition and shows us the cause of the existence of the thing. A third type of horos (such as ‘noise in the clouds’) can be characterized as (D3) ‘the conclusion of a demonstration of what something is’, which requires our grasp of the existence of the thing in horismos (93b38-94a10). In this way, we can understand how the one cause reveals the unity of horismos.

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The Normativitiy of Moral Value

An Explanation Based on Constructivism

Satoshi FUKUMA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 293-308,L22
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.293

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Constructivism can usefully be seen as a view about normativity. It denies both that normativity is a constraint based on a fact which is prior to and independent of our stance (realism), and also that it is a merely causation originating in our conative attitudes (noncognitivism). It takes normativity to be a requirement which is derived from our rational choices and which is constructed by our practical reason. On this constructivist view, it becomes clear that normativity is constitutive of those who ‘are agents who make choices and judgments on the basis of reasons’. In this article, by examining moral judgments about the good from the viewpoint of Korsgaard's constructivism, I consider how it explains the normativity of moral value, and how it presents a possible means of dissolving the controversy between realism and non-cognitivism about moral value. First of all, I clearly specify what it is to be constructivist (sec. 2). Secondly, through examining a constructivist criticism of realism (sec. 3-4) and the rationalist theory about the good which constructivism advocates (sec. 5), I show that an important feature of the constructivist account of the normativity of moral value is that it emphasizes the procedure of making moral judgments in the light of our multiple agency. Thirdly, I set out what it is to be a reason-a concept which constructivism presupposes (sec. 6). Lastly, I reply to some objections to constructivism (sec. 7). In this article, I particularly take up G. E. Moore's realism and investigate onstructivism's explanation of normativity by contrast with this.

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What does the Last Wittgenstein's Continuity Thesis Mean?

Keiichi YAMADA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages 309-325,L23
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.309

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In his last writing, Wittgenstein suggests that the border between empirical propositions and logical or mathematical propositions is continuous (I call this idea the ‘continuity thesis’ in this paper). The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate what brought about this idea and what it means.
In the system of language games, just as the basic form of calculation cannot be mistaken insofar as far as it functions as the measure for other calculations, so the basic form of judgment cannot be mistaken since it functions as the measure for other judgments. However the basic forms of our language games are supported by various contingent and natural facts and therefore we cannot preclude the possibility that exceptional states of things which cause mistakes might change into ordinary states, and consequently our present scaffolding would break down. The doubt about Moorean propositions (e. g. ‘Here is a hand’) implies doubt about the background conditions or scaffolding of our ordinary judgments and to refuse these doubts means to refuse doubts about this basic form of judgments. In this respect Moorean propositions possess the logical status of a norm of inquiry which is similar to what mathematical propositions possess.
It was the encounter with epistemological skepticism that led to Wittgenstein's continuity thesis. And this thesis shows the contingency of our epistemic norms and implies that the hardness of the epistemic ‘must’ consists in the fact that we must start from this scaffolding when we see this world from within the world.

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Unsettled-Domain Utilitarianism

A Revision of Hare's Two-Level Theory for Application

Tetsuji ISEDA

2008 Volume 2008 Issue 59 Pages L25-L38,L23
Published: April 01, 2008
Released on J-STAGE: July 01, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2008.L25

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This paper offers an eclectic version of utilitarianism that is better suited for applied contexts than more familiar versions of utilitarianism. This version of utilitarianism, called unsettled-domain utilitarianism (UDU), is based on Hare's two-level theory, but the role of the critical level is significantly downplayed. In Hare's version, utilitarian critical thinking is used for choosing intuitive moral rules, but according to UDU, a utilitarian calculation should not be used to evaluate existing moral intuitions or to decide which intuitions to have.
UDU divides moral issues into two domains, namely the settled domain and the unsettled domain. The settled domain is the domain of situations and problems that can be dealt with by following existing moral rules, and the unsettled domain is the domain of situations and problems that cannot be solved by following existing rules. UDU respects the existing moral rules in the former domain, while it adopts utilitarian thinking in the latter. There are few alternatives anyway in this latter domain.
There are several expected objections to this position, and the latter half of this paper addresses these. To meet the criticism that UDU is too conservative, I distinguish between heuristic and justificatory contexts, and emphasize that a conservative approach is necessary in a justificatory context. I also argue that demarcating the boundary between the settled and unsettled domains is not a serious problem for UDU. To the criticism that UDU is too relativistic, I argue that even though UDU can be classified as a version of relativism, it does not have relativism's undesirable features. I conclude that UDU is a promising alternative, definitely more promising than it may seem at first glance.

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