Using a disaster ethnography research methodology, this study identifies both the tacit and formal knowledge which were at work in the news production process at TV-U Fukushima (TUF), a local broadcasting station, during its coverage of the accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. It also reveals, through the medium of questionnaires, the types of strains/stresses imposed on TUF as an organization, as well as on its staff.
The study confirmed the assumption that the residents who were left behind were not covered by the media at first, because the tacit knowledge gained from past coverage — don’t go near a failed nuclear power plant — kicked in, although it would be unfair not to mention that, under such circumstances, the safety of staff had to come first for any responsible, organized, journalistic entity. On the other hand, a tradeoff was made between TUF and its key station, Tokyo Broadcasting System, in terms of exposing staff members of both entities to the risk of radiation, suggesting that risk management protocols were working effectively.
Another finding was that the stress of possible exposure significantly hindered TUF’s coverage.
On March 12, 2011, almost all mass media pulled out of the vicinity following a hydrogen explosion at Unit 1. It must be admitted that the media failed to inform local residents of the probability of a life-threatening situation, virtually abandoning its duty to protect their lives and safety - which duty media holds as one of society's "disaster prevention organizations." Moreover, the principle, "journalism’s first loyalty is to citizens" (Kovach, 2002), was nowhere to be seen.
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